JPRS 77518

5 March 1981

West Europe Report

No. 1710

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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ERRATUM: In JPRS 77467 of 26 February 1981, No 1707 of this series, please make the following correction: In the article entitled "PCE Leadership Under Fire at Assembly of Intellectuals"

which begins on page 112, amend paragraph eight, line four to read...Fifth Congress of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] took place, ..., thus correcting the acronym and supplying its expansion.

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NEW ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEM MEI-80

Rome DIFESA OGGI in Italian Nov 80 pp 663-664

[Text] By 1986, the Italian Army will acquire a self-propelled, short-range, light missile system, the MEI-80. This system will complement the very short-range, self-propelled antiaircraft system, armed with conventional, multibarrel cannons, which will be acquired beginning in 1983. The MEI-80, with a maximum range of 10 kilometers, is capable of providing air defense for secondary mechanized and armored units against low and very low ceiling air attacks. The first prototype of the weapon system is planned for 1984. The MEI-80 (Italian Army Anti-Aircraft Missile for the 1980s) is based on research which had begun in the late 1960's, and can be classified as a light, all-weather anti-aircraft missile system, mounted on an M-548 tracked chassis, built by OTO Melara of La Spezia under FMC license. Each firing section consists of four self-propelled units designated Unit 1, Unit 2 (2 batteries) and Unit 3. Unit 1 consists of a spotting radar, IFF [Identification Friend Foe] apparatus, tracking radar and the apparatus for optical aiming and tracking, command elements for the missile's guidance, computation equipment, operational command equipment and the telecommunications equipment. Area coverage of the system is approximately 20 kilometers. Unit 2 comprises of two launchers with six ramps each for the Indigo missile, capable of 2.6 Mach speeds, armed with preset fragmentation warhead featuring both a proximity and impact fuse. Unit 3 consists of a fourth M-548 for logistical support, able to carry 12 extra missiles and capable of quickly reloading the launchers. The above mentioned firing unit can operate singly or as a battery command post capable of directing three to four firing units.

9209
CSO: 3104

LNG, ENERGY TRANSPORT DEMANDS SPUR SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Jan 81 p 38

[Article by Francois Grosrichard: "Favorable Prospects on Methane Tanker Market Provide New Opportunities for French Shipyards"]

[Text] La Seyne. While the years 1979 and 1980 were times of financial worry and featured a certain degree of commercial stagnation for the shipyards of La Seyne (Var), 1981 is beginning with brighter prospects. This in any case is the impression we get from the remarks made on 24 January by officials from CNIM (Mediterranean Shipbuilding and Industrial Construction) and especially by the company's president, Mr Andre Herlicq, on the occasion of the christening of the 130,000-cubic meter methane tanker "Tenaga-Empat," built for Malaysia, in the presence of Dato Paul Leong Khee Seong, that country's minister of mining industries.

The "Tenaga-Empat" is the first in a series of five identical vessels ordered more than 5 years ago by Malaysian International Shipping Corporation in order to move the methane--in a liquefied form--from the Bintulu field (in Sarawak) all the way to Japan. Two of them were built at La Seyne and three were built at the France-Dunkerque Shipyards. At the time, that order had caused quite a sensation because it underscored the prestige of the engineering techniques perfected by the French Gaz Transport company and because it was a rather considerable order for the shipyard (today, each of these vessels is worth between F800 and F900 million).

Unfortunately--and this is true of almost all liquefied methane transport chains--this ship and similar vessels, which will follow it, must, at the moment of their delivery, be laid up for a while in a Norwegian fjord, probably until the start of 1983, the date when the Malaysians will have finished their liquefaction plant at Bintulu.

1983 is also the target year for the CNIM order portfolio which grew appreciably over the past several months; the company employs 4,600 workers.

"Three Priority Requirements"

Here we of course have the contracts for the two passenger and mail cruise ships for the Caribbean, plus the ocean oil drilling equipment and, very recently, naval frigates for Saudi Arabia. This week we look forward to the signing of an order

for a drilling platform, to be placed off Norway, to be operated at great depth, north of the 62nd parallel. And the La Seyne enterprise is also going into ship repair especially with the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean as customer. If we make a count, we find that all of these maritime customers are foreigners and that there are very few French enterprises which concentrate all of their activities on exports.

Parallel to this, industrial diversification is becoming the rule at La Seyne since one-quarter or one-third of the company's business volume now involves so-called "shore" activities (missile launch tubes, turbines, escalators, manure incineration plants).

Mr Michel Denieul, the new director-general of the merchant marine, making his first official trip, took this opportunity to state "the three priority requirements which must guide the policy of our shipyards:

"Diversification and organization of big shipyards to get into the industrial and military markets of the future;

"Technical capacity, research, and innovation;

"Economic competitiveness through rigorous financial discipline."

The maritime shipment of liquid methane is undeniably at the head of the list of the industrial markets of the future and the strategic prospects. But, for the past 10 years, we have raised many hopes which then came to naught often for technological reasons (liquefaction plants) or due to prices (last year's suspension of certain Algerian shipments to the terminal in Philadelphia and, because of that, the development of a serious dispute on the biggest contract signed so far). The United States understood that and now has the world's biggest methane tanker fleet.

In July 1980, 16 vessels were ordered. Japan is in first place among importers, taking 56 percent of worldwide deliveries of methane, with Indonesia passing Algeria by in 1980 among the listing of exporting countries.

France is getting Algerian gas at Fos and Le Havre and in a few months the big terminal at Montoir will be placed in service along the lower Loire.

Right now, almost all shipyards all over the world are trying to get an order of which it has been said that it will be one of the biggest of all time. To ship gas from the Bonny deposit in Nigeria to the United States and Europe, we will as a matter of fact, within 3 or 4 years, need 17 vessels. Shell--which already has had an opportunity to appreciate the technology of French shipyards--will probably get responsibility for controlling maritime shipments.

Icebreaker for Canada

In addition to this matter involving Nigeria, large deposits of natural gas were discovered in Australia, in Malaysia, in Indonesia, in Cameroon, Trinidad, and also in the Arctic zones of Canada. By the year 2000, we are going to need scores of new methane tankers, including icebreakers.

On the basis of their experience and their top-level technology, the major French shipyards appear rather well placed when it comes to building extremely complex vessels, such as methane tankers (the gas is carried at a temperature of -160° and the ships, 280 meters long, have double hulls). Worldwide, there are only three patented technologies for building the tanks: two French, under Technigaz (an affiliate of the AMREP Group), Gas-Transport (a Worms affiliate) which, moreover, signed an agreement with the American MacDonnell Douglas firm, plus the dangerous Norwegian rival Moss. Certain company managers in this connection regret the fact that the engineers at Gaz-Transport sold their patent to something like 30 big shipyards (including some in Japan), thus offering the most redoutable competitors a chance to get at the contracts.

Today is not the time to say "Ah, if I had only known!" The essential objective instead should be at all costs to avoid inter-French competition. From that point it is only a short step toward the revival of ideas concerning an approach between one or the other shipyard or shipyards.

5058
CSO: 3100

NEW GAS-TURBINE POWER PLANTS PLANNED

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 5 Dec 80 p 1056

[Text] An additional total of 200,000 kilowatts will soon be available to ENEL's [National Electric Power Agency] network to help overcome the risk of blackouts, which are particularly dangerous during the winter period, when both minimum and maximum requests for electric energy are most likely to occur. This involves the turbogas plant at Carpi (Modena), equipped with two gas turbines built by FIAT TTG of Turin, whose first turbo unit has just been incorporated into the national electricity network. This new plant, finished in record time, joined the others, also built by FIAT TTG last winter in Alessandria and Pietrafitta (Perugia). These are all part of the initiatives taken by ENEL to rapidly build plants needed to confront the reduced reserves of the national electric system. Turbogas plants are particularly useful for peak hour demands (and for reserve), due to the fact that they can be started up and fully set in motion in very short periods of time (even in a blackout), be remotely controlled from dispatch centers, and be located in zones close to areas of peak demand.

Other characteristics which make gas turbines so interesting for specific tasks are: low installation costs, reduced size and lead time requirements compared to any other type of plant, absence of the need for cooling waters, automatic usage to correct distribution network faults, lack of smoke problems and the possibility of propulsion by either liquid or gaseous fuels. With the aim of attaining usage flexibility for this type of plant, attention is being focused on the eventual use of heavy liquid fuels as well as, in the long run, products obtained from coal gasification, research for which is presently underway in various parts of the world.

9209
CSO: 3104

NEW OIL CONSORTIUM DEALS WITH ENERGY CRISIS, EEC ENTRY

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 8 Jan 81 pp 1, 33

[Article by J.A.M.S.]

[Text] According to sources close to the government, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, and a very small group of associates are working against the clock on the final plan which will combine all government corporations of the energy sector into the so-called Spanish Petroleum Agency. This plan, which is being kept an absolute secret, could be completed within 2 weeks for immediate presentation to the Council of Ministers.

During the Christmas holidays, the group of experts now drawing up the plan received this assignment with instructions for the matter to be handled with "utmost urgency." According to our sources, this urgency stems not only from the seriousness of the present energy crisis and its future outlook, but also from the enormous division of organizations and corporations disconnectedly making decisions in Spain on oil-related issues.

The new Spanish Petroleum Agency, about which endless reports and contradictory reports have been written in the past, will combine all government corporations, ranging from oil and gas exploration to the final distribution and marketing of petroleum derivatives.

The final problem to be solved in the next few days is the status which CAMPSA [Leasing Company of the Petroleum Monopoly, Inc.] is to have after giving up some of its authority and slowly but irrevocably becoming a government monopoly without monopoly of trade, as required by the EEC for our entry.

The reorganization of the Spanish petroleum sector has been the subject of numerous battles between groups of elite officials and the respective ministers themselves--of industry, finance, commerce and transportation--fighting to maintain, if not to increase, their authority. Thus the Petroleum Agency has so far been a constant target for significant public and private pressure.

The energy crisis, negotiations with the EEC, the lack of coordination and the government's weak negotiating capability, caused by the division of oil-related decisionmaking centers, are the main reasons, cited in official circles, for working "double time" on the sector's reorganization.

The speed with which the issue is solved may also be related to the knowledge which the government's deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, former minister for EEC relations, has of community requirements concerning the petroleum monopoly and his previous experience as an oil contractor in the Rio Tinto Explosives group.

Prominent among the choices being considered, now subject to speculation, is the vertical integration plan, from government-controlled exploration to distribution, which could come under Enpetrol (Industry) or CAMPSA (Finance).

Enpetrol (National Petroleum Company) was established in 1974 through the merger of three large public refining companies: Repesa (Cartagena), with a refining capacity of 10 million tons of petroleum; Entasa (Tarragona), with a capacity of 12 million tons of petroleum; Encaso (Puertollano), with a capacity of 4 million tons.

CAMPSA was founded by Jose Calvo Sotelo, minister of finance, during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. In this connection, it has been remarked in circles close to the monopoly that Calvo Sotelo gave life to the company and it will be the job of someone else to take it away.

However, official sources have told EL PAIS that "the petroleum monopoly will remain as it is, retaining the distribution phase while giving up some other functions."

The second choice being considered these days is the creation of two large groups with vertical integration as well, from exploration to distribution, centered around Enpetrol (public) and CEPSA (private).

The Spanish Petroleum Company, Inc. (CEPSA), as old as CAMPSA, is part of the Central Bank group, in whose hall of honor also hangs the portrait of one of its leaders, Jose Calvo Sotelo.

11915
CSO: 3110

SEARCH FOR OIL TO BE INTENSIFIED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 7 Jan 81 p 6

[Text] Ankara--ANKA--It is reported that work is being intensified in order to meet Turkey's needs for crude oil in 1981. Talks with countries from whom Turkey has imported crude oil are underway, and contacts have been initiated at the committee level in order to obtain commitments.

According to information obtained by an ANKA [Ankara News Agency] correspondent from TPAO [Turkish Petroleum Corporation] officials, a delegation is continuing talks in Tehran so that a portion of Turkey's crude oil requirements, which were 13 million tons in 1979 and 17 million tons in 1980 and which are expected to be approximately 17 to 18 million tons this year, can be met by Iran.

TPAO Director General Firuzan Ardic reported that the Turkish committee that is holding talks in Iran is requesting about 3.5 million tons of crude oil from that country. In the meantime, TPAO officials noted that 3.4 million tons of crude oil of the amount committed by Iran in 1980 could not be obtained, and delivery has been extended to 1981.

TPAO Director General Ardic recalled that Iraq has guaranteed that it will furnish a significant portion of Turkey's crude oil requirements and stated, "Iraq plans to provide Turkey with about 8.5 million tons of crude oil this year." Ardic also reported that the petroleum will be transported through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline.

A committee will go to Baghdad next week in order to confirm the amount of crude oil to be obtained from Iraq and the monetary conditions for the purchase.

In addition to obtaining crude oil from Iran and Iraq, according to information provided by TPAO Director General Ardic, an agreement has been reached for the purchase of 900,000 tons of crude oil from the Soviet Union by way of Libya and of 2 million tons from Libya itself.

The TPAO director general noted that Saudi Arabia will be able to help Turkey on the topic of crude oil and stated that no progress has been made on the subject of procuring a proposed 8.5 million tons of petroleum from that country.

11673
CSO: 4907

KPOE PRESENTS DRAFT PROGRAM FOR 1982 PARTY CONGRESS

Austria's Road to Socialism

Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 28 Jan 81 supplement pp 14-20 (excerpts)

[Text] The goal of the KPOe is communism: The classless society where the well-springs of production flow so abundantly and the people have developed all-round to such an effect that the principle may be realized: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." The society where the freedom of each individual is the guarantor of the freedom of all, and vice versa.

Socialism, the first stage of the communist organization of society, is historically the first alternative to the system of exploitation, to state monopolistic capitalism. It is still the rule of a class: That of the working class and its allies. But, for the first time in the history of mankind, it is a popular rule, that is the rule of the majority. Its state does not serve to perpetuate class rule but to reconcile and gradually abolish the classes in the course of a long evolution. By the socialization of the means of production socialism removes exploitation and crises. In place of class privilege it adopts the guiding principle:"From each according to his abilities, to each according to his performance." The basic feature is the steady and planned rise in the material and cultural standard of living, the greatest possible prosperity and security, the opening up and development of all creative forces among the people.

Socialism--Consistent and Qualitatively New Democracy

The socialist revolution is the most democratic, profound and fruitful transformation in history. Freedom for capital always implies lack of freedom for many, dependence of every kind imaginable. Since the bourgeois revolution launched the great watchwords "liberty, equality and fraternity," they have daily been given the lie by bourgeois reality. The development of the workers movement is indivisibly linked to the appreciation that, in the final analysis, property and power conditions mainly if not exclusively determine the possible reach of liberty, equality and fraternity.

The bourgeois constitution promises equality before the law but takes no account of the social inequalities inevitably spawned by the bourgeois society--over and over again and ever more obviously. "Equal rights for all" are transformed meantime into the right of the stronger (in economic terms), a version of the law of the jungle.

Unable ever to synchronize liberty and equality, the defenders of the profit system assert that liberty and equality are irreconcilable opposites; more equality is bound to come at the cost of liberty. Liberty and equality are not irreconcilable opposites. The greatest benefit of socialism lies precisely in the fact that, within it, liberty and equality depend on one another and mutually advance one another. Freedom from social insecurity, misery, unemployment, exploitation, regimentation, misinformation or ignorance: Only socialism can guarantee these, to the extent that it alone provides the social, material and ideological conditions for greater freedom.

Socialism is not the "ultimate state." Applicable to it also is the maxim that the extent of freedom achievable cannot be greater than permitted by objective and subjective conditions: The stage of development of the productive forces, the cultural standard, the consciousness of the masses, the social structure, the conditions of the national and international class conflict.

Solidarity and human dignity--they arise to the millionth degree in the resistance to injustice, the arbitrariness of an exploiter system. Only a society free of exploiters can be carried by solidarity, the feeling of responsibility for the community, for one's neighbor.

In capitalism irreconcilable class antagonisms clash, social evolution prevails spontaneously, things and creatures revolt against man. By abolishing the basic contradiction by which a few privately acquire that which many produce socially, socialism provides the prerequisites for the greatest liberating act in society: That men work for the common interest, consciously, as per plan and humanely organize their lives on the basis of progressive insight in their living conditions; that by such relations abilities and needs, creativity and personalities of men develop; that the results of their actions approach their intentions. Material production in socialism is not an end in itself, nor the purpose of life: It is an indispensable means for a more meaningful life.

The issue of ownership is the basic issue of the workers movement. It absorbs the issues of justice, liberty, equality and freedom from exploitation. A central point is the conquest of power by the working class in order to deprive capital of its foundation, to snatch its privileges. No "third way" is possible.

National Features and Inevitabilities

Already socialism is wearing the colors of many nations. The greater the variety of the shapes and members of the state and political system related to the expansion of socialism, the more obviously do common features emerge from the diversity. While there cannot be inevitabilities "as such," remote from precise historical and national features, national features may exist independent of inevitabilities. It is at all times necessary to do justice to both. Consequently any "model of socialism" is bound to be unsuitable; after all, in a "model" one of the two is bound to draw the short end of the stick. Nothing can replace the creative application of scientific socialism and its general teachings to the prevailing national conditions.

From the aspect of the development of productive forces Austria is riper for socialism than any country at the time the socialist revolution was victorious there. In contrast to most countries where the material bases for the new society had to be created only after the victory of the revolution and often in circumstances of great

deprivation, Austria is in a much more favorable situation consequent upon its well developed industry, the large nationalized sector, a labor force and intelligentsia well educated for generations and its highly organized agriculture. Not that any of this guarantees an "easier road" to socialism, but it does offer a realistic base. Also helpful are the existence of a system of countries of developed socialism, the strength of the international workers movement and the liberation movements. Not least of the benefits are the experiences of other peoples--in the positive as well as the negative sense--for shortening and softening the birth pangs of the new society. No doubt socialism in Austria will have its own features, turn out to be socialism in Austrian colors.

The Economy at the Service of the People

Not even science allows us to make detailed long-range forecasts. The manifestations of socialism are largely decided by the conditions prevailing at its birth. Actually they are defined already in the struggles leading up to it. Taking into consideration long-term national features and general experiences, it is possible to sketch outlines. Public ownership of important means of production and exchange will be the economic base of a socialist Austria. To be nationalized are domestic and foreign corporations, banks, insurance companies, foreign trade and the wholesale trade in order to liberate the economy from the dictates of profit, remove exploitation and allow us to plan developments in accordance with the material and intellectual needs of the people.

The sudden and immediate transfer of all means of production to social ownership is not an inevitability, indeed it is an impossibility. Once public ownership of the important means of production is assured, the new state will be able in the construction of the bases of socialism to cooperate with small and medium private enterprises, so that they may contribute to the satisfaction of needs. The opportunities for such collaboration will largely depend on the attitude of these strata to the new order.

To be constitutionally protected in socialist Austria will be property generated by personal labor and its inheritability. The state will encourage the development of cooperative models in crafts and trade.

Large landed property will be divided up or transferred to cooperative ownership (state or cooperative ownership). Large forest property will be nationalized and handed over to provinces, districts and local authorities for administration and exploitation.

The state will encourage the development of agricultural production, purchasing, sales and processing cooperatives as an important sector of the socialist economy.

Merger into cooperatives--whether in farming or crafts and trade--must be handled exclusively on the basis of voluntary acceptance and mutual benefit.

Both the state and cooperative sectors in socialism differ profoundly from similar types of ownership in capitalism: The yield from their labors in part directly benefits those working in the enterprise, the other part goes to society as a whole. Exploitation has been abolished. Socialist ownership makes possible and in fact requires the progressive democratization of the working world. All managers in these

sectors are subject to constant democratic supervision by the elected representatives of the labor force and cooperative members. They are at all times required to report and account. The elected representatives have the right to help decide all issues involving planning, working conditions, the fixing of wages, norms and bonuses. The socialist principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his performance" is incompatible with either leveling or gross differences in income. The spread between the remuneration of skilled workers and management staffs in the economy and government is to be so narrowed that there are no incomes diverging a great deal from the average living conditions of the large majority of the people.

Socialization of the means of production enables us to proceed to national planning and management of the economy. The basic principle is that of democratic centralism. Each decision by the respective legislative bodies must be preceded by democratic and public discussion. Total planning must be coupled with the maximum autonomy of enterprises and corporations and provide for the independent decisionmaking scope of Lander and municipalities.

The goal of socialist planning is the broadening of an efficient material-technological base permitting stable and strong economic growth, growing productivity accompanied by a decline in hardships--as the prerequisite for the steady rise in the standard of living, the expansion of sociopolitical achievements and the development of a new lifestyle worthy of socialism. A crucial condition is the coupling of the accomplishments of the scientific-technological revolution with the benefits of socialism. The socialist planned economy permits and requires a fundamental change in financing: General taxation is radically reduced. The profits of the socialist sector of the economy represent the main source of state revenues.

The State of the Workers Power

Decisive for the socialist transformation of society is the workers power, the new state, the realization of a qualitatively new socialist democracy. Marx and Lenin described this new kind of state in scientific terms as the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Their intention was to underline the fact that--disregarding exceptions--the state is an organ of class rule wherever and as long as there are hostile classes. How much democracy is compatible with this rule will ultimately be decided by the predominance of a particular class. In the case of power exercised by the working class and its allies we will have democracy for the large majority. Wherever the economic and political power of capital is unbroken, its dictatorship is bound to persist: In the sense that, ultimately, monopoly capital makes prevail in all crucial issues its own special interests and those of capital in general--with the aid of legislation, the state power, in short organized power. From the first day on the socialist state can satisfy the interests of the working class, the great majority, provided it lets their interests and will prevail in decisive issues--against the profit motive and irreconcilable special interests, provided it is able to protect the new achievements of the people against external and internal attack.

The new state needs all those who may serve the cause of the people. It must itself be most closely linked to the organizations of the people. It has no use for anyone who is involved with the old exploiter system.

The social base of the socialist state is broader than ever: The working class and its allies. The greatest strength of the socialist system is derived from the consciousness of the masses and their ability to judge, to be guided by their interests, their active involvement in decisions about all vital issues. The existential and developmental condition of this system, therefore, is a permanent cultural revolution in order in the literal meaning of the word to make the "people's property" everything progress, useful and beautiful ever produced by culture and science.

The Political System in Socialism

The supreme organs of the state power in the Austrian socialist republic will be the elected people's representations. Elections will be direct, general and secret. They will differ fundamentally from the formal nature of bourgeois representative bodies by the fact that their decisions will be mandatory on the economy, and that they will have to carry out implementing as well as legislative tasks. The deputies of all representative bodies will be accountable to the voters and may be recalled even between elections. In their work socialist public bodies will be assisted by many kinds of voluntary and unpaid collaborators, by committees in various social sectors as organs of direct democracy.

In a socialist republic there will still be different ideologies and religious movements. Already in the major class conflicts leading up to socialism it is likely that parties and organizations will emerge, which are no longer dominated by the influence of big capital or the ideologies of "reconciliation" with capital. In these conditions the KPOe envisages the transition to socialism in the form of a multiparty system. That is particularly likely if the road to socialism should lead via a stage of antimonopolistic democracy.

It is an absolute principle of communists--whether before or after the socialist revolution--to endeavor to conclude alliances with all forces willing or able to contribute to the achievement of common goals. In the relationship with its allies --whether parties, organizations or movements--the KPOe is guided by the teachings of scientific communism: It will be imperative to involve all forces, groups, parties and classes operating within the country, and certainly not to decide policies only by the wishes and ideas, the extent of class consciousness and combativeness of just one group or party.

The final liberation of working people from exploitation and the construction of socialism require a leading force, that of the organized working class and its revolutionary party. The indispensable necessity of an alliance with other classes and strata means that this leading role must be exercised in equal cooperation with others, on the basis of agreement on the essentials as well as in consideration of existing differences in interests and views.

The leading role of the revolutionary party cannot be ordered from above. It must be the result of the ability, with the aid of scientific socialism, mature internal party democracy, unity and discipline, to orient to the goals capable of common achievement. It calls for selfless, prudent and exemplary commitment to the cause of the liberation of the working class and all working people, the prosperity of the new society. Consequently it must constantly be re-established--with the confidence of the masses.

Particularly important in the political system of the socialist society, especially in the evolution of various types of direct democracy, are the united labor unions as the broadest class organization, trade union and enterprise representative organs, federations of women, youths and other mass organizations.

In the socialist state newspapers and publishing houses will be in the hands of democratic social organs. The public broadcasting monopoly will be secured. Real freedom of opinion and criticism will be guaranteed by the availability of extensive and truthful information, discussions of all important concerns of society, the provision of a humanist content and a new morality. Abolished will be the freedom to pronounce lies dangerous to the public weal, to glorify exploitation, crime and militarism, to disseminate racism and nationalist hatreds, to brutalize and deform men intellectually, morally and ideologically.

The socialist state will guarantee the freedom of religion and conscience, of the Church and atheism on the basis of the separation of state and Church.

The socialist state will guarantee and realize fundamental freedoms and human rights which capitalism professes but in fact daily restricts, injures and withholds:

The equality of women in law as well as in life.

Each citizen's right to education and to opportunities for developing his/her gifts and abilities.

The unrestricted equality of national minorities.

The right to decent housing by a comprehensive system of social housing construction and the encouragement of one-family home construction.

The right to comprehensive health care provided by a general national health service.

The socialist state will take care that nature be preserved as a source of life, wealth, health and pleasure.

The Democratic Road to Socialism

We have an infallible guarantee that the road to socialism--however it may twist and turn--is bound to be democratic: It is advanced on only when the masses are won over to the cause. Against a highly organized opponent such as the concentrated power of the state and monopolies this profound transformation can be wrought only where the masses are no longer prepared to let themselves be ruled, exploited and defrauded in the old manner, where they are resolved with all their strength to commit themselves to profound change.

Any revolution--whether antimonopolistic or socialist--presumes that the working class, led by a strong revolutionary party, becomes the political, ideological and moral leading force, in other words achieves "hegemony." That is the prerequisite for any revolution. At the same time the achievement of hegemony is not tantamount to the political and economic disarmament of the foe. As long as capital disposes of power in the state, the economy and the mass media, it will, with their help,

endeavor to sow dissent among the people, to unsettle, corrupt, desolidarize, intimidate and--if possible--terrorize them in order to repel the working class.

Just as there are no models of socialism, there are no models of revolution. At the same time we cannot deny that socialism has nowhere been achieved by way of a gradual and even evolution, a step by step transformation. Evolution is always uneven, at some crucial times even abrupt. Sooner or later, regardless of all possible intermediate stages, the need inevitably arrives to finally deal with the suppressive and manipulative machinery of the old state so as to free the way to a new order.

The KPOe aspires to advance toward socialism without civil war. It would be naive to expect that the exploiters will voluntarily resign their dominance. Although this cannot be guaranteed, an advance without civil war is possible provided that the popular movement is sufficiently powerful and determined, that it succeeds in attracting sections of the army and the police to its side or at least in neutralizing them.

Still, in no case can the road to socialism without civil war be a smooth "parliamentary road," even though the use of parliamentary status by the workers movement may be most important. The power of capital is rooted outside of parliament. Its struggle is conducted mainly in "extra-parliamentary" terms, using any means at its disposal.

Internal forces are decisive for any revolution. Revolutions can be neither imported nor exported, nor can they be replaced by coups or daring conspiracies. Only adventurers or doctrinaires think so, who cannot expect to recruit the masses. At the same time the progressive forces in Austria need international solidarity to exploit every opportunity within their own national scope. They need the solidarity especially of the socialist countries, need a favorable international power constellation, so that a major interference by reaction from outside may be prevented or effectively countered.

The crucial prerequisite for any revolution--whether antimonopolistic or socialist--is a social crisis coupled with a fundamental shift in political strength toward the working class: A strong communist party, working class unity of action tested in many battles, a firm alliance with other strata, the repulsion of anticommunism and of the illusion nourished over and over again by the exploiter system, that it is able to settle basic social problems and fundamentally renew democracy without transforming property and power conditions, beginning with monopoly capital.

The history of the workers movement--including many chapters on social democrat majorities who did not advance a single step toward socialism--constantly teaches us the same lesson: Concessions to this illusion do not yield a "longer, steadier and safer road" to the socialist goal. They yield another road, another goal: Mere corrections, patchwork on the exploiter order, the holes and nakedness of which are getting more and more glaring.

The gates to a new society were reached and opened only where the workers movement succeeded in largely overcoming deceptive expectations for a "compromise in the interest of all" within its own ranks, repel it in other strata and unite the energies of the mass movements for a push against the centers of the system.

For an Antimonopolistic Democracy

In the conditions prevailing in Austria it is most likely that the road to socialism will lead via another stage--antimonopolistic democracy. The objective basis for this belief is the extensive crisis of the state monopolistic system, the profound differences in the interests of this system and the large majority of the public. These even permeate parties which are built on the system, although the effects are still slight.

The details of socialism are not foreseeable simply because they depend to some extent on the manner socialism is finally accomplished, the struggles preceding it and the role of institutions and organizations in these struggles. The communist party initially expects a stage of antimonopolistic democracy. This can be achieved only by an upheaval, and many steps will be necessary to bring it about. Indispensable preconditions are the break-up of the system of social partnership, a new combative role for the labor unions, a definite access of strength to the communist party, alliances with other socialist and resolutely democratic forces.

The masses can be recruited for the construction of a revolutionary democratic power --such as the state of the antimonopolistic democracy would be--only by the lessons learned in the struggle for their interests and to the extent that they recognize: The security and expansion of democratic and social rights require the resolute repulsion and restraint of the political and economic powers of monopoly capital until it is completely dismantled.

On this basis it would be possible to accomplish far reaching political and economic transformations: By removing the nationalized sector from the profit system and making it an instrument of the working class, by the nationalization of all monopolistic enterprises, farm monopolies, banks, insurance companies and commercial corporations; by eliminating the counsels and stooges of the state monopolistic system from state institutions and the monopolized mass media.

It is to be expected that, in the struggle for these decisions, domestic and foreign monopoly capital will use all means at its disposal--including the attempt to establish an openly reactionary dictatorship --to prevent its loss of power. It will be imperative to close such reactionary escape routes and, after monopoly capital's loss of power, make any reversal impossible.

Economic planning would already be possible in the state of antimonopolistic democracy, especially with the aid of the state sector, its expansion and investment and credit controls. The profits of the state sector could be used in the interest of the public.

Capitalist production conditions would continue in non-monopolistic firms. Therefore we would still have exploitation and elements of anarchy in the economy. Antimonopolistic democracy would be a tremendous step forward but can never be an end in itself. Its revolutionary-democratic power would make it easier to assist and complement the class struggle of the masses by state resources, by way of political, economic and social measures in the interest of the people to provide more favorable conditions for the struggle for socialism, the victory of the socialist revolution.

KPOE Functions, Nature

Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 28 Jan 81 supplement pp 18-20 (excerpts)

/Text/ The KPOe emerged from the century old struggle of the Austrian workers movement against feudal reaction, the Hapsburg monarchy and capital, against imperialism and war. Indelibly alive in its ranks is the heritage of the antifascist resistance, the national struggle for freedom. As a revolutionary and future oriented party it draws strength also from the traditions of all progressive movements in our people's past. It is proud of the fighters of the peasant movement and the radical men of the enlightenment in the 18th Century, the fighters on the barricades in 1848 and the February fighters of 1934, who did not bow to fascism.

The communist party considers itself the heir and successor of that revolutionary social democracy which, in the Holmfeld Program, described its task as "politically to organize the proletariat, arouse its awareness of its condition, get it ready for combat both mentally and physically, and keep it so." Two events decided the conditions and timing of the KPOe's birth: The victory of the first socialist revolution in Russia, gained with the leadership of an imperturbable and battle hardened workers party: The transition in World War I of the leadership of Austria's social democracy to the camp of war and the class enemy, "domestic" capital.

The history of our country has several times over demonstrated the consequences, calamitous for working people and injurious to the nation, that even a great party is unable to lead the working class to victory and liberation if all it seeks is "compromise" instead of the necessary decision; it does not matter how selflessly and sacrificially the masses fight. Even in the most favorable conditions the transformation of obsolete and sometimes lethal conditions is impossible without a strong revolutionary party. Independent of its size a revolutionary party is irreplaceable for the workers movement: In daily struggles as the driving force, in major social issues as the guiding light.

At the same time the consolidation of the communist party, its evolution as a mass party, is a key issue of social progress, not some "communist special interests." What matters is the emergence of sound unity of action by the working class and stable alliances with other strata; the break-up of the social partnership, of the constant secret pacts with capital; the freeing of the forces of the working people. All of this will profoundly alter the balance of power. It is indispensable for the struggle for an antimonopolistic democracy, the victory of socialism.

There are many organizations of the working class--labor unions, women's, youth, sports and cultural organizations. All of them strive for sectional goals, often benefiting only some parts of the class and limited to the framework of the prevailing capitalist society. The KPOe leads and links the struggle in the political, economic and ideological field, such as is required by the fact of capital's dominance. It always represents the total interests of the working people. At the same time it fights for the future interests of the total movement also, because it classifies and subordinates everything to the one goal: The liberation of the working class and, with it, all working strata.

Basis--Scientific Socialism

The KPOe's entire efforts and goals are based on scientific socialism. Incompatible with this are petty demagogical considerations such as characterize all politics accepting of the rule of capital. The teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin are an indispensable source of illumination for the inevitable movements of society, the realistic appraisal of the enemy, the appreciation of our own opportunities, of our optimism. In general terms their doctrines reflect the actual conditions of the class conflict. Alongside with these conditions they must constantly develop further. The cause of the workers can be expected to succeed only when existing and imminent conditions of the class conflict are analyzed and the results applied in the struggle.

Communists study the wealth of experiences of the peoples for their possible application in national conditions.

The revolutionary workers movement needs the disclosure of the most important truths at times when others need to hide them. It needs the clash of opinions in order to consolidate and develop: Against right opportunism which never lacks reasons to reconcile itself to the rule of capitalism, and against anarchism, "left" opportunism or left radicalism, all of which forget that history is made by the masses, not by "elites" nor good intentions. Only the coupling of scientific knowledge with the workers movement resulted in scientific socialism and the coupling with science in the modern workers movement. This close link is not a once-only affair. It must be reforged over and over again, and indispensable for doing so is the revolutionary party rooted in the working class.

Spreading Socialist Consciousness

Communists stick to Marx, Engels and Lenin: At all times they emphasize property and power conditions on the one hand and mass initiative on the other as that which is ultimately decisive. In the spirit of the Hainfeld Program they resolutely oppose "any obfuscation and disguise of the class antagonisms." They consider total disclosure one of their most important duties: The persistent and patient demonstration of the most significant social relations, using actual situations and experiences. Such enlightenment is more needed now than it ever was, following many years of social partnership sermons about the "feasibility of reconciling all interests for the benefit of all."

Communists consider it their main duty to make the working class and all victims of the state monopolistic system aware of their common interests (despite all differences), their irreconcilable antagonism to the power and profit motivation of big capital. The communist party is a fighting unit, not a group of instructors. That is why it always remembers: Indispensable is the initiative of the masses, the action in the course of which many become receptive to instruction as a consequence of their own experiences.

Internal Party Democracy

The construction and method of working of the communist party as a voluntary fighting unit are settled by specific standards. These are the sum of the experiences

of the revolutionary workers movement in various conditions. Their core is democratic centralism, initially developed and applied by Marx and Engels. It combines the broadest internal party democracy with the centralized unity of action which is indispensable vis-a-vis a highly organized opponent. Democratic centralism is based on the right of all members to involvement in the discussion and drafting of party policy; on the election of all leadership organizations from the bottom up; on the accountability of all elected organs and all organizations to superior leadership bodies. Resolutions are adopted by majority vote following democratic discussion. The members obligate themselves to champion and carry out these resolutions.

The decisions of superior organs are mandatory on all organs and members. The supreme organ is the party congress; between party congresses the central committee elected by it. It is the duty of all leadership organizations and members to observe the norms to the fullest extent. Factionalism is incompatible with unity of action and the norms.

The history of the KPOe and the entire workers movement confirms the fact that the party is able to cope with the most difficult situations only as long as its unity is maintained. Reverses for the party and serious damage to the entire working class were suffered whenever the unity of will of action was lost, the standards of party life flouted.

Communists feel responsible to see to it that party life is characterized by collectivism and personal responsibility, frankness in the shaping of opinion and discipline in the implementation of resolutions. They strive for comradeship, mutual assistance and solidarity. By criticism and autocriticism they help overcome defects in party work. Communists make every effort in addition to their active work for the party to expand their Marxist knowledge.

Basic Party Organizations

Party policy is largely shaped and implemented by the basic organizations (factory and residential organizations). To a large extent their work affects the party's fighting strength and power of attraction. The party is always only as strong as the majority of its organizations, their work and links to the outside, the variety of experiences involved.

In the basic organization every communist may comment the party line and cooperate in its execution, submit motions and express criticism. In the basic organization every communist may gain and utilize political experience, find answers to his questions. In the basic organization every communist may contribute to the implementation of party resolutions and, by strengthening the organization, to the consolidation of the entire party.

To Work as a Communist

As Marx and Engels said in the "Communist Manifesto," communists differ from other workers only by their insight in the condition, procedure and general results of social development. The wealth of ideals, initiatives and optimism of communists is based on this insight. It enables them at the various stages of development to represent the interests of the total movement and its future. As part of the working

class in the conditions of capitalism they are not free either of the effects of this society. Because communists desire to conquer the exploiter order, they set themselves great political and moral challenges.

Communists are at work wherever working people meet to look after their interests. Whether in the factory, the residential district, on public bodies--everywhere communists act as prudent and incorruptible champions of the cause of the working people. Their attention is devoted to everything touching upon the masses. To the best of their abilities they aid and encourage solidarity in thought and action. They seek political discussion to instruct, to point out connections in society. They use every opportunity to demonstrate that it is useful to move forward, to illuminate the necessity for socialism and its benefits. They endeavor to develop their personalities because the cause of the workers necessitates this, and because personal example serves that cause.

An Internationalist Party

Revolutionary parties are in place on all continents, in more than 100 countries and in the most varied conditions. They are guided by scientific socialism. Their emergence and growth confirm that the cause of the working people needs such revolutionary parties. They are irreplaceable.

In our country the KPOe is such a party. As a national force it is also part of the worldwide communist movement. The latter has long outgrown its beginnings. Differences in the conditions of the struggle and the breadth of the movement are incompatible with any "directing center." Each communist party decides its policy independently--well aware of its responsibility toward the working class of its own country, the nation and the international movement to which it is linked by community of purpose and ideology.

Though its meaning differs fundamentally in capitalism and socialism, internationalization is a basic feature of the modern world. Its most threatening embodiment are the "multinational corporations," those capitalist monsters which operate beyond frontiers and disregard national interests wherever they are able to do so. The positive aspect of internationalization is reflected in the fact that internationalist attitudes are no longer confined to the workers movement, they are adopted also by the champions of peace, antifascist and anti-imperialist forces. International reaction therefore tries all the harder to weaken this unity by exploiting any trend to narrow-minded nationalism, selfish and self-sufficiency.

The broader the alliances in a country, the more important is the independence of the working class and the revolutionary party. The broader international alliances against reaction, the more important is proletarian internationalism. The internal and international class conflict represents an increasingly tight unit. Internationalism is indispensable to the consistent pursuit of national interests. For its part internationalism calls for the greatest efforts to strengthen the forces of socialism and peace within the national scope.

The most important factor for the preservation of world peace, the advance of the world revolutionary process is the internationalist policy of the Soviet Union and its strength. The boundless anti-Sovietism of reaction aims even more at the

desolidarization and isolation of international progressive forces than at the Soviet Union itself. Firm solidarity with the Soviet Union is therefore in the interest of all international progressive forces. For communists it is a matter of course.

The KPOe is doing its best to deepen its amicable relations with the fraternal parties, the socialist community of nations. It works for expansion of fraternal relations with communist and workers parties. It exercises active solidarity with all anti-imperialist movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The KPOe lends all its strength to cementing the unity of the communist world movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The KPOe does not exist in a vacuum. It arose because the working class definitely needed it. It is now needed more than ever: For Austria's people, for Austria's working class.

The "Communist Manifesto" starts with these words: "A specter haunts Europe. All the powers of old Europe have allied themselves in a holy war against this specter." Neither agitation, nor lies nor oppression were able to prevent the "specter" from becoming fact in the shape of a new social order in half of Europe, from gaining a foothold on other continents. Nothing will be able to prevent the most humanist of causes, that of the communists, to score further victories.

11698
CSO: 3103

FRANCE DESCRIBED AS 'POLITICAL ALLY' OF QUEBEC

Quebec LE SOLEIL in French 31 Dec 80 p A 6

[Article by Paul Painchaud from the Political Science Department of the Laval University: "Franco-Quebec Relations: A Durable Goal"]

[Text] Prime Minister Levesque's latest trip to Europe is more important than a mere headline. We are not being superfluous in making a brief analysis.

It first appears that this trip puts the finishing touches on what Jean Lesage had started in 1961, regarding Franco Quebec relations. It is symbolic from the point of view that the death of the ex-prime minister occurred when the current prime minister was getting ready to cross the French border. Franco-Quebec relations rest, henceforth, on principles and realities which will never change, whatever the government in Paris or Quebec may be.

We can sum it up, as follows: 1. France is one of Quebec's "political allies" and will favor the assertion of its individuality, whatever form it might take on a constitutional plan; 2. France recognizes that it is not alone in what concerns assuring the survival of the French culture in the world, and that it should count on the support of a developed society, such as Quebec; 3. Quebec admits that its cultural sphere is insufficient and that France is becoming a place for expansion and confrontations needed to its specific make up; 4. Thanks to cooperation programs, direct transnational relations between the two societies, at all levels, an osmosis threshold has been crossed, which guarantees its perpetuity and diversity; 5. Direct governmental relations between France and Quebec continue to be the privileged means for the realization of its goals and policies.

Here is the goal in regards to which there seems to be a large consensus in Quebec and in France, spanning all colors of the ideological and partisan rainbow. On the French side, the referendum should contribute to this debate of conscience, by making better known the complexity of Quebec's political situation, and from that, the limits of what France could expect from Quebec. On Quebec's side, the current constitutional crisis will have allowed observation, more harshly, the fragility of our destiny and, as consequence, its essential limitations and among them, the French Alliance.

Rene Levesque's trip reinstates what Jean Lesage, followed by Daniel Johnson, have already established. For a time, Quebec's party action had feared, in fact, that the "French connection" could avail itself of partisan goals or, at least, promote

a particular constitutional option. These fears were not unfounded. But France, which has a deeper view of its history and diplomatic situation has, at long term, integrated these relations with Quebec which could, as a consequence, adapt itself to all governments.

From this point of view, Quebec diplomacy's main goal, as defined by Jean Lesage from the beginning, has been reached: "To constitutionalize" somehow, rather than "internationalize" Franco-Quebec relations; i.e., to vu'garize them, to integrate them into Quebec's normal day to day life, making them a family affair. Rene Levesque has just completed this operation. From now on it will no longer be necessary to receive dignitaries on either side with so much formality. This was indispensable for mutual "recognition" of the two entities in a singular juridic context. Reunion parties should now take on another look. If France had, at first, set the pace, now it's Quebec's turn to do so, in its own way: practical, rustic, and North-American.

But if it consolidates the past, this trip has also moved towards the future. It seems that three facts should be stressed: To begin with, the very formula for the meetings between prime ministers. It has been criticized, at least in its current form. It continues to be, still, an important means of Franco-Quebec relations in the future if they succeed in simplifying it. Franco-German relations, for instance, rest on this privileged means which only indicates, on the part of the two countries, an extraordinary strategic interest in the broad sense of the word. It is the case of France and Quebec. For Quebec, this technique for intergovernmental relations is important, all the more because it has no known diplomatic status. This steady access to the highest level of French political offices compensates for this weakness. But this means must be improved. Immediately one thinks about a sort of "Dual Commonwealth": relaxed, informal, pragmatic.

The second innovation in this trip concerns the links which must be established between the Brussels' and Paris' visits by Quebec's Prime Minister. From now on, it increasingly appears that, in fact, a tough and liberal francophone triangle is about to be formed transcending all official institutions. In other words, the three countries admit that the future of French culture in the world, at least moderately, rests firstly on their efficient cooperation in the important areas. For now, all that remains of francophone is pomp, illusion and shortsighted trickery which will, in addition occur only in a still uncertain future. The will of Quebec's two European partners to force the presence of Quebec in francophone's multilateral instances adheres to this original realism. On the other hand, it is extremely evident that in forcing opposition to Quebec's presence in the francophone Commonwealth, Ottawa increasingly risks isolationism in the francophone community. This is the price it should pay for its outdated obstinacy.

Finally, it should be stressed that Quebec's policy of scientific, technological and industrial cooperation comes to the rescue of Canadian diplomacy in Europe, perfecting it successfully. Critics of Quebec's international role never see this larger contribution to the policy of Canada's Third Option, where this precisely is given priority: To balance American Influence in Canada through the development of technological and industrial exchanges with Western Europe. Because France and Belgium's political will is very strong and clear, Quebec will be very effective on the same level and will offer a contribution to Canadian action which Ottawa will make a mistake to minimize, out of spite. Quebec's history of international relations has not yet failed to take one by surprise.

9626
CSO: 3100

1981 BUDGET BILL EXAMINED

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 31 Dec 80 pp 1,4

[Text] The 1981 fiscal year budget law bill, which was approved by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly, has been set at 6,165,302,000 Turkish liras. Minister of Economy and Finance Hakki Atun held a press conference yesterday to give information on the 1981 fiscal year budget. When providing information on the budget, Atun said, in summary:

Submitted to Federated Assembly

"As a result of intensive work underway since September 1980 in my ministry, the 1981 fiscal year budget law bill, which has been drafted in harmony with the 1981 portion of the First 5-Year Development Plan, was submitted to the Council of Ministers on 19 December 1980. The 1981 fiscal year budget law bill, which began to be discussed in the Council of Ministers on 23 December 1980, was approved on 26 December 1980 and was submitted to the Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly today. As is known, the government, in accordance with imperative provisions of our constitution, is required to send its budget bill to the Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly by 31 December at the latest.

"The 1981 fiscal year budget law, which has been approved by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly, totals 6,165,302,687 Turkish liras. It is broken down as follows. Appropriations, personnel expenditures, and other personal benefits, 2,240,142,260 liras; other normal expenses, 728,683,367 liras; transfer payments, 1,637,457,060 liras; investment projects, 1,023,360,000 liras; and defense expenses, 535,660,000 liras.

Financing

"Our financing consists of the following. Our own revenues secured from financial sources, 2,945,450,000 liras; state materials sales revenues, 30 million liras; Republic of Turkey aid, 1,635,660,000 liras; United Nations Refugees High Superintendent's Office aid, 192,600,000 liras; and other foreign aid and loans, 1,361,592,687 liras.

Goals

"Members of the press, through the 1981 fiscal year budget law bill, our government's third budget, we seek to achieve, in a balanced manner and appropriate to the aims of the plan, the economic, social, and cultural development of the KTFD [Turkish Cypriot Federated State]. Furthermore, the 1981 fiscal year budget tax bill is a bill that proposes to battle current inflation, that is designed in a manner befitting principles of just taxation, and that contains, inherent in itself and to a large degree, social and economic measures."

Freedom Fighters

Minister of Economy and Finance Atun reported that a goal has been set to meet, within 5 years, the obligations stemming from the Freedom Fighters Indemnification Law. With this in mind, an appropriation of 200 million Turkish liras has been inserted in the 1981 fiscal year budget.

Other Appropriations

Minister of Economy and Finance Atun, who noted that 50 million liras have been appropriated in the budget for the purpose of eliminating shortages caused by insufficient capital within the KIT [Public Economic Enterprises] and organizations with circulating capital in particular, stated that a 10-million-lira incentive appropriation has been placed in the budget for exporting organizations in the fields of industry and agriculture. According to information provided by Atun, 10 million liras have been earmarked in the 1981 fiscal year budget law bill for a social housing project; 50 million liras for implementation of the Settlement, Land Assignment, and Equivalent Value Property Law; 30 million liras for the social and economic rehabilitation of refugees; and 20 million liras for repairing refugees' homes. While 15 million liras have been assigned to complete the Nicosia organized industrial region project, 83.5 million liras have been set aside for the repair of schools and the construction of a new school. Atun, who noted that a total of 67 million liras is designated in the 1981 fiscal year budget law bill for the repair of roads between cities and roads within a group of villages, said that 63.7 million liras will go for projects related to agriculture and animal breeding. Furthermore, 227.8 million liras have been appropriated for the Guzelyurt Variation Project and 187 million liras for various town and village drinking water projects.

Becomes Effective 1 March

After being ratified by the Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly, the 1981 fiscal year law bill, which includes appropriations and designs directed toward achievement of the goals of the 1981 program of the First 5-Year Development Plan, will become effective on 1 March 1981.

11673
CSO: 4907

OPEN LETTER ADDRESSED TO OZAL

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 3 Jan 81 p 1

[Text of HALKIN SESI open letter to Turgut Ozal]

[Text] Dear Mr Ozal,

We are among those closely following with interest and appreciation the radical measures you are applying with great courage so that our motherland, Turkey, can attain an auspicious economic future.

We are among those who know that, along with all this intensive work, you are closely interested in the growing economic problems of our tiny island and that your interest has multiplied during your current visit to our island.

Throughout this trip of yours, you will become acquainted with holders of various viewpoints, with a variety of persons, and all of them will submit, one by one, their own ideas to you. A portion of these, by hiding from you the economic chaos created by the views that they were, unfortunately, successful in getting the well-intentioned KTFD [Turkish Cypriot Federated State] governments to accept, will attempt to show you the world through rose-colored glasses. These persons, however, are not strangers to you. They are not persons you do not know. You are well acquainted with these persons, who, for a long period of time,and in a meaningless and unnecessary manner, have fostered the "basic rate of exchange" nonsense in our economy and who have unjustly usurped the rights of citrus fruit exporters. You will recall how, on a Saturday morning last November in Ankara, they reacted when you directed questions to them.

From this standpoint, we wholeheartedly believe that it is possible for us to explain easily to you our concerns.

Mr Ozal,

We are among those who have, since the fortunate 1974 peace action, supported the creation of an "open market" on Cyprus. Just as there is a

Hong Kong next to continental China, we say there can be a northern Cyprus next to the motherland. To date, we have not been able to encounter one person who has convinced us that our viewpoint is wrong. However, the persons who were unable to answer your questions in Ankara are proposing to today's well-intentioned KTFD governments the vintage 1930 foreign exchange systems that our motherland is making an effort to change and are championing "protectionist" trade systems. We attempted to explain, in these columns, our cares to Ekrem Ceyhun, who visited our island on the fifth anniversary of the founding of our federated state and who was then minister of state and chairman of the Cyprus Coordination Council. As far as we know, Ceyhun issued the necessary directions. However, the "protectionist mentality" later succeeded in altering the course of things. The results of the report of the technical committee, which was headed by Osman Nuri Torun, who visited northern Cyprus prior to Ceyhun's visit and who, as far as we were able to learn, diagnosed Cyprus' economic problems accurately, are unknown to us.

Mr Ozal, the KIT [Public Economic Enterprises] are another of our huge concerns. Without adding anything further to this subject, we will be content to quote here the portion of the views we published in this column on 13 February 1980 that were addressed to Ceyhun.

On 13 February 1980, we said:

"If we are unable to earn sufficient foreign exchange today, we are not responsible for this. Approximately 90 percent of the total economic resources in tourism, communications, agriculture, industry, and exportation are in the hands of the KIT. These KIT are such that it is not known how their administrative councils are formed nor who is appointed to the councils by whom and in what manner. These KIT are such that administrative council members take trips as tourists to participate at meetings held once a month in Turkey and on Cyprus. These KIT are such that, while shareholders do not even have the right to speak up, administrative council members, whose only knowledge of Cyprus is its location on a map, are able to turn this economy in the direction they desire on the day they are appointed. Under these conditions, will the communications problem be solved? Will our tourism advertising be carried out by these KIT in foreign countries? If not, will they be able to increase production and exportation?"

Today is 3 January 1981. We have nothing to add to this. Our only wish is that you will intervene so that the motherland's government will take the necessary measures to prevent this from continuing to go on longer in this manner.

We send you our regards.

11673
CSO: 4907

FRG JURIST ON GDR CLAIM TO SEPARATE CITIZENSHIP

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Jan 81 pp 34-39

[Interview with Federal Constitutional Court Justice Martin Hirsch by Rolf Lamprecht and Olaf Petersen of DER SPIEGEL in the SPIEGEL offices in Karlsruhe about the GDR claim to separate citizenship: "'First, Pharisaical and, Secondly, Wrong'"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: For a long time, and particularly loudly of late, East Berlin has demanded that Bonn recognize a separate GDR citizenship. Now, the GDR indisputably is a state, with the people, territory and power of a state. Why is it not a foreign state?

Hirsch: The Federal Constitutional Court [BVG] has said that it is not a foreign state. The GDR is a state but not a foreign state.

SPIEGEL: Domestic, then?

Hirsch: Not domestic either; a mixtum compositum [hodgepodge].

SPIEGEL: Again one of those juristical inventions that mean nothing to the average citizen.

Hirsch: What do you mean, inventions? I would say it is a necessary construction for settling the relations developing between two such structures as the Federal Republic and the GDR--at least as long as there is no peace treaty.

SPIEGEL: You say "structure;" former Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger described the GDR as a "phenomenon." Not foreign, not domestic, a mixtum compositum, a structure. In the end, is that not fooling around with labels?

Hirsch: Certainly not. Those who created our constitution were convinced--probably rightly so at the time--that there would soon be a German Reich again.

SPIEGEL: That was more than 30 years ago.

Hirsch: But it is still written that way in the constitution.

SPIEGEL: Exactly where?

Hirsch: It derives primarily from the preamble and runs like a red thread through the entire Basic Law.

SPIEGEL: All that there is is the exhortation unceasingly to strive for reunification. Anything further comes from the BVG--that is, the thesis that the German Reich did not perish in 1945 but continues to exist and that the Federal Republic is partly identical (as they say so beautifully) with that structure. Partly identical because in the other part another state has made itself at home. Have such theses not become pure theory in the meantime?

Hirsch: Well, in my personal opinion, the German Reich in fact perished ignominiously in 1945. But the Basic Law proceeds from the rule in international law that a vanquished state continues to exist juristically in its original form as long as no peace treaty has been concluded:

SPIEGEL: What such a construction is worth has been stated aptly by your colleague on the BVG Joachim Rottmann when he said that the "German Reich perished according to constitutional law," that the Federal Republic and the GDR "face each other as sovereign states," that the theory of a perpetual Reich "unfortunately was swept away by developments in political reality."

Hirsch: I don't want to offend Mr Rottmann, but as a constitutional court justice he should not have said so shortly before the Karlsruhe trial. And, in fact, it had the effect one would expect.

SPIEGEL: It was stated to have been biased. But how right he was in the matter has been proved by the latest supreme court contortions. Late in November 1980 the BVG considered that it had no choice but to treat a political denunciation committed in Cottbus as a criminal offense committed abroad.

Hirsch: How so? That judgment showed that the BVG justices can cope with the complicated problem...

SPIEGEL: ...by stating that the place of the crime, Cottbus, is abroad but that citizens living in Cottbus are not foreigners.

Hirsch: As far as criminal law is concerned.

SPIEGEL: Apparently their Basic Law judgment forces them to engage in such sophistries. But let us leave that aside for now. Let us proceed from the body of judgments of the court in Karlsruhe: What bearing do the standard decisions have on the question of citizenship.

Hirsch: We do not impose our citizenship on any German, but when one wants it he gets it. GDR passports are recognized in practice. The fact is respected that there are so and so many GDR citizens who even have their residence in the Federal Republic; these, however, do not get a passport from us, but rather their GDR passport remains valid; and no one asks them to fulfill their civic duties, such as military service for instance.

The diplomatic personnel, the truck drivers going across the country, journalists and pensioners--they all stay in the Federal Republic as GDR citizens, not with a West German passport but with a GDR passport. No one gives a hoot about that. These things proceed quite normally from the citizens' point of view. What is at stake here exclusively is the need for prestige on the part of the GDR leadership.

SPIEGEL: Strangely, what you are saying without ado arouses great excitement also in the Federal Republic if a politician happens to say it--as FDP Bundestag Deputy Uwe Ronneburger has just done. Did not the BVG with his judgment concerning the inter-German Basic Treaty substantially contribute to making this matter taboo?

Hirsch: No. After all, by going on record with the fact that the Basic Treaty did not settle any questions of citizenship, the federal government itself took the provisions of the Basic Law into account. In our decision we added an exclamation point, as it were.

SPIEGEL: An exclamation which is binding on any government in Bonn unless Karlsruhe changes its mind one day.

Hirsch: It is not Karlsruhe that is binding on the government but the Basic Law, to which the BVG has to adhere. And if everything could be interpreted as easily as article 16...

SPIEGEL: ...according to which no German--regardless of where he is at home--may be deprived of his citizenship...

Hirsch: ...we would not need a BVG. On the other hand, of course, the political arm is not prevented from changing the constitution if some sort of situation should arise which made that necessary.

SPIEGEL: In 1972 the GDR declared that it was proceeding from the premise that the treaty would facilitate the settlement of citizenship questions. And it follows this up time and again.

Hirsch: From the GDR point of view, this surely is quite legitimate, and perhaps also quite clever politically speaking. But when the GDR maintains that it runs counter to international law for the Federal Republic not to recognize its citizenship, this is, first, pharisaical and, secondly, wrong.

Pharisaical because people who constantly break international law when it suits their interests--for example, at their border--per se have forfeited the right to invoke international law. And wrong because with its statement concerning the Basic Treaty the GDR itself acknowledged the fact that the citizenship question had not been settled.

SPIEGEL: The international law expert and present president of the University of Augsburg, Karl Matthias Meessen, thinks it follows from the Basic Treaty that--as the GDR has done--the Federal Republic should introduce a citizenship of its own. It would not restrict the right of all Germans, if they desire, automatically to become West German citizens. Would that be a way to make concessions to the East Berlin need for prestige?

Hirsch: With great caution, I would say that legally nothing stands in the way of that. But surely one must first ask of what use this is. We would be in a position, as it were, to have two passports, an FRG one and an all-German one. As for the all-German one, we surely continue to have it anyway as long as the Basic Law is valid. So what advantage would there be in our also formally having this imaginable dual citizenship? It surely would not yield anything at all.

SPIEGEL: Perhaps it would calm down Mr Honecker.

Hirsch: Maybe it would. Only, there is another point: What about Berlin? Because, despite the city's special situation, they did not get around the German citizenship of the Berliners. It is tacitly recognized that the Berliners get a German passport.

If we now said, "All right, we will also create an FRG citizenship," East Berlin would probably be delighted. And then we will say, "But of course it must also be valid for Berlin."

SPIEGEL: Surely it would be a good thing if it was possible that way to obtain a bit more legal security for the Berliners.

Hirsch: Sure, sure; only I have no faith in it. They say, don't they, that Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic. But let us suppose that the East agreed that Berlin should be included. We would then have those two citizenships. For the all-German one could not be abolished except by a two-thirds majority amending the constitution.

SPIEGEL: But one need not abolish the all-German citizenship, need one?

Hirsch: But then the matter becomes pretty meaningless, for the GDR's problems would not have been solved in any way.

SPIEGEL: Because the GDR feels that precisely the all-German reservations by Bonn discriminate against it. In fact it would like to be formally treated as a foreign country.

Hirsch: But it is a fact in international law that following a war, when a country is divided or areas are separated from it--that then those living in that territory have a choice to say to which part they want to belong. And when the GDR talks about international law, it ought to think about what the consequence would be in international law if this line of partition were drawn for good.

SPIEGEL: Then the GDR would have to let its population opt freely as to whether they wanted to be part of West Germany or East Germany.

Hirsch: To vote with their feet. Just imagine what that would be like.

SPIEGEL: But evidently recognition of citizenship is the final tessera as far as GDR sovereignty is concerned.

Hirsch: I don't really understand what they want. The GDR has been recognized internationally as a sovereign state, it belongs to the United Nations, it has diplomatic relations with almost every country, and the Federal Republic respects its citizenship.

SPIEGEL: At least to the extent that GDR citizens so desire.

Hirsch: Actually East Berlin wants more--a change in the Bonn Basic Law. This is precisely the kind of interference in the internal affairs of another state which East Berlin is so fond of reproaching others for.

SPIEGEL: Would it not make sense nevertheless to find out through negotiations what price--for instance, in the area of further human relief--the GDR, in its need for sovereignty, is prepared to pay for Bonn concessions?

Hirsch: That is quite a different angle. It might of course be possible for such concessions to mean a very great deal to the GDR, which (and that is so striking here) continues to suffer under its minority complex.

In addition, I wonder whether East Berlin really appreciates the consequences of its demands. Looking at it from the political point of view, without regard for constitutional objections, the GDR not only would have to offer a great deal for being recognized as a foreign country but at the same time would risk the loss of benefits.

SPIEGEL: For instance?

Hirsch: So far they really have fared very well with the all-German reservations. They live virtually as if they were a member of the European Community, for as far as the European Community countries are concerned, they are considered as German domestic territory.

SPIEGEL: As a German foreign country, in other words, the GDR would have to tighten its belt even further.

Hirsch: And perhaps in addition have to pay billions in back payments.

SPIEGEL: For what?

Hirsch: Based on its all-German obligation, the Federal Republic has paid alone, and continues to pay alone, for National Socialist wrongs--including a victim of persecution who used to live in Leipzig.

SPIEGEL: Back to constitutional law. In fact, as you yourself conceded in the beginning of this interview, the Karlsruhe Basic Treaty judgment clearly draws the line concerning citizenship and recognition as a foreign country, but not only in those respects. What binding effect does the Germany judgment, now almost 8 years old, actually have?

The demand of the court that every line of the decision, every period and every comma had to be gospel in Germany policy was even then in striking contrast with what was being taught in constitutional law, and had never been made earlier, or was ever made later, by the court.

Hirsch: The BVG decision stated that the Basic Treaty was constitutional. And then--we may argue about whether it was necessary--some additional remarks were made, for instance about the postal agreement.

SPIEGEL: The court decreed that Bonn must not tolerate any violation of the secrecy of correspondence--a foolhardy demand because it could not be implemented.

Hirsch: You can say these are obiter dicta...

SPIEGEL: ...incidental remarks that are not binding. You and your colleagues, however, did not regard anything as not binding but virtually decided that every line of the judgment--46 pages of 30 lines each--was binding; 1,380 lines with guidelines for Germany policy until the year 2000. For example, the above-mentioned remark about the postal agreement, the reaffirmation of the Reich borders of 1937 or the judicially decreed duty to keep the desire for reunification alive. Putting candles in the window?

Hirsch: If the BVG writes an opinion, it gives its view, the view of the majority. Whether these are fundamental statements or, as in this case, obiter dicta which--ex officio, as it were--were turned into fundamental statements, the interested politician learns in any case what the thinking of the BVG is. Furthermore, the BVG right at the start decided that the court itself can always change its opinion.

SPIEGEL: The trouble is that Germany policy is inhibited by the judgment.

Hirsch: If the politicians engaged in Germany policy feel inhibited, it is their own fault. The judgment prevents no one from making policy.

SPIEGEL: On the other hand, the court stated that every word of the judgment was binding on policy. In a weak moment, you yourself said that the court committed a cardinal sin there.

Hirsch: I cannot recall having said that in connection with the Basic Treaty. In the meantime, however, I have become firmly convinced that the court should guard against such obiter dicta. For the optical effect alone, one should not codify every line.

SPIEGEL: Ex post facto you would consider that an error by the court?

Hirsch: Let us say, a technical juristical error, because the BVG thus causes misunderstandings. The court itself says: We can change our opinion at any time. If it then goes on record with such comprehensive binding obligations, it creates the impression that this opinion will hold good for all time.

And of course it is obvious that even today the composition of the BVG is quite different from what it was then. In 5 years not a single justice who participated in the Basic Treaty judgment will be in office any longer. The new justices could say at any time: What our predecessors wrote at the time, we are now abandoning; it is no longer valid.

SPIEGEL: Further, the Basic Treaty judgment is 13 years old. For that long a time, the court must not tie the hands of the politicians. Therefore the court generally declares only its fundamental judgments to be binding, and not every casual dependent clause.

Hirsch: Incidentally, it was not meant to do any harm. It was only an attempt to stiffen the backbone of the federal government precisely because what our judgment stated about these points had constantly been voiced by the federal government verbatim in the Bundestag and everywhere else.

SPIEGEL: If the court codifies for all time political statements which of necessity can only be valid within a particular time frame, it does not stiffen the backbone of anyone. Rather, the federal government must have gained the impression that one was out to break its neck.

Hirsch: With their sometimes erroneous interpretation of the judgment, the CDU and CSU perhaps created that impression. For that reason, I would very much hope that Karlsruhe never again ought to do such a thing as codify as binding all that led to an opinion of the court--every single word.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, Mr Hirsch.

8790
CSO: 3103

SPD'S FIVE POINT PROGRAM ON DIVISIVE ISSUES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Feb 81 p 7

/Text/ The following is the text of the five-point program adopted, after all-night sessions, by the SPD federal executive early Thursday morning:

Our Responsibility. On the Situation of the Party in February 1981

The SPD executive asks all members and friends attentively to note the following declaration and resolutely help remove ambiguities about the meaning of social democratic policy.

I. We Stand by Our Word

Social Democrats carry the responsibility for the Federal Republic of Germany. The SPD and FDP were chosen to make up the Federal Government through 1984. We must meet the challenges of this assignment. Consistent support for Helmut Schmidt and his government cotinues to be the political duty of social democracy. There is no persuasive alternative to the social-liberal coalition.

Less than ever may Social Democrats in Germany evade responsibility now, in 1981. The opportunity actively to shape policy must not be yielded for the sake of issues, some of which will turn out not all that important even in the medium term, while others will be amenable to settlement only by social democratic government responsibility.

By their government declaration of 24 November 1980 the coalition parties agreed to a program for the next 4 years. Both partners will uphold it and, at the same time, be open to new challenges. No coalition of two parties and parliamentary factions is possible without some compromise. Superfluous polemics and publicity seeking speculations injure collaboration. That holds true for both parties.

II. Looking Forward

Berliners have been encouraged by the example of Hans-Jochen Vogel and his staff. SPD and FDP have demonstrated that they are able to act forcefully, rapidly and resolutely.

The SPD has achieved much for Berlin; in recent years, however, it did commit some mistakes. Social Democrats, a party with a long history and great political experience, are quite able to learn from their mistakes.

The new start in the Senate, now headed by Hans-Jochen Vogel, is being emulated at local party level. Berlin's Social Democrats have had to display more strength coping with the problems of the city than any other party and certainly did not deserve a lack of solidarity or general reproach. They will propose new names for party offices and the city assembly, including especially committed employees and women. The Berlin SPD is arming for an enormous effort. In the matter of the Berlin elections every Social Democrat should ask himself what he could contribute to a successful outcome. In the weeks up to 10 May we will see who is to be trusted. At this point it is imperative straightforwardly to back Hans-Jochen Vogel and the Berlin Social Democrats.

III. Safeguarding Jobs in Increasingly Difficult Circumstances

Against the background of a worldwide recession the economy is in a state of upheaval which affects our country and every one of us. Gloom is no more an appropriate response than the idea that this process could be left to its own devices.

The main economic task of the coming years will be the structural adjustment of the German economy, the restoration of the foreign trade balance and the preservation of the social stability of our country. World economic challenges call for the full international coordination of economic, financial, energy and monetary policies. This cooperation must be guided by the desire to achieve a balance between the interests of the industrial countries, the oil producing countries and the developing countries. In accordance with its worldwide responsibility the Federal Republic of Germany must be specially committed to this goal.

The November 1980 government declaration imposes an obligation on all of us: "We must reaffirm the goal of full employment." In other words the security of jobs and a high level of employment are our first priorities. Conservative recipes are of no use. In other countries they had devastating consequences on employment, prices and social peace.

As far as the Federal Republic is concerned, it is correct to claim that we still maintain our competitive and successful status. We refuse to let this be destroyed; we want to help strengthen the modernization and competitiveness of our economy. At the same time we say equally frankly that willingness for social change must go hand in hand with technological change.

One of the most important tasks for SPD propagandist work consists in describing to our fellow citizens the difficult conditions confronting the Federal Government and all of us and arousing their understanding for that which can be done.

To resolve our problems we need more than general economic programs.

Such programs are immediately vitiated by the oil price-dependent current account and the danger that worldwide inflation may more than hitherto affect the Federal Republic. It will be necessary to choose the areas of growth where additional jobs may be provided. They include housing construction, the remodeling of old buildings, energy conservation and the construction of power plants, especially the replacement of obsolete coal-fired plants. The opportunities offered by these and other sectors for strengthening our economic capacity are being complied and appraised by the study group on employment recently established by the Social Democratic parliamentary faction. Its findings will be available in April next.

The tremendous economic and social challenges facing us can be dealt with only with the help of all blue and white collar workers and their trade unions. The SPD unswervingly upholds its claim for employee codetermination as rooted in the Godesberg Program. Legislation now on its way through parliament will, for the next 6 years, prevent the major corporation Mannesmann and subsequently other firms from revoking the iron and steel codetermination agreement on 1 July 1981. Everyone must realize that we will continue to do battle for the permanent assurance of equal employee codetermination.

We are fully aware that codetermination is a fundamental prerequisite for the humanization of working life. That holds true especially at times of technological and structural change in the economy.

The difficulties experienced in some sectors of the housing market, especially in the large cities, are caused by, among others, functional defects of the land holding system and crass inequities in the distribution of real property. We will have to strongly emphasize that in this sector also it is impossible to obtain greater efficiency without more equity. It will moreover be necessary to point out the errors committed in the modernization and restoration of the inner cities, and to help remedy them.

A key issue is the decision on future energy supplies. The SPD has intensively studied this issue and adopted valid resolutions at its party congresses.

Our energy policy is determined by the following aspects: Most importantly greater emphasis on energy conservation, priority for coal, the promotion of alternative forms of energy, the use of nuclear power if the demand for electricity cannot be met by any other means.

It is true that we have already achieved appreciable oil conservation, but a substantial energy conservation potential still awaits exploitation. The SPD will more emphatically pursue the potentials for energy conservation at federal, Land and municipal level. We endorse the Federal Government's offer to the Laender for instituting a new distant heating program and also the announcement of the preparation of a law on ending the use of oil in power plants.

As for nuclear energy, we refer to the resolutions of the Hamburg and Berlin party congresses and the possibilities mentioned therein.

In some regions it will be necessary to decide on one of several approaches to the energy issue. We must not allow our political opponents to hoodwink us into considering this an all or nothing choice. That applies even to Brokdorf. The construction of a nuclear power plant in Brokdorf as well as the construction of alternative coal-fired power plants with thermal heat coupling to replace Brokdorf would conform to the SPD congress resolution.

There is no reason whatever for the sake of this issue to jeopardize the capacity to govern and the will to the responsible organization of policies. Nobody in this country is better fitted than the Social Democrats to develop and pursue a responsible and future oriented energy policy.

IV. To Secure Peace

Since 1969 the SPD and FDP, in close coordination with their Western allies, have pursued a policy of balance, detente and technical cooperation. This has provided greater security for our country and Europe. The SPD and FDP have carried this policy against the strong resistance of the Union parties and a section of public opinion. Up to now our traditional critics have lacked the wisdom to look at these matters realistically.

In the meantime new dangers to peace have arisen. Our security also could be decisively imperilled by a further speed-up in the arms race, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the war between Iraq and Iran, increasingly frequent crises in other regions and the exacerbation of the North-South conflict.

Even in the most difficult months after Afghanistan and confronted with the acute dangers arising from the Polish situation Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Defense Minister Hans Apel have demonstrated that they are successfully laboring for the cause of peace. The party executive reaffirms the SPD Bundestag faction's declaration of 10 February and stresses that moderation is the dictate of the hour, and that recourse to force within and without Europe is incompatible with the final act of Helsinki.

Social Democrats are well aware that the alliance and our contribution to it are indispensable for our security. Within it we champion our German as well as European interests. There is no alternative in the 1980's either to the policy of balance, reasonable relations, the peaceful reconciliation of different interests, the policy of detente. To further develop this policy, help it achieve new successes--that is the present-day challenge to us Social Democrats.

Social Democrats are also well aware that an approximate equality between the systems of alliance is necessary to preserve peace. For Social Democratics this excludes a position of weakness as much as the striving for military superiority.

The party executive reaffirms the resolutions adopted by the Berlin Congress on defense policy, the alliance and the Bundeswehr. It notes that the Federal Government's policy agrees with our resolutions. As regards the NATO dual resolution, the Berlin Congress decided that the Federal Government should agree to the emplacement in Europe of medium range weapons developed by the United States on its own (possible at the earliest in 1983) only on condition that their introduction be renounced if arms control negotiations are successful. Following this resolution and thanks to the efforts of the Federal Government pertinent negotiations have begun. The SPD stresses the necessity and urgency of negotiations, failing which we cannot hope to obtain the satisfactory results desired.

The SPD assumes that the Federal Government will urge the responsible partners toward the continued actual observance of the principles of the SALT II Treaty and also insist on the early continuation of the SALT process while, at the same time, stressing the special interests of Europe and the Federal Republic.

No constructive development policy is feasible unless the prerequisites for arms limitation are provided. We cannot succeed if, by ourselves alone, we proceed to couple arms limitation and assistance to the developing countries.

Our earlier restraints on arms exports should be maintained. They should also be observed with regard to the requests for weapons supplies currently discussed.

Provision has been made for better coordination between the government and the government factions in parliament. Our faction set up a "study group on arms exports" which will submit its proposals next month.

At its meeting of 12 December 1980 the party executive unanimously informed the Federal Government of its disapproval of arms exports to the Chilean Government. It also backed efforts to cancel the shipment of submarines to Chile.

V. Open Discussion, United Action

Open discussion as to how the SPD is to tackle the problems of mankind and society is as necessary to us as air is to breathing. The past 10 years have demonstrated that the SPD did best in elections whenever it discussed vital issues and showed our citizens--whatever their political opinions--that it understands their problems and endeavors to find the best possible solution. In practical terms this means that we must talk to one another, not about one another. Even passionate controversies may help us advance, provided they do not leave the realm of human decency and political commitment.

Leading Social Democrats should not publicly criticize the situation in the sphere of responsibility of others. Everyone has his own responsibility, and all must bear it in common. No individual Social Democrat may presume to decide on his own what social democratic policy should be.

1981 is a year of special challenges and a year when all Social Democrats will be tested. The party must, therefore, concentrate its political instruction and to an even greater extent take note of the new topics emerging in the society of the 1980's.

11698
CSO: 3103

SPD OFFICIAL BREAKS WITH SCHMIDT OVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Feb 81 pp 29-31

[Article: "End of the Line"]

[Text] Kiel's SPD front runner and atomic power opponent Klaus Matthiesen threw in the towel. He does not want to run for minister president against the grand nuclear coalition of Schmidt and Stoltenberg.

When Klaus Matthiesen, 39, the opposition leader in Kiel, boarded an Alitalia jet in Hamburg last Thursday morning to take him to Bonn, he still hoped he might convince Helmut Schmidt of the fact "that solidarity is not a one-way street."

In a private meeting with the chancellor, Matthiesen implored him not to support CDU minister president Stoltenberg's plans for building the Brokdorf nuclear power plant. Otherwise, the decisions of both the SPD and FDP organizations in almost all of North Germany would be "undercut."

Matthiesen's "last attempt" to get Bonn "to change course" did not succeed. Schmidt, who said "I will stick to my position," let it be known that he would "encourage" Preussenelektra to take Hamburg's place, if it should decide not to take part in the Brokdorf project. After an hour, Matthiesen decided: "I am no longer available as top candidate for 1983."

There is no denying that there is a new crisis now --on the heels of the Berlin senate's resignation and the airport controversy in South Hesse and the nuclear power fight in Hamburg. Now there is a crisis situation in a party organization that had high hopes until not too long ago to take over the Land government. 2 years ago, at any rate, SPD and FDP, with Matthiesen at their head, had missed winning a majority in the Land elections by just a few hundred votes.

Now that Matthiesen has withdrawn, the Land organization which once bore the distinct stamp of "red Jochen" Steffen, has no credible candidate to offer. The Land chairman, Guenter Jansen, 44, would rather concentrate on his legislative duties in Bonn.

The party presidium would seem to lean toward 41 year-old left-winger Bjoern Engholm, just named federal education minister, to succeed Matthiesen. But Engholm, when told by SPIEGEL of Matthiesen's decision last Friday afternoon, simply said: "My name is being mentioned without my having anything to do with it."

It was clear to see both that the Brokdorf conflict might worsen and that Matthiesen might make good his threat to withdraw. Matthiesen, a practicing Lutheran who would have wanted to become a priest, a "man with a backbone," as the HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT has characterized him, tends to view Brokdorf as a moral challenge, too.

Matthiesen supported the SPD 1979 convention's compromise resolution --but just barely-- which assigned priority status to coal and restricted the use of nuclear energy to covering additional power needs, if any. But when Schmidt said that Bonn would, in Matthiesen's words, extend "emergency help to Stoltenberg," Matthiesen considered that a "provocation," contending that "the Brokdorf reactor, if built, would clearly assign priority status to nuclear energy in North Germany." Matthiesen also felt that the new plant would aggravate the nuclear waste disposal problem and would impede the far more sensible construction of coal-powered power plants.

Schmidt's nuclear policy seems to Matthiesen to be a "prime example" of the "dilemma of social democratic policies generally."Matthiesen holds that "compromises worked out at party conventions are no longer considered to be binding goals of social democratic government policy. Saying 'we can live with this decision,' the government simply disregards them and pursues the same policy as before... in tandem with the CDU, if need be; against the spirit of these very decisions, if need be."

In the SPD Land organization last weekend, Matthiesen enjoyed broad support. Outraged party members said they were "fighting mad" about Schmidt's"dirty deals." One of them shouted amid applause: "This is the end of the line."

Matthiesen himself tends to agree. "No party can survive forever," he says, "if there is a wide gap between its words and deeds."

A man like Matthiesen cannot; that much is clear.

9478
CSO: 3103

PROBLEMS, TASKS OF SPD IN RELATING TO YOUTH

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 22 Jan 81 p 17

/Article by Bernd Schoppe on the prejudgment of "apolitical" youth and the task of the SPD: "'Come All Ye Children' Does Not Play Any More"]

/Text/ Last October the majority of young voters again chose the SPD--no reason for complacency, though. Why? What happens among young people and is misinterpreted even by the SPD people as withdrawal to resignation and "opting out" in fact represents more than a provocation to the parties. Together with their political credibility, democratic institutions as such are at risk.

All parties have announced that they intend to concern themselves more with the young generation. Many young people may consider this more of a threat than a promise, many others will not care, and others yet will adopt a wait and see attitude. In any case the parties will not find the going easy because the gap is exceedingly wide.

Social Democrats should not complacently contemplate the helplessness of the Union parties. The main problem is not the danger of the young turning to the Union, it is the danger of alienation from democratic institutions as such. This alienation is not reflected in a revolt against political institutions such as the parties (as was the case among some students of the 1960's). The present danger is much greater: Alienation takes the form of indifference vis-a-vis the political parties.

In former times protests concerned conflicts with the parties. By now many young people consider the parties so meaningless for their personal outlook that they assign no value whatever to disputes or protests. Insofar the parties are now confronting a problem which will be much harder to deal with than the integration of some of the extra-parliamentary opposition in the late 1960's. At that time many of the young, while criticizing political institutions, still recognized the importance of these institutions and the need to change them (reflected in the popular slogan "a march through the institutions"). What threatens at the present time is the danger of more and more young people assuming a "non-relationship" to the parties. No longer are the parties the object of many young peoples desire for change.

For the SPD the main implication is this: Not to expect very much when addressing the young. It is simply not on the agenda to persuade young people that social democratic attitudes are correct--for that it is too late. On the agenda now would

should be a more modest attempt to find at least some kind of an approach to communication with the young. In the present circumstances that would be quite an achievement.

We are often told about the change in values of the young generation--the abandonment of the emphasis on material values and the longing for non-material values. This theory is simplistic at best. It may have been true at the time of comfortable economic growth rates when, on the basis of secure material circumstances the issues of "having" tended to take a back seat to issues of "being." However, the "society of plenty," maintained entirely at the expense of the ecology and the peoples of the Third World, has vanished for good--in future we will be confronted by shortages rather than abundance. In view of these prospects material issues are again important to the young also: Whether they will get a job appropriate to their education is as much a material problem for them as the question whether they will be able to rent an apartment at a reasonable price.

These material--even vital--issues may turn out socially explosive when confronted by obviously immoral responses: Houses standing empty because of profiteering offer an example of immorality. Many of those affected are bound to consider a virtual provocation the fact that this society hardly bothers anymore to conceal its contradictions. While not approving the squatters, we should not be surprised by their rise either.

The doctrine of the reorientation of the young from material to non-material values is too inexact, yet there are indeed some changes in attitudes discernible in many young people--albeit to a differing extent. One of the features of this change is the fact that alienation from political institutions is accompanied by a turn inward, toward their own measurable circumstances and the belief that these may be directly organized and affected by themselves: As regards recreation and housing, for instance. In such matters they are also willing to commit themselves and undertake quite strenuous efforts.

The Label 'Apolitical'

This has nothing in common with the "withdrawal to private life" or "getting out of politics." Such simplistic labels are no more than proof of many politicians predilection for denigrating as apolitical everything which in fact is just different. This youth is not apolitical, it simply interprets politics in different terms: Away with the delegation of social and even personal problems to large organizations with structures they consider ossified and tending to prevent participation--back to self-reliance and personal initiative. Obviously politics are involved when, for example, people organize their social lives in the housing sector.

It may be claimed that many young people nowadays enter into fewer but rather more purposeful political commitments. It is not that they have become apolitical but that the scope for active political commitment has narrowed due to the more difficult conditions of training. To obtain admission to an attractive course of education it is no longer enough to have graduated from secondary school; in many disciplines the numerus clausus can be overcome only by being "better" than the others.

Nowadays young people do not take coaching to avoid a "d" in the report card but to achieve an "a." Obviously this leaves little scope for political activism.

Responsible for this turn of events are mainly the worsening material conditions. Insofar the doctrine of the declining significance of material values--whether deliberately or not--has the function also of removing from discussion the economic background to this development.

The "major topics of politics" are all too remote from the immediate concerns of young people. Though some of these topics, such as the "security of peace," exert great moral attraction, disregarding demonstrations they are relevant to daily life only when they may be included in the young people's own range of experience. Herein lies the importance of conscientious objection. Young people do not believe that they can influence government decisions on disarmament or rearmament. They are, however, well able to decide whether they themselves should take up arms. Conscientious objection also represents an attept to wipe out their feeling of helplessness regarding this vital topic and to more or less make their personal contribution.

Another aspect of change among large sections of the young generation is greater concentration on the realization of their concept of personal happiness. Again this should not be confounded with "opting out," because these concepts frequently also amount to social goals, although the commitment is confined to the immediate environment. When they encounter others of like mind, they get together with them. And if society is unwilling to go along, they proceed not against it (as used to be the case earlier) but without it (or at least so they believe). Their main concern is that society should not hinder them. They do not expect support but are quite prepared to defend themselves against obstruction.

Silent Rituals

At the same time they want these goals to be realized here and now. The present is not judged so much by the criterion of what used to be as by what could be right now. They point out the discrepancy between that which is and that which could be. These are criteria which leave as little scope for escape to utopian visions as for complacent comparisons with the past.

Politicians will have to come to terms with the fact that the politics of this generation are geared much more to individuals and their behavior. While, in the 1960's, "system-related issues" and social structures were hotly debated, the young people now scrutinize mainly individuals and their credibility. Many may smile and regard this is a sign of naivety, but it is definitely less comfortable for politicians because they are held much more directly responsible for political developments.

In political discussions with the young such classifications as "left," "right" or "center" are far less important than the criteria "morality" and "credibility." In case of doubt credibility is not enjoyed by that politician who loudly proclaims the rightness of his ways but by the one who shows himself ready to listen to and ponder the arguments of those who hold different opinions.

What to do? To begin with Social Democrats must demonstrated that they have recognized and learned to appreciate these trends among the young people. That does not mean that they should accept everything--ingratiation is not a suitable approach. However, an important condition of that approach is sensitivity to the feelings of many of the young, especially in view of the widespread attitude that "they simply do not understand."

Of course it is not enough to signal understanding. The party must make an effort to establish a dialog. The best chance here is the local sector, because it is best suited to appeal to the actual level of experience of the young. This is all the more important because "major politics" are offered by the media anyway. The young are totally disinterested in forms of communication which merely reproduce this political offer.

Organized party events must be alternatives to media politics. The tendency is still very much that of "come all ye children," to sit back and wait for the young to attend party events just to listen to the statements of party officials. Many elected officials are just too lazy to visit youth centers and take part in the discussions. The classic form of communication is still the "pronunciamento," where party officials reel off their lecture for the umpteenth time, though we have learned in many election campaigns that conferences in the form of a debate or dialog are far more attractive.

Where are the party events at which the young or not discussed but at which we discuss with the young? Where politicians and "experts" do not inform other politicians and "experts" about their views on modern youth, but where the young people themselves talk of their problems, the politicians listen, and both sides then discuss the issues? Even thinking of such meetings makes some party officials shudder because they cannot foretell how such meetings will end, whether they will be able to control them.

Where are the events which are not primarily oriented to the potential media response but to the needs and interests of the young interlocutors--even if that might involve the danger of the party losing a few feathers to the young? Once Social Democrats are prepared to take such risks and organize meeting with youthful input, they will be far more credible for the young than by withdrawing to stramlined and smoothly functioning events.

No Market for Tactics

Another aspect of the topic credibility is that of the party having the courage to admit to learning from its mistakes. The admission to have learned from external impulses (such as citizen initiatives) represents an excellent response, especially in view of the accusation that the parties are overly rigid and immobile. The SPD surely enjoys some remnants of respect among the young just because its internal discussions more strongly reflect the controversies in our society than those of all the other parties. At the present time, however, there is the danger of narrowing the scope of discussion by misusing the argument of "endangering jobs" to bludgeon all other moral arguments, wither with regard to the ecology or disarmament, to take some examples. The party is bound to lose its attraction for the young by such procedures.

Lastly: At the local level especially Social Democrats should offer the young more opportunities for involvement and aid for their own initiatives. We simply cannot constantly appeal to the sense of responsibility and the initiative of the young without doing something about it--especially in those communities where the Social Democrats hold sway. This involves the need to support sensible initiatives even if they cannot be organizationally incorporated by the SPD or are not oriented to the SPD.

Considering the apprehension aroused among many local Social Democrat politicians by the slogan "self-administered youth centers," it is all too clear how much work remains to be done among our own ranks. From this aspect it is not surprising that young people mistrust the party's attempt to approach them, because they assume such approaches to be no more than recruitment tactics and motivated entirely by self-serving party interests.

Let nobody be deceived by the SPD's relatively good showing among young voters: The negative image of candidate Strauss once more drove many young people to the SPD, but alienation from and apathy to the parties are advancing apace. When the problem begins to be appreciated, that is when it shows up in the election results, it is usually too late to reverse the trend. Those who are complacent about the election results resemble those politicians whom Austrian writer Werner Schneyder described as follows: "Some politicians count so much on the vote of the electorate that they find no time to listen." /This last is a play on words: In German the term "voice" may be substituted for the word "vote."/

11698
CSO: 3103

STRAUSS ALLEGEDLY LOSING CONTROL OF CSU

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Feb 81 p40

/Article: "Remove Helmets"/

/Text/ The conflict with the CSU fraction in the Land parliament is causing Strauss to lose both strength and face in his own camp now. Party friends of his are beginning to "feel that his days are numbered."

When the CSU presidium met at party headquarters last Monday, Munich's lord mayor Erich Kiesl made something of a gesture to August Lang, the chairman of the CSU fraction in the Land Parliament. He handed him a plateful of donuts and Bavarian lard noodles and said: "You see, Gus, I will not let you starve."

Now Gus was definitely in need of kind words and sustenance because lateron, both at the presidium meeting and at the meeting of the CSU Land presidium that followed, the main topic was the intensified "trench warfare," as Munich's ABENDZEITUNG put it, between the Lang camp in the fraction leadership and Bavarian minister president Franz Josef Strauss-- even if the front lines have shifted somewhat of late.

The latest blast came in a heavy-handed article aimed at the Lang camp and published in the next-to-last issue of the party paper, BAYERNKURIER. Its author, Baron Georg von Waldenfels, state secretary in the Bavarian economics ministry had hardly been heard from before. Waldenfels, 36, who is from Upper Franconia, spoke of "deceit within the ranks" and accused the CSU lawmakers of "mounting intrigues" and loosing a "flood of indiscretions," all designed to enhance their own reputation "at Franz Josef Strauss' expense."

Waldenfels' harsh words referred primarily to a threat voiced by the CSU party chairman at a joint cabinet meeting attended by members of the parliamentary fraction to the effect that he could "tell all" about the failures of the Munich police department in connection with the 1972 Olympic massacre and that he might select the Land parliament's investigating committee as his forum which

is to look into Strauss' engineering the dismissal of Munich deputy police commissioner Georg Wolf at a CSU meeting last September.

This brought a sharp retort from Lang who said that there are "far more" indiscretions that can be traced to the executive branch than to the legislature. Alois Glueck, another member of the fraction's presidium,attacked Waldenfels by saying: "We will not let anyone call us a bunch of incompetents."

What irked the lawmakers most was that a "state secretary's drivel," as Lang put it, must have been inspired by someone higher up and could not have found its way to the front page of BAYERNKURIER without Strauss' approval, who is the paper's publisher. "What is he after this time," one member of the fraction asked himself.

The loss of the Bundestag election, continued dissatisfaction with policies at the Land level, the intemperate threats (as in the case of the Olympic massacre) and wild allegations (as in the case of the Oktoberfest bombing for which, according to Strauss, GDR agents were responsible) are all causing the party chief to lose more and more ground and more and more of his following within the ranks. The legislative fraction, which is gradually emerging as a second power center next to party headquarters, no longer considers itself "his private political fighting force complete with steel helmets and machine guns," as one lawmaker has said, and therefore refuses to be drawn into a loyalty conflict of choosing sides for or against Strauss or Lang.

While Strauss was able to boss around and ridicule Lang's predecessor Alfred Seidl at will --he would say to him "you are both dumb and short and what is more neither failing can ever be corrected"-- he has had no success along these lines with Lang. If anything, the reverse is true.

When Strauss accused the fraction of not sufficiently informing and consulting with the government, Lang countered by saying that the minister president made a habit of not attending important sessions of the legislature. Last November, however, when the two clashed over this issue, Lang prevailed in the face of Strauss' request that a parliamentary manager be appointed as a watchdog. "Over my dead body," Lang said.

As for the opposition, it is enjoying the duel between the self-confident Lang and the somewhat groggy Strauss. The SPD calls the situation "warlike" and the FDP views Lang as an "historical figure emerging in the CSU; a kind of tree against which Strauss is continually butting his head."

Talk of these controversies is making the rounds inside the CSU, both in the provinces and in Bonn. "Strauss' prestige is no longer what it once was," a Bundestag member and CSU Kreis chairman says. "There is a feeling generally that his days are numbered. Down at the grass roots, people applaud when you let them know you support the Land parliament fraction."

The Strauss faithful at CSU headquarters appear to be worried about this change of climate. This particular Kreis chairman told us that headquarters recently asked all CSU election district managers "to listen around and report back any negative statements made about Strauss."

Whatever the result of this endeavor may be, the controversy centering around Waldenfels' BAYERNKURIER article and the alleged "indiscretions" has produced no more than a diversionary maneuver. The CSU Land presidium issued a communique which made no mention of the test of strength between the fraction and the minister president but merely referred to what was called "misinformation" on the part of the press in an attempt to discredit Strauss "by citing imaginary, anonymous lawmakers or members of the CSU presidium."

Even conservative MUENCHNER MERKUR, which Strauss recently succeeded in rubbing the wrong way, called this an "old wives tale which no one in Bavaria, not even a 3 year-old, can be expected to believe. And yet, the CSU presidium is not above putting out such nonsense."

On the other hand, the outcome of the presidium meeting hardly seems to indicate that Strauss carried the day-- even if he himself smugly says: "That put an end to pluralism."

9478
CSO: 3103

ACTIVITIES, AMBITIONS OF CDU'S SPAETH

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Feb 81 p42-43

[Article: "Meadows and Forests"]

[Text] Stuttgart's CDU head of government is mounting a publicity campaign and setting his sights on CDU leadership, on Bonn and the FRG itself.

Spaeth's new official car is to be "the strongest of the strong," STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG reports: an armor-plated Mercedes 500 SEL with air conditioning and inch-thick windows and is to cost DM 240,000. The chancellor in Bonn meantime has to make do with a weakly 380 SEL.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, for its part, has poked fun at Spaeth's penchant for exotic travel, comparing its style and variety "with the pace set by the Pope." Over the past 2 years, Spaeth has visited China and South America, South Korea and Australia, Newzealand and Hongkong, the United States and Mexico along with a number of European countries.

And STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN has pointed out that Spaeth, who took over as minister president of Baden-Wuerttemberg in August 1978 is "the greatest in air travel" in the FRG, too. In 1980 alone, he flew 130 police helicopter sorties in addition to his frequent flights to Bonn aboard the private planes of friends.

Spaeth, 43, is the only minister president to have engaged an advisory staff of "13 wise men." This brain trust, on board since last November, is composed of experts in the field of economics, finance and the social and political sciences including Rudolf Wildenmann and Karl Steinbuch as well as Hermann Luebbe and Gottfried Bombach, who are both Swiss.

This choice group, which has its own budget and its own offices in the state capitol is to advise the minister president primarily on "matters dealing with the future and with world trade." In commenting on the advisory group, South German Radio said that on closer

inspection "it would seem to be suited to the requirements of a chancellor rather than those of a minister president," since all the experts' opinions are "focused on a much larger picture." The commentator therefore concluded: "In a way, one can almost feel sorry for the minister president."

But that would be selling Spaeth's estimate of himself short. He feels on top of things now and is committed to climbing higher still. At the Baden-Wuerttemberg CDU's party platform conference in Boeblingen this Friday and Saturday he is presenting himself as the one who can point the way to the future as concerns the party, the nation and society as a whole.

Under the circumstances, the delegates, most of whom are from rural constituencies and middle-sized towns, will not be discussing the glut of teachers and the aged and infirm, the housing shortage and questions of urban renewal, nor even new strategies for combating potential inroads the SPD and FDP might make.

Instead, the official program lists such topics as the "future of the family" and "secure jobs in a humane work environment" as well as "structural policies." The keynote speech on "perspectives in foreign and security policy for the eighties" will be given by CDU Bundestag member Manfred Woerner.

All of this is in line with the plans the ambitious, eloquent Spaeth has for the CDU national convention in Mannheim next March where he expects to climb another rung. Thus far, his election there to the CDU presidium is uncontested; he would then be one of the seven deputies of party chairman Helmut Kohl. As for further advances right up to the party chairmanship, succeeding Kohl-- Spaeth likes to think himself unstoppable.

Clever scheduling by the Land presidium has relegated the agenda item for which many CDU politicians did most of their homework to the late evening hours, after supper-- the one entitled "discussion on the organization and operation of the party."

Spaeth can thus look forward to this sole potentially critical item without trepidation: the delegates will be well fed and tired by that time. There had been talk at the grass roots level that Spaeth, who took over as CDU Land chairman in 1979, should by rights be taken to task for traveling all over the world and neglecting his home base in the process and for the party's having sustained two sharp election defeats during his tenure.

In the Land election last March, the CDU slipped to 53.4 percent as compared to 56.7 percent in 1976 under the then strict and thrifty of Hans Karl Filbinger. And in the Bundestag election last October, the CDU dipped below the 50 percent mark, getting 48.5 percent of the vote.

Spaeth is materially responsible for this second worst showing in CDU history in Baden-Wuerttemberg because he came out early for his crony Strauss and stayed with him throughout the Bundestag election campaign. "We simply never achieved our goal," Spaeth said when asked to comment on his miscalculation.

Although the good results achieved by the FDP and the Greens in the Land elections should have made Spaeth aware of the need to shift gears for the Bundestag campaign, both he and the CDU in Wuerttemberg-Baden as a whole paid no heed to these signs of a change in the political climate.

The FDP, for its part, under its adroit Land chairman Juergen Morlok who appeals to the bourgeois middle class, the young voters, the professionals and upper echelon civil servants in equal measure has been gaining both strength and favor since 1979. The FDP's chances of breaking the CDU's absolute majority in Baden-Wuerttemin the Land elections 3 years hence are not at all bad.

Even the Social Democrats, weakened by a loss of votes, sulking in the corner at the behest of their grouchy Land chairman Erhard Eppler and seriously sapped in strength by the Greens, are hoping for better days. To be sure, hardly anyone outside Baden-Wuerttemberg has ever heard of Ulrich Lang, the Land chairman designate, who is a friend of Eppler's and a teacher, like him. But the SPD is out to make its mark in the Land parliament by working hard and that is the very forum Spaeth seems to care about least by now.

Among other things, it has been Spaeth's seesaw budget policy, his witchhunts against radicals, his brusque manner vis-a-vis his own fraction and his lack of contact to CDU experts in the legislature that have eroded his prestige.

Lawmaker Erwin Teufel, the CDU fraction chairman, who is frequently outmaneuvered by Spaeth and the votes of the cabinet members and state secretaries loyal him complains about Spaeth's "up-and-down policies" and his predecessor Filbinger feels that Spaeth's grandstand tactics betray a "lack of substance."

The CDU's Land organization in Baden-Wuerttemberg has increased its membership to 86,000, the third largest in the CDU/CSU, but it has grown most among senior citizens. Gerd Langguth, the chairman of the Young Union, fears that the CDU is in the process of becoming "a minority party, biologically speaking" while the SPD, the FDP and above all the Greens are making every effort to attract the younger generation.

The fact that Spaeth is considered a strong leader and an activist both in Bonn and throughout the country as only Strauss is otherwise may perhaps be due to his never having had to put his head on the block for anyone or anything since he took office in 1978, to his never having had to bear any responsibility and to his not being hampered or jealously watched by a troublesome coalition partner.

For example, the court decision on the construction of the controversial nuclear power plant at Wyhl in Baden is not yet in. Baden-Wuerttemberg has not had anything like Gorleben or Brokdorf to contend with and there have not been any street battles or political scandals.

That is why Spaeth has the peace of mind it takes to propose to the CDU/CSU as a whole --with an eye to the convention in March-- a "social-conservative program" tailored to the needs of "sensitive segments of society." The CDU, Spaeth feels, ought to make more of an effort in the social field and should "win over the handicapped in greater numbers."

In Bonn, on the other hand, he would seek to gain acceptance by adopting a "new strategy in the Bundesrat" such as having the Stuttgart contingent support important pieces of legislation sponsored by the socialist-liberal federal government, even if other CDU-controlled Laender did not-- a proposal the SPD calls a "diffuse jingle of words."

The first such opportunity has come and gone and Spaeth's assertions notwithstanding, Baden-Wuerttemberg's delegates cast their vote against both the mineral oil tax increase and the law calling for the reduction of subsidies last week.

But such discrepancies between words and deeds do not bother Spaeth in the least. He considers it more important to have been mentioned twice by name in PRAVDA, the more so since he is eagerly hoping for an invitation to Moscow. Last week, Spaeth and his cabinet visited France for 3 days. His next trips, all within this year, will take him to Yugoslavia, Norway, Africa, Japan and China.

9478
CSO: 3103

FDP POLITICIANS IMPLICATED IN FINANCIAL SCANDALS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Feb 81 p90-91

[Article: "Enough is Enough"]

[Text] FDP chairman Genscher is alarmed about the financial escapades of his party friends Ertl, Karry and Gattermann and worries about the FDP's reputation of being Germany's Mr Clean.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher may not be fond of raising his voice-- but he can when he has to.

In no uncertain terms he wanted to find out what the matter was and what else there was to know. "What else have we not been told," he burst out. "How much more is there ?" One of his associates was quite stunned. "I have rarely seen the boss so indignant," he said.

Genscher lost his cool when he read about his party's weird financial practices in last week's SPIEGEL. There are growing grounds for suspicion that kickbacks on arms deals were sought by agriculture minister Josef Ertl, by FDP treasurer Heinz Herbert Karry, who holds the post of economics minister in Wiesbaden and by FDP Bundestag deputy Hans Gattermann, the FDP treasurer for North Rhine-Westphalia.

Questioned by Genscher, Karry protested his innocence, as always. There is nothing to the accusations, he said-- but he did not want to go to court: there was nothing to be done to counter the SPIEGEL article.

In his own defense, Karry produced a sheaf of telexes to show that the arms manufacturer Rheinmetall had approached members of all three parties represented in the Bundestag as well as the chancellor himself with a request for help in obtaining an export license for a machine gun factory to be supplied to Saudi Arabia.

But these documents will be of little help to Karry. It was he, after all, who negotiated with a representative of the arms firm in December 1976 according to arms dealer Gerhard Mertins. "Following that conversation...approval was granted," Mertins said.

Ertl who is also alleged to have used his connections to help the arms manufacturer did not have anything new to say in his defense last week either. Instead, he laid the blame for the whole affair on his leftwing FDP opponents, as he had before. The liberals in interior minister Gerhart Baum's camp were after Karry, after him and after economics minister Lambsdorff, in that order.

"It is a cops and robbers story with political overtones," Ertl told his party chief, informing him that he had also said as much to the Bonn district attorney who interrogated him.

But Genscher has long since stopped being amused by Ertl's financial escapades and those of the other Free Democrats. A source close to Genscher says: "By now he has reached the point of saying enough is enough."

The chairman is worried about his party's reputation. The FDP, long known for its high scruples, might soon shrink down to size in more ways than one.

If it should turn that the liberals, too, are prepared to sell political favors, then they would not be one wit more honorable than the SPD which has had its share of scandals or the CDU which was rocked by the financial scandal that caused the downfall of Nikolaus Pasolt, the president of the Association of German Industry.

News from Berlin is that the liberals are deeply involved in the scandal centering around the bankrupt architect Garski, which is running into hundreds of millions. An investigating committee may uncover damaging information relating to economics senator Wolfgang Lueder, who has since resigned.

In Bonn, the kickback affairs of agriculture minister Ertl are still smoldering and as such constitute a threat to the socialist-liberal government which at least has not been tainted by corruption until now.

In Wiesbaden last week, FDP treasurer Karry tried his best to make light of his role in the arms export deal. "The lady cannot be serious," he says of the charges leveled against him by Gertrud Rech, Gattermann's former secretary. "I was acting in the best interests of the Hessian machine building industry."

Karry's habit of using every opportunity to act as a spokesman for domestic industry not only irritates the socialist members of the coalition in Hesse but also the Bonn FDP leadership. In December, Karry thwarted a police search of building firms suspected of illegal price fixing although a judge had previously examined the records of the Land cartel office and issued the search warrants.

When the Wiesbaden district attorney's office announced last Monday that an investigation for suspicion of bribery was underway against Karry's assistant director Georg Schneider, the minister became very nervous indeed.

Both Schneider and Otto Kirst, the state secretary in the economics ministry, made representations to SPD justice minister Herbert Guenther because they were distressed by the unfavorable publicity.

As for Schneider, he stands accused in a sworn statement by Mrs Rech of having accepted checks and cash and having passed these monies on to the FDP in return for the procurement of loans and leases for housing built for American soldiers. Schneider denies the charges and Karry is even willing to risk his "head to prove that Schneider never received 150,000 Marks."

North Rhine-Westphalian treasurer Gattermann is also at pains to defuse Mrs Rech's revelations by pointing out that he must have been duped himself. Behind his back, he says, the lady must have used "my Bonn office as a kind of message center or broker's office." She might even have "embezzled" the many thousands the arms exporters meant to pay out to the FDP. "I am just a simple notary public from the country," Gattermann says. "I had no idea about how these things are done."

But the party leadership may not believe he was as naive as all that. In fact, a source close to Genscher says, "three men ought to resign. We would even be pleased if just one of them took the hint."

9478
CSO: 3103

CP CHAIRMAN SAARINEN ON PRESIDENCY RACE, POLAND

Helsinki SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI in Finnish 16 Jan 81 pp 14, 15

[Article by Ulpu Taviola: "Aarne Saarinen: People's Front Seeking A Joint Presidential Candidate"]

[Text] In the opinion of SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Chairman Aarne Saarinen the people's front parties should attempt to find a joint candidate for the 1984 presidential elections.

Saarinen surmises that the presidential question is just as difficult in the SDP [Social Democratic Party], the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League], and in the Center Party. It is also a serious matter from the point of view that opportunities for joint appearances should be considered already during the process of nominating candidates.

In Saarinen's opinion it will, of course, be important for the SKP to elect a worker as president. But more important than this is the finding of a suitable individual. After Kekkonen Finland should elect a president whose will and ability to continue the Paasikivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line can be trusted.

"Even though officially a broad unanimity prevails with respect to our foreign policy line, there are still many who have a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union," states Aarne Saarinen.

Even though Saarinen admits that he is not fully capable of interpreting the people's feelings, he considers that this type of hostility can primarily be found in Conservative Party quarters. According to him it also appears in other parties.

"Because of my work I am primarily involved with political people. I have also come to know the counselors of mining all the way up to the level of managing economic relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Indeed their behavior is friendly and polite since Soviet trade represents an excellent source of business for them. But I cannot say that I know their real opinions," states Aarne Saarinen.

Last October the SKP chairman's position on the presidential question received considerable publicity. At that time in an interview published by HUFVUDSTADSBLADET he cast doubts on Mauno Koivisto's suitability for the office of president.

The reference to curly hair, which continues to charm female voters, caused a wave of protests. Saarinen's statement has also been considered as partial reason for the SKDL's poor showing in the local elections.

"I am ready to admit that the statement given by me to HUFVUDSTADSBLADET was not fully thought out. It was a negative reaction to the Gallup game in which it is considered self-evident that Koivisto is the candidate," states Saarinen.

"Presidents are not, however, made by Gallup polls. I was angered by this, particularly since even the SDP has not officially nominated Koivisto as its candidate," he continues.

Aarne Saarinen considers that outside circumstances and factors play a considerably important role in influencing a person's selection process. However, they should not be used as a basis for selection when such an important issue as the presidential elections is in question.

Social Democrat or Bourgeois

The president of the republic is responsible for the conduct of our country's foreign policy. This task presupposes a strong-willed person. Vascillation and hesitation are in Saarinen's opinion bad. For this reason he casts doubts on Koivisto's suitability.

"I have sometimes been reproached for not believing that a communist can yet become the president of Finland. But that is how it is. The president can either be a Social Democrat or a member of the bourgeoisie as long as he shows himself to be worthy of the trust needed for the task," explains Aarne Saarinen.

Previously it has been assumed that the Communists are interested in Bank Director Ahti Karjalainen in connection with the presidential question. Now, however, one gets the impression that views among Communists concerning Karjalainen's suitability are changing, that is, except for the minority.

But all in all the presidential question still seems to be very much of an open and difficult question according to Saarinen. In his opinion this also explains the Center Party's views supporting President Kekkonen.

"Going behind Kekkonen would, of course, be the simplest thing to do," states Saarinen.

Center Party, a Prisoner of the Rightwing

It has been said of the Communists that they will be the last to be ready to leave the government.

To this allegation Saarinen answers that the fact is that the Communists consider the continuation of government cooperation between the left and the center to be politically very important. This is especially so since no better ruling alternatives exist from the point of view of the workers.

A positive stand with respect to the continuation of government cooperation does not, however, mean that we can be satisfied with the present work of the government.

"Indeed there are many difficulties in it and this is no wonder when one takes into consideration that bourgeois forces have a majority in the parliament and the gov-

ernment. Ideologically and politically the government is made up of very diverse forces," states Aarne Saarinen.

In Saarinen's opinion there has occurred a change of positions in the Center Party. According to him the party's own internal even reactionary forces have an excessive influence on the Center Party's policies.

"In addition to this, rightwing forces outside of the government, particularly the Conservative Party, also, of course, enter into the picture. The influence of the Conservative Party can be seen quite clearly in the behavior of the Center Party leadership and its government faction. Even though the Center Party is in the government with the left, it is to a considerable degree, however, a prisoner of rightwing forces," continues Saarinen.

According to Saarinen there are no real great differences between the policies of the Conservative Party and that of the Center Party. From public positions one could even draw the conclusion that in some issues the leadership of the Conservative Party would be even more progressive than the leadership of the Center Party.

According to Saarinen the difficulties of the Center Party and the leftwing are to be found in economic policy. The Center Party has set upon the path of also opposing qualitative reforms which do not require large amounts of money.

"I would refer to every person's right to expand one's knowledge, which is difficult to promote in spite of the trivial nature of this legislative program. The gravel law proceeded from the government to the Diet with differing opinions and everyone knows what finally became of it. The reform of middle administration is still on ice not to mention constitutional reform," enumerates Saarinen.

In Saarinen's estimation the fate of the government lies with next spring's income solutions. Even if this question is cleared up, the next stumbling block will be the compilation of the state's 1981 budget.

"Indeed there are many such problems and issues on which the government can hang itself," states the Chairman of the SKP.

Praise for Postwar Work

In discussing the lack of prospects and the conservative trend of our times Aarne Saarinen complains that postwar achievements are not sufficiently appreciated. Youth does not even know anything about them.

"When the goals established 36 years ago are examined now, one can confirm that for the most part they have been fulfilled both with respect to foreign policy as well as domestic policy.

"When one considers, for example, Finnish and Soviet relations and Finland's position in theinternational arena, the change is indeed great. As far as relations between Finland and the Soviet Union are concerned the situation is to such a degree paradoxical that the relations between a capitalist Finland and the Soviet Union are on a better footing than the mutual relations between certain socialist countries," states Saarinen.

Saarinen cites domestic policy progress by enumerating, among other things, the achievement of a labor contract system, the strengthening of the position of union shop stewards, the development of labor legislation and the shortening of the work week. A 48-hour work week was in effect after the war. Now it is in some places now down to 38 hours.

Saarinen also makes reference to the health insurance system, unemployment security, and the reform of the elementary school system.

"Now the child of a working man has rather good opportunities for a college education," he notes.

However, according to Saarinen the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the mass media as well as in the creation of a social atmosphere and the Americanization of our lifestyle prevent an appreciation of the achievements of the workers' movement.

"Even though the Conservative Party in particular has opposed all progressive issues, the impression has remained that all this is due to the work of the bourgeoisie," he states.

In Saarinen's opinion the workers' movement should pay more attention to the ideological education of youth. Also a stronger attitude should be taken with respect to the expansion of democracy and opportunities for white- and blue-collar workers to influence conditions in their work and their lives.

Class Struggle to Be Continued

"For Communists the continuation of the class struggle includes such concrete goals as the nationalization of the commercial banks and the transfer of key industries to the ownership of society. We are also striving to increase, expand, and diversify state-controlled industries. White- and blue-collar workers should have the opportunity to participate in the administrative and decisionmaking process of the large enterprises," states Saarinen.

The keeping of these goals in the forefront and the attempt to bring them about are in Saarinen's opinion representative of the class struggle in the greatest sense of the word. Progress, however, is no easy.

"Unfortunately today the opportunities do not exist for the kind of joint progressive program that was built after the war between the left and the center, the so-called big three," he regrets.

SKP to Give Up Double Channel

The SKP is now making preparations for its 19th congress to be held in May. A while back Chairman Saarinen made public a stand in which he demanded that the leftwing of the Diet faction either join in cooperation or go its separate way.

"These issues will not, of course, be fully resolved in a single congress. However, the forthcoming congress will be different from the congresses held in the 1970's. In it there will be no repetition of the decisions of the extraordinary congress held in 1970, which obtained an official sanction for the bipartition," states Saarinen.

According to Saarinen the goal is to get away from this double channel. In his opinion an apparent desire for rapproachment can be seen between the factions.

If this rapproachment strengthens, it will make it possible for those holding extreme views to fall by the wayside. This process is now going on under the surface and is thus not yet too visible, but it can also be observed in public speeches and views," states Saarinen.

The situation is according to the SKP chairman made difficult by the fact that it is peculiar to this bipartition that democrat centralism does not concern the whole party, but each faction separately.

"If one leaves the trenches to pursue the other factions, there is a danger that one will fall in between if the aspiration is not general and fo[illegible]ul," he notes.

With respect to his own continuation as chairman of the party Saarinen states that personally it would be easier to withdraw. The reasons that speak on behalf of continuation seem in his opinion to be important and they must be taken into consideration.

The poor showing of the Communists has in addition to domestic reasons also been explained by international reasons.

Saarinen does not underestimate the effect of internal division.

"Even in civilian life a quarrelsome family cannot achieve a sympathetic feeling, but pity and lamentation," he states.

Changes in the international atmosphere also have an effect. This can also be seen in other European communist parties, which in spite of their position of opposition have lost support.

Independence to Be Valued

In addition to increased tensions in the general international atmosphere, the SKP chairman is also naturally concerned about events in Poland.

The old leadership of Poland's fraternal party has according to Saarinen apparently made mistakes, otherwise the present chain of events would not have happened. He, however, wants to point out that positive achievements are also apparent.

Saarinen seems to be very concerned about the fact that the appetite of the solidarity movement seems to increase as it eats. When the party leadership, the old as well as the new, first says no and then says yes, room will also be found for forces negative to socialism. Continuing strikes and the demand for additional wage increases will in themselves worsen the situation.

The events in Poland were also brought up in a recent discussion with a party delegation from Hungary.

"Our points of view were completely unanimous from the point of view that each party must itself determine its own issues. Outside intervention will not help, but complicate the situation," states Saarinen.

"The independence of parties and noninterference in their internal affairs is the only way to avoid conflicts and maintain effective ties in the international communist movement," emphasizes Aarne Saarinen.

10576
CSO: 3107

CONTRADICTORY PRESIDENTIAL POLLS SUMMARIZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Feb 81 p 9

[Article: LE FIGARO poll of 18 Feb and PARIS MATCH poll published 27 Feb; passages enclosed by slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] LE FIGARO on Wednesday 18 February published a SOFRES poll taken 6-12 February using a representative national sample of 1000 people 18 and older. According to this survey, Mr Francois Mitterrand should win in the second round of the presidential election with 52 percent of the vote, compared to 48 percent for Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Compared with the previous FIGARO-SOFRES poll in January (LE MONDE of 22 January), the socialist candidate has gained three points, and the present chief of state has lost three. Out of five SOFRES presidential election polls, this is the first time Mitterrand is running ahead of Giscard d' Estaing.

In the first round, the president of the republic gets 28 percent of intended votes (compared to 31 percent in January), Mr Mitterrand 25 percent (compared to 23 percent), Mr Marchais 17 percent (compared to 16 percent), Mr Chirac 13 percent (compared to 11 percent), Mr Debre 4 percent (compared to 5.5 percent), Mr Lalonde 3.5 percent (compared to 3 percent), Mme Garaud 3 percent (compared to 2.5 percent), Mr Crepeau 1.5 percent (compared to 2 percent), Miss Laguiller 1 percent (compared to 2 percent) and Mr Krivine 1 percent (compared to 0.5 percent). The tallies for Mr Garaudy (1 percent) and Mrs Bouchardeau (0.5 percent) are the same as those recorded for January.

If Coluche is a candidate, he is credited with 7 percent of the intended votes, as he was in January. That candidacy costs Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand 2 points each, Chirac and Marchais 1 point each, and Krivine and Lalonde one-half point each.

According to a poll published by PARIS-MATCH, dated 27 February and taken by Public S.A. on 11-12 February with a representative national sample of 1000 people aged 18 and older, using the quota method, Giscard d'Estaing should be reelected in the second round with 51 percent, compared to 49 percent for Mitterrand. In its previous barometer Public S.A. showed the two candidates running neck and neck.

Voting intentions for the first round remain stable for Giscard d'Estaing (31 percent), as well as for Crepeau (1 percent). Chirac with 12 percent gains 2 points over the previous survey, Mitterrand with 26 percent goes up 1.5. Debre with 2.5 goes up one-half, and /"a candidate of the extreme right"/ with 1 percent goes up one-half a point. By contrast, Marchais loses 2 points (15 percent instead of 17 percent), /"an ecologist candidate"/ loses 1 point (6 percent instead of 7), and /"an extreme left candidate"/ loses 1 point (1 percent instead of 2), while Mrs Garaud goes down half a point (4 percent instead of 4.5).

9516
CSO: 3100

CORSICAN TERRORISTS' TRIAL SHOWS AUTONOMY, POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Principal Accused, Sentenced

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Feb 81 p 10

[Article by Laurent Greilsamer: "Prison Sentences of 3-5 Years Demanded Against Principal Accused"]

[Text] At the end of his concluding arguments in the Bastelica-Fesch trial on Monday, 9 February, the prosecutor-general attached to the State Security Court, Mr Henri Dontenwille, called for prison sentences between 3 and 5 years for Messrs Marcel and Christian Lorenzoni, Gilbert Casanova, and against Messrs Dominique Bianchi and Paul Cortinchi, both of whom refused to appear before the court ever since 14 January. The prosecutor-general demanded the same penalty, with reprieve from execution for Mr Maurice Lorenzoni and possibly sentences of less than 3 years for Messrs Lisu Fazi, Michel Polini, and Auguste-Marc Tirroloni. Mr Dontenwille demanded penalties of less than 3 years, partly with suspension, for Messrs Rene Casanova, Jean-Paul Maurel, Jacques Pianelli, Antoine Bisgambiglia, and Jean-Marie Lorenzoni. Finally, the prosecutor-general suggested that Mr Nonce Grisoni be released. "The law will carry force only to the extent that it is applied in a graduated manner," said the prosecutor-general. "Although these men have gone too far, let us not do the same thing."

Mr Dontenwille made his demands from the aspects of fear and challenge at the same time. Fear above all which "little by little," according to the prosecutor-general, "took hold of all society" in Corsica. With the help of some statistical data, the prosecutor then traced the increase in the number of attacks on the islands since 1968. This has been a noticeable, constant, and impressive increase. 1968 was the time of a certain theft of explosives, the biggest theft ever known in France. At Bordeaux, 2,500 kilograms of explosives, something like 10,000 detonators, and 6 kilometers of fuse slowly changed hands and in Corsica, plastic jumped 15 times. The facts are here: In 1980, nationalists attacks were almost as numerous as the days of the year. A "climate" has thus been created and insidious fear keeps spreading.

This first violence however, starting in 1975, was joined by a second fear, the fear of counterterrorism, the fear of attacks committed by groups which in the end would merge within Francia (New Action Front Against Independence and Autonomy). "There is no such thing as good or bad plastic," said the representative of the office of the attorney general forcefully, talking of "sidetracked legitimate defense" in connection with the action of those men, springing from a visceral reaction in favor of the one and indivisible republic. Now "the republic does not settle accounts," declared the prosecutor-general. "It fights out in the open, its face uncovered. This escalation is unacceptable, worthy of condemnation, and unworthy of draping itself in our colors even though it claims to defend itself." So much for fear.

Hues and Shades

After picturing terrorism and counterterrorism back-to-back, Mr Dontenwille "objectively" talked about the Bastelica-Fesch affair, "a challenge between one man and another, between one clan and another, between one group and another, between certain groups in a state of stiff opposition against the state and the authorities." For Mr Dontenwille, the Bastelica action as a matter of fact tilted into illegality, stayed there, and then gratified. After having intercepted and then kidnapped three men--presumed police detectives--the nationalist group of Bastelica refused to turn over its "prisoners of war" on two occasions, on the first day, against all legality. The prosecutor-general explained: "The armed gang organized itself, it deliberately makes trouble for the state and an entire portion of national territory escapes legitimate authority."

In his explanations, the office of the attorney general was entirely behind the authorities which considered the press conference demanded by the autonomists to be impossible. "It was unthinkable that one could authorize such a thing," he reaffirmed. "There is no good or bad hostage taking. That would open the way to arbitrary procedure. As for the pledges obtained under duress, this is an insult to human rights." Concerning the episode in the Fesch Hotel at Ajaccio, the office of the attorney general again was quite clear. Looking over the eyewitness statements from hotel guests ("that audience which shook with fear"), it was clearly noted that the Fesch Hotel had been properly occupied. So much for the challenge to the state and to the authorities.

After this speech, it remained for Mr Dontenwille to graduate his demands with "important mitigating circumstances." And that was done. "The people really behind the Bastelica-Fesch affairs are not here," said the prosecutor-general. Like Master Jean-Baptiste Giaggi, for the civilian side, on 6 February, Mr Dontenwille revealed certain elements of information which in effect show, according to him, that the National Liberation Front of Corsica (Separatist) was mostly behind the events of Bastelica. "All of this is proof of a trap, of a machination," the prosecutor-general maintained. By the same token, the accused, the 15 autonomists, likewise became victims.

Status of Autonomy, Terrorism

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Jan 81 p 12

[Article by Laurent Greilsamer: "Growing Concern in Corsica Over Revival of Attacks"]

[Excerpts] Just a year after the events of Bastelica and Ajaccio and on the eve of the trial in the State Security Court, the island's inhabitants are increasingly worried about the "rise in violence" which is expressed especially by a growing number of attacks. Two attacks involving explosives took place during the night between Sunday, 11 January, and Monday, 12 January, at Ajaccio. One of them destroyed the car of Mrs Eliane Pierotti, the manager of a law office. Another one, quite symbolic, damaged the bishop's palace in the city. Signs were painted on the walls "kick the bishop out."

"Kick the French Out"

The feeling of insecurity among the population in view of this "rise in violence" is far from negligible. The RPR [Rally for the Republic] parliamentary delegation, from which the four Corsican deputies came, is not wrong when it says: "Why in a final analysis, should we not realize the most essential piece of evidence here: Corsican public opinion is tired." Bastia mayor Jean Zuccarelli (MRG [Revolutionary Left Wing Movement]) says just about the same thing: "The population of Bastia is peaceful almost unanimously. It is beginning to be fed up and it is rejecting this plastic bombing wave."

This last remark has been particularly true since September. At that time, the FLNC [National Liberation Front of Corsica] in effect began to plastic-bomb the apartments of "non-Corsicans," thus resuming a policy which it had rejected at the end of 1978. In just a few months, the independence promoters of the FLNC went after about 50 targets, primarily in the region of Ajaccio. This FLNC policy in particular was rehabilitated in a document dated January 1980 and reading as follows: "The FLNC has no other alternative than to stop the invasion by all means even if we must take the risk of initially being misunderstood. Today, every Frenchman who settles here quite obviously participates in the slow death of our people. This is the moral backup for colonialism and it is thus a strong part of genocide in Corsica. This explains that our people has lost its traditional hospitality and why we say: 'Kick the French out!'"

The reasoning employed by these independence promoters is simple. According to them, out of the island's 230,000 inhabitants, only 50 percent are Corsicans. According to them likewise, 3,000 Corsicans each year leave the region, whereas 6,000 non-Corsicans come in "to take their place." This is what the FLNC calls "genocide by substitution." These statistical data obviously can be challenged. The Union of the Corsican People (Autonomist) in turn believes that out of the 230,000 inhabitants on the island, 40,000 are of foreign origin and that about 50,000 are from the continent, including many who have Corsican relatives in their family. "The Corsicans are not in a minority at home," declared the UPC [Union of the Corsican People], "and saying so is not correct."

"Where Are We Going?"

The little "white book" (60 pages), published this summer by the FLNC nevertheless reaffirms: "Today the French who settle in Corsica are a priori enemies of the Corsican people." And the so-called "door-mat" attacks have been resumed, thus spreading tremendous concern. Empty jam jars, filled with plastic, blow the doors of the homes of people from the continent and sometimes even those of the Corsicans as an unforeseeable consequence of the blast effect. The FLNC apparently does not bother with the details and does not refrain from bombing the homes of retirees or progressives from the continent. This has gotten so bad that the Corsicans complain: "They simply go by the telephone directory; this is getting impossible." And a retired nationalist concludes: "Every time they can blow somebody up, they do so."

The new tactic of the FLNC has already had at least two consequences. The first is the worry felt by those from the continent. You find it most acutely among the civil servants for whom being assigned here to Corsica is not always the "easy station" it used to be--in any case, the promise of plenty of sunshine and peace and quiet--but sometimes it even turns into a kind of "punishment." Some are in a hurry to "put in their time" and get out. Others try to move up the date of their departure by requesting a change of station. The deputies from Corsica, in a bill aimed at guaranteeing indemnity for damages suffered by attack victims, note the following: "The insurance companies refuse to insure anybody who has already been a victim of a first attack involving the use of explosives and on the other hand they refuse to insure persons who are of French origin without being of Corsican origin. Finally they refuse to insure the repatriated French." That is what the climate is like.

The second consequence is the increasingly flagrant way in which the FLNC has been pushed to the sideline as the initiator of a struggle which is being decried loudly. Observers doubt that its underground operations are absolutely air-tight and there is a suspicion that the outfit is being manipulated by some so-called special services. Others blame the organization's new tactics on the arrival of orders from the extreme right-wing militant movement. The isolation of the FLNC in any case is undeniable. For the past 2 years, "cadres" have left the organization and this tendency it seems has grown in recent months. At the same time, the "Front," as it is called, is recruiting more than before among the very young sympathizers whereas about 50 of its members supposedly took to the hills.

The FLNC--in the minority as it has never been before--nevertheless carries unknown weight. The police have lost count in numbering its little subgroups and other splinter elements. "We no longer know where we are," said an official. The seizer of the files of this underground group in 1978 had one good result and that was to yield the Front's statistics: 327 sympathizers and 90 militants. Today, nobody can give any figures without the risk of being wrong. One thing is sure: very few of the plastic bomb throwers were arrested last year. One inhabitant asked himself this question: "Where are we going?" Mr Philippe Loiseau, prefect of Northern Corsica, answers in his own way when he talks about the "tiresome and odious string of attacks which give the impression that Corsica is blowing itself up from the inside."

But there is one truism: A climate of violence, regardless of what it may be, is never good for the economy of a region or a country. Investments do not easily come in to finance enterprises which in advance are called "colonial." This same

violence has persuaded the continental owners of building land to drop their construction plans or at least to put them on the shelf. Finally, retail trade and the crafts as everywhere else suffered from the economic crisis and the number of failures has gone up.

This general picture does not fail to have an effect on the social cost of the crisis on the island. Statistics show that, at the end of November, 6,741 people were looking for jobs out of an active population estimated at 80,310 in 1975. This unemployment rate of 8.3 percent is all the more preoccupying since almost half of the individuals involved are unemployed women and men under the age of 25. The elected officials do not hesitate to speak of a "really dramatic situation." This situation moreover is characterized by a small number of jobs paid above F30,000 per month. Overall, the private sector pays its employees 25 percent less than on the continent. Thus, a wage earner would make F2,800 per month in Corsica whereas his counterpart would get F3,700 on the mainland.

The financial effort made a short time ago by the government however is difficult to deny. Large funds have been allocated and released in support of the island. (In its September information bulletin issue, the prefecture for the Corsican region in particular points out the following: "The allocation of equipment funds from the government budget for Corsica went up from F167 million in 1974 to F426 million in 1980, in other words, an annual average rise of 21 percent, thus placing Corsica at the head of the French regions concerning the amount of investments coming from the government per capita, with F1,117 in 1976 and F2,026 in 1979, in other words, almost three times the national per-capita average.") The distribution of these funds however remains the big issue since the elected officials and the system of clans do not promote a regional view of investments. RPR deputy Jean Boazi, from Southern Corsica, admits: "We do sprinkle the funds a little bit too much, especially in the rural areas." And he continues his self-criticism: "We do not sufficiently give preference to regional actions; we quibble about the definition of development as it applies to Corsica." The UPC asks in a somewhat more rude tone: "Funds? What are they?"

"Only Reformism Is Revolutionary"

One is thus tempted to believe Master Charles Santoni, an attorney admitted to the bar in Bastia and member of the Socialist Party when he says: "Only reformism is revolutionary in Corsica." This remark seems all the more correct since the political situation seems hopelessly stuck. The administration as a matter of fact does not deviate from a policy of firmness in dealing with Corsica. Firmness regarding the institutional statute of the common law in the region and firmness toward the autonomist movement inspired by Dr Edmond Simeoni. This policy naturally makes the government seek support from the elected representatives of the majority, for better or worse, that is to say, it leads to a do-nothing situation and respect for Corsica's political and social institution, the clan. Attempts to get out of this sad situation are rare and are almost doomed to failure in the past.

A new approach as a matter of fact cannot be expected either from those elected officials who are the support of the establishment in power and who above all guarantee the status quo in their territory. Their act of courage for the year 1980--at least the most visible and the best orchestrated--was "to react with firmness

against any violence" in a document adopted by the regional council. That is little enough. As for the rest, it seems that they are essentially occupied with making a choice among government promises kept and those not kept. Behind the scene, certain elected officials of course are thinking of some minor changes to be made in the common-law statute of Corsica. But that is all. Mr Zuccarelli, the MRG mayor of Bastia, demands "more flexibility" and criticizes even the sacrosanct regional council as being "a hybrid, conceived in violation of common law, to assure the majority of a majority in the administration." Since the charge of electoral fraud is constantly being flung into the face of elected officials everywhere and from all sides, Mr Zuccarelli in turn challenges the establishment: "They have election fraud at the very highest levels."

Having looked at the government and the elected officials of the majority which is in the majority in the administration, it remains for us to look at the UPC and the FLNC, which are now more opposed to each other than friendly enemies. Undoubtedly, the UPC is having a bad time right now. The movement has lost its aura down through the years, as if the failure to analyze and clarify the concept of "internal autonomy" had in the end finally carried greater weight. For the time being, the UPC is still there. And to the question: "Is the UPC moving back toward the center?" Dr Simeoni replies: "I think that, for the past 2 or 3 years, there has been much more realism among us and much less romanticism and passion." Would not the leader ask the government to help Corsica get out of this "pathological drama?" How? By "purifying political life," by instituting "progressive bilingualism," etc.

But, as we know, the government is not ready to get together with the UPC, a legal movement which it disdains and intends to reduce. The preservation of a certain "Corsican characteristic" as demanded by the UPC sounds bad in its ears. One can therefore conclude without any risk that the FLNC is wrong when it says that its elder brother in the Corsican situation "has started negotiations with the UDF [French Democratic Union] establishment."

In summary, the deadlock is quite clear. Nobody in Corsica seems to be capable of discussing anything with the other side, regardless of what it might be. Squeezed between government policy, elected officials and the branches of the autonomist and separatist movement, the Corsicans do not deeply, for the most part, adhere to any of the three points of this triangle which is so struck with unrealism. Looking at it overall, shaken by violence which has become the rule, they would just the same pick their elected representatives, Corsicans who know how to boast of the charms of a "peaceful local life." Says one observer: "The silent majority once again will relieve itself in the polling booths."

5058
CSO: 3100

NAVY LAUNCHES 6-YEAR PUBLIC SERVICE EQUIPMENT PLAN

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Feb 81 p 9

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "Navy Launches F836 Million 6-Year Equipment Plan for Its Public Service Tasks"]

[Text] The plan involves 11 vessels, three aircraft, and 1,000 men. In 1980, the French Navy overall spent the equivalent of 2,550 sailing days and 1,933 flying hours, performing public service missions which the government had officially assigned to it, along with the traditional missions of nuclear and conventional defense. The number of sailing days is essentially identical to what it was in 1979; it represents about 17 percent of the navy's total operations, the equivalent of operations performed by about 30 warships during a full year. By themselves, the activities involved in the fight against pollution, navigation surveillance, and policing of fishing activities in economic zones tripled in 1980, as compared to the preceding year. To accomplish its missions, the navy has launched a 6-year equipment plan which comes to F836 millions.

There are three events which persuaded the government in February 1980 to decide to assign the Navy responsibility for ocean-going vessels in public service on the high seas, rather than allowing the units of the various government agencies involved (customs office, gendarmerie, transportation) to proliferate in a disorderly fashion. (All vessels more than 40 meters long and with a displacement of more than 120 tons are included here, along with all aircraft weighing more than 6 tons.)

In 1978, territorial waters, considered an extension of national sovereignty, were extended from 3 to 12 miles and the contiguous zone was extended from 6 to 24 miles. Starting in 1976, the government created an economic zone of 200 miles off the French coast (with the exception of the Mediterranean and Adelie Land), increasing the maximum maritime space to be watched to something like 11 million square kilometers. Finally, on 16 March 1978, the petroleum supertanker "Amoco-Cadiz" ran aground off Portsall, in Brittany; the dimensions of this disaster revealed the insufficiency and absence of coordination of marine pollution control equipment.

On 15 November 1979, an interministerial committee learned the proper lessons from that; after that, each maritime prefect--and there are three of them, at Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon--was appointed as chief coordinator of civilian and military operations conducted by the government at sea, under the authority of the premier.

Henceforth, all missions involving the protection of the national interest at sea, maintenance of public order, and safeguard of property or persons fall within the purview of the French Navy, provided they necessitate ocean-going vessels. Only vessels which can sail on the high seas, as a matter of fact, vessels which have the necessary communications equipment and a towing capacity, manned by disciplined active-duty personnel, with a permanent command structure, can accomplish such missions during any kind of weather and in all areas.

Existing coastal vessels will continue as they are, but these picket boats and small patrol boats, under the control of other administrations, when it comes to actual operations, are placed under the command of the martime prefect, who, somehow, becomes the "main communications channel" or the official responsible in serious incidents.

In February 1980, the French Navy thus took over the execution of public service assignments; we could list about 40 of such assignments, from navigation police and fishing surveillance all the way to scientific exploration or underwater activities, via maritime rescue, medical evacuation, escort missions, hydrographic work, and marine pollution control.

Present at Brest on 18 November 1980, upon the departure of the training vessel "Jeanne-d'Arc" for its annual round-the-world cruise, the chief of the joint chiefs of staff, at that time Gen Claude Vanbremeersch, explained to the navy officer students that he considered equivalent the three known defense missions of the navy (deterrence, security of maritime approaches, and freedom of navigation, as well as showing the flag throughout the world) and its public service assignments. "In addition to these three defense objectives," he said, "we have a traditional obligation which is to contribute to the accomplishment of certain tasks of public interest on the high seas for which, according to all evidence, the navy alone has suitable capacities. This, then, is the grand and clear mission assigned to you."

Breach of Confidence

For this type of activity, the navy so far has not had any specific vessels but, in France and overseas, employs its usual combat vessels which often are heavy, ill suited to the situation, and expensive to operate.

This is why--while spelling out the navy's obligations and priorities--the government has launched a special equipment plan which, between now and 1986, calls for the construction of 11 vessels and the placement of three specialized aircraft in service, for a total of F$36 million. Along with these equipment items, which will be assigned to the navy, plus those that might be detached from its forces for provisional missions, the navy will use the 350-ton surveillance vessel "la Sterne," which belongs to the merchant marine, and five Gardian (Falcon-20) twinjet aircraft assigned to oversee public service operations.

The plan now being carried out involves the purchase of two SP-2000 vessels (for public service) with a tonnage of 2,000 tons, resembling a dual-purpose frigate, capable of carrying one helicopter, four SP-900 assistance units with powerful hoisting and pollution control equipment, four SP-300, slightly heavier patrol

craft of 1,500 tons for spray products, and one 1,500-ton patrol craft for long-range and long-lasting missions, which could be a converted ocean-going fishing trawler.

As of today, the model for the three aircraft has not been defined; the staff is interested in an adapted Transall, since the Breguet-Atlantic of the new generation (ANG) appears to be too "sophisticated" for the requirements stated.

In 1981, the navy asked and got F15 million for this entire program in payment funds and F90 million in program authorizations (which cover commitments for orders). Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, the socialist deputy from Morbihan, estimates that these expenditures for 1981 far from meet the need. He feels that the announced F836-million plan is quite modest in view of the estimates of the parliamentary committees (F3-4 billion at 1978 francs). "We are tempted to speak of a breach of confidence," he wrote in LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME.

To man its public-service vessels, the naval operations staff has called for an increase in the personnel force involving an additional 1,000 men, including less than 100 officers, since one must figure on two crews per ship if one wishes to maintain permanent patrols.

The naval staff argues that it is not trying to come up with a "separate navy," in contrast to what is happening in certain foreign countries where there is a separate coast guard which is divorced from the navy as such. "We are not going to have a race among the public services. Public service equipment will be integrated with combat vessels," goes the reply to those who are afraid of the possibility of the development of a body of sailors due to the effect of parochialism or the specific nature of their missions, as can already be detected in the case of submariners, surface sailors, Marines, or naval aviators.

5058
CSO: 3100

SOLUTION TO ARIANE'S PROBLEMS SEEN NEAR

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 5 Feb 81 pp 45-46

[Article by Marc Chabreuil: "Green Light for Ariane L-03"]

[Text] Eight months of strenuous work, 86 ground tests of the engine and a good share of empiricism have been required to propose a cure for the problems of Ariane: to increase from 0.2 to 0.4 mm the diameter of the injector orifices.

European meteorologists and Indian telecommunications specialists are going to smile again. Their Meteostat and Apple satellites should hit the space road aboard Ariane L-03 toward the end of June. But there are still conditions. For although the leaders of the National Center for Space Studies (CNES) think they can cure the defects that caused the in-flight failure of the second Ariane model, they have not yet tested and validated the modifications they have decided upon. According to Frederic d'Allest, the CNES director of launchers, "the launching date of Ariane L-03 will be definitely set when qualification of the five injectors of the first and second stages have been approved." This will undoubtedly be in six weeks, but a slip is not impossible. "However, the end of August forms a limit. Beyond that, operational flights would slow down, which in certain cases would be incompatible with the needs of our customers," says Yves Sillard, the director general of the CNES.

This pessimistic hypothesis is rejected for now by the leaders of Ariane. Because for the last few weeks they have been making significant progress in learning about the phenomena that caused the failure of last May. Not only were they able to retrace, second by second, the scenario that ended in the explosion of the launcher, but they also emerged from a long period of trial and error and uncertainties. Between 3 July 1980 and last 16 January, some 86 ground tests of the injector were required, to eliminate 90 percent of the possible causes of the malfunction. Unfortunately, these tests were disturbed by the appearance of vibrations at 2,700 hertz, whereas Ariane L-02 had been the victim of high frequencies at 2,300 hertz. "And even today all the efforts undertaken to determine the origin of this instability have failed," Roger Vignelles, head of the Ariane project at the CNES, admits. It is very certainly the installation on the ground that is the cause. But, for lack of certainty, it will be necessary to modify the injector so that it retains its stability under much more severe conditions than those encountered in flight.

Comparative Tests Until March

Another thing that does not seem to be giving satisfaction is the manufacture by the European Propulsion Company (SEP) "of reduced dispersion injectors" meant to obtain materials as reproducible as possible. But narrowing the manufacturing dimensions so that the injection holes open precisely over the conical side of a part and no longer over the cylindrical face does not cause the high frequencies to disappear. In fact, the true solution would consist of increasing from 0.2 to 0.4 mm the diameter of the injection orifices, or at least halfway between.

So until mid-March the Ariane leaders are going to continue comparative tests of these two types of modifications in order to make a choice, to modify the parts in stock and proceed with much stricter formula tests than those carried out in the engine development phase. Which will not prevent them from continuing prudent testing of other types of complementary modifications (baffles, resonators, additives in the ergols [translation unknown].

"It is no secret that this vibratory phenomenon caught us off guard and diverted us," confides Frederic d'Allest. "There is no mathematical model for solving such a problem. There is only one solution--empiricism."

To prevent finding itself in a similar situation with new engines, the CNES has just concluded a long-term study contract at ONERA [National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research]. It should result in models and methods making it possible to predict the stability of an engine in terms of its characteristics. This true computerized simulator will unfortunately not be ready in time for the Ariane-3 program, which is to begin in 1983.

The third in-flight test of Ariane should put an end to a situation that is paradoxical at the very least. This is very certainly the first time that a piece of European equipment that is experiencing perfecting difficulties has registered such a commercial success, including in the United States. The order book of the privately-owned Arianespace Company, which is in charge of marketing Ariane, has already reached 1.8 billion francs. What is more, the Grumman Aerospace Corporation has agreed to market the launcher with American companies and furnish the necessary technical support. And while the leaders of the CNES and the ASE (European Space Agency) exhibited a silence that made everyone dread the worst, the Luxembourg Broadcasting Company and the Colombian government were taking three options. "In spite of everything, the failure of the L-02 caused us to lose two American orders. And we can't expect new options to be taken before next June," acknowledges Frederic d'Allest.

8946
CSO: 3100

NEW OUESSANT SHIP CONTROL CENTER'S DUTIES DESCRIBED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 3, 4 Feb 81

[Article by Pierre Gallerey: "New Traffic Control Center in Ouessant Sector"]

[3 Feb 81 p 28]

[Text] With the Policemen of the Ocean

> More than 150 vessels and 1.5 million tons of petroleum are on the move each day in the Ouessant control sector. The president of the republic is scheduled shortly to inaugurate the new Ouessant control center, a tall tower equipped with a very powerful radar which will enable it to watch all maritime traffic in the sector --in other words, separated traffic movement zones-- used by freighters and tankers entering the English Channel or coming out of it. Following the "Amoco Cadiz" disaster, new and much more drastic traffic movement regulations were put into effect in this sector through which more than 150 vessels pass each day, carrying 1.5 million tons of oil, pushing the route of loaded tankers much farther out to sea. As of now, two ocean-going tugs are based permanently at Brest and Cherbourg and French naval vessels, in contact with the Ouessant radar, patrol around the clock, relentlessly tracking down any vessels that violate the regulations.

"Set your two engines forward at 120." The day has barely started out at sea and the lights of the vessels dance in the misty rain of the early morning hours. The French navy frigate "Second-Maitre-Le Bihan" which has been patrolling since the day before in the Ouessant sector, begins to "give chase." The shipboard operations center, which permanently tracks the movement of ships spotted on its radars, has just reported to us that a freighter is violating the limitations on speed increases. There is a radio call in English: "This is the warship 'Le Bihan.' I am calling the vessel on my starboard side on Channel 16." The searchlight is turned on to attract the ship's attention. After contact has been made, we have the long litany of questions: Name, type, flag, home port, tonnage, cargo, destination, etc. And then it is necessary to verify the vessel's identity, to decode its code numbers on the hull. This is a delicate operation, especially at night and in bad weather; the patrol vessel must approach the other ship's stern to within

300 or 400 meters, avoiding any risk of collision. It happens as a matter of fact quite frequently that another ship, which is in the area nearby and which does not exactly hold its position, will respond in place of the ship which is doing something wrong.

This is what is going to happen this time. A Greek vessel, the "Star Venus," whose record which we carry on board shows us that it committed a violation in this area in February 1979, has established contact. But this time it was not at fault. The real violator was a freighter from Guyana, the "Alexander K." Its captain claims that he has been having bad luck, he blames the weather, the storm, and problems with his radar. It takes a rather attentive and seasoned ear perfectly to pick up this conversation conducted in bad English, coming out of the loudspeakers.

Be Kind to Trawlers

The "Alexander K" is the third and last vessel which had fallen into our net in the past 24 hours. The other two ships--a Dutch ship late in the afternoon and a Liberian during the night, while I was tossing from one side to the other in my bunk --had also committed the same infraction, moving more or less deeply into the traffic lane separation zone. A German freighter, reported out of Ouessant-control, has likewise been pursued but it was too far away from us and we had to abandon the chase. The sea is so vast. Sometimes, when the shipping interval is minimal, we are content with just reporting this fact, without filling out any complaints. And there is a certain custom in handling trawlers which have the right to fish inside the shipping lane provided they do not interfere with ship movement; but, when they are underway, they must follow the general rules.

These rules by the way are quite simple: You have to stay within the traffic lanes and, in case of cross navigation--to enter or leave a port--you have to get across those lanes by cutting them at a right angle. But, to gain time, the captains sometimes have a tendency to "sail on a tangent." Our patrol sector, between the first zone going north, reserved for merchant vessels entering the Channel, and the double lane going south, taken by freighters heading toward the Atlantic and empty tankers, is the sector which reveals the largest number of voluntary or involuntary navigation errors. As a matter of fact, according to Captain Guillebon, violators in good faith are very rare. As for loaded tankers, which the new regulations force to sail very far out at sea, between 25 and 30 nautical miles, they cause much less traffic problems and generally stick very strictly to their course.

The frigate "Second-Maitre-Le Bihan" was launched 2 years ago and is a sturdy 1,250-ton vessel; it is 80 meters long and has a crew of 100 men. Equipped with powerful armament--I can see only 100-mm mount which points its big gray snout forward--was primarily designed for ASW in coastal waters but it also takes care of surveillance and assistance along the shore as well as serving as ocean-going training vessel for the various naval schools. Since its commissioning and regardless of its national defense missions, it has ploughed the seas 50 times along the Ouessant sector and the Casquets sector, at the entrance to the Channel. But for Capt Philippe de Guillebon, the mission being completed now is also the last one. Reassigned as public relations officer at the Toulon naval base, he is saying farewell to the ship and perhaps even the sea.

For me, this was my first tour on board a unit of the navy. Let me simply say that I only have very happy memories.

Violations Cut in Half

This "policeman of the sea" role does not necessarily create any great enthusiasm among junior officers who are dreaming of more maritime activities but it is a part of the various missions that are of general interest to the navy (20 percent of its operations) and everybody does his job with the most scrupulous vigilance as I was able to see for myself. According to Captain de Guillebon, everybody is concerned with not needlessly bothering the other ships, operating with maximum effectiveness and preventing any needless risk. This is a prevention rather than a repression function which however, if necessary, does not rule out utmost firmness; 93 vessels guilty of serious violations were diverted and escorted into port in 1979, the latest one being the "Good Mariner," a Greek vessel which really did not do honor to its name. This looks like a rather effective procedure since there were no diversions in 1980. As for the number of violators, it declined by one-half between 1978 and 1980--in spite of a major increase in 1979, when the new traffic lanes were freshly instituted--dropping from 2,962 down to 1,367, while the number of violation reports decreased from 1,771 to 419.

New international maritime legislation, the increase in the rate of fines actually imposed--as much as F150,000--and the collateral demanded if the vessel has to put into a French port undoubtedly did their job in this entire affair but there is no denying that the permanent and strong presence of a French naval vessel out at sea helps bring about a little more caution on the Ouessant run.

It is now 1100 and our watch is over. We have covered something like 350 miles, about 650 kilometers, since yesterday morning. "Le Bihan" sets course for Cherbourg. The sun stabs through the clouds. Another French naval vessel, "Le Tenace," will take over now and the process continues.

[4 Feb 81 p 13]

[Text] The Islanders Along the Edge of the Sector

A thin white cylinder whose neck gets wide at the top, somewhat unaccustomed in this flat piece of land dotted with small houses, a minaret 72 meters tall, which the people of Ouessant contemplate with a rather dubious eye. Accustomed to the more massive structures of lighthouses and beacon markers, they find it a little bit slim, a little bit sick-looking, a little bit odd--that new radar tower which rises in the eastern part of the island, on the spit of Stiff. "This has been tough on the area," says an old inhabitant. But he does not deny the usefulness of its function because it is well placed here to explore the dangers of the sea. But people do remark that this structure rises on a strictly zoned shoreline classified for a long time, like the rest of the coastline of Ouessant. But, in the end, necessity is the mother of invention and people are just going to have to get used to this tower.

The thing that bothers mayor Marcel Ticos most of all is that the tower in question has not produced any economic fallout for the island nor will any additional families move in because, starting next year, it will be operated directly from Corsel-en-Plouarzel.

On the other hand, the new installation will also lead to the almost complete elimination of the French Navy detachment--about 40 men--who operate the current semaphore. Of course, people understand that this is no laughing matter for the "folks on the continent" when it comes to living for many long years on this island which is swept by powerful winds, completely isolated every day by bad weather although it is nevertheless quite beautiful. Ah! If we only had a port--that would change everything!

This mythical port, which the locals have been talking about for 2 centuries, is the big thing in Ouessant. A real deep-water port permitting the regular arrival of the boat from Brest without any risk, a safe haven which would be the real economic nerve center of an island that must import everything from the continent--including fish! In the absence of such a shelter, there is only one real commercial fisherman at Ouessant and he is Henri Goulard; nevertheless, the sea is quite generous here but it is often quite wild.

"They could also move the ocean-going tug here which is currently based at Brest and which would thus gain 2 valuable hours in case it has to go into action on this run," says Marcel Ticos. We could even accommodate pleasure craft. Some high-priority studies were prepared last year by a laboratory from Maisons-Alfort and we now wait for the Equipment Ministry to determine the cost of the operation and to release the funds."

Another big thing on the island, as we know, are the rabbits. The people at Ouessant do not like to talk about that too much. The invasion of these little rodents, imported here 5 years ago by the hunting society, wishing to have something in its sights, has caused much ink to flow, a real waterfall of words, and that by the way is not at all the style of the people here. These little newcomers, well sheltered against the cold and the rain, not encountering any natural predators, multiplied tremendously, in spite of the long duration of the hunting season, the call issued for many more hunters from the continent, and the bonuses offered for catching them alive; there are now something like 60,000 or 80,000 of them and they are quite accustomed to the sea air and, late in the afternoon, you can see them crowding the wild points of the island.

Reviving Agriculture

These rabbits also create a serious problem for Jean-Yves Moigne, the agricultural engineer who came here in 1977, as part of a mission for the Armorique Regional Natural Park and who has become tremendously fond of this piece of land. With the support of the township and with financial assistance from the Association for the Promotion and Protection of the Atlantic Islands, he has started to revive agriculture on this island which is today fallow, being slowly eaten away by the sandy moor where something like 1,500 sheep graze freely from September to February.

"The first difficulty was to reorganize the various pieces of land," said Jean-Yves Moigne. "There are 50,000 plots of land on the island, whose unit of measurement remains the furrow--a strip of land of 132 meters--which yesterday was still being cultivated with the spade. This subsistence agriculture, run by the women--the men traditionally were out at sea in the merchant marine or in the navy--declined progressively since the start of the century until it disappeared completely during the fifties, when the income offered by the navy reached a decent level. But today, the new mechanized vessels employ much less manpower and Ouessant which has no substitute activities, is suffering from that."

The Association for the Revival of Agricultural Activities on Ouessant 3 years ago launched a vast cultivation program which is now beginning to yield fruit--or rather vegetables; 30 hectares of land were assembled, not without trouble, due to a complex legal structure--the association of course was not the owner of that land --plus 100 tons of potatoes exported to Great Britain.

Between 15 and 20 new hectares will be placed in cultivation today along with a major development program which is now underway and which calls for land clearing, the creation of shelter belts, etc. The association is also interested in reviving animal husbandry; the island has only one cow by the name of Mandarine and it belongs to Nini Jezequel. A weaving shop is being established in some old military buildings. Things are going to get going but slowly. And while they love to complain that they have been forgotten by the mainland, the people of Ouessant do not always look very kindly upon this operation which was "decided in Paris," which is a little bit beyond their taste, which gets the benefit of mysterious and undoubtedly colossal subsidies for as yet rather poor results and which runs the risk of depriving the sheep of all their land.

"And then," says the mayor of Ouessant, "the people have gotten away from the land and besides, these sailor folk never were inclined toward agriculture; this is an old story for them, the symbol of a time when life was harsh. The women no longer want to be slaves, as one of the women of the parrish told me."

It is true that they are not living too badly in their little homes which are often very comfortable and where they have had electricity only since 1952 plus a color TV. They have their kitchen gardens, their domesticated rabbits, they need little, their tastes are modest, they have some traditions out of habit and they are fiercely proud of being from Ouessant. But the population is declining rather gently from 2,600 inhabitants in 1920 to a little more than 1,000 today, with about 30 deaths per year and half a score of births, while the young folks go away for lack of jobs.

Except for the summer season, when the "chinchars," the tourists, Ouessant comes to life only over the weekends, with the return of the college students who study in Brest and some "expatriates" who come back to see their families. There is a little bit of life at Lampaul, the only little town on the island, along with arm wrestling competition at the Richard Cafe, the noise of the bowling alley, the local saloon, a little whiff of action. And then there is a brief clearing in this fog which gradually settles over Ouessant.

6058
CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE RENAMED--The first French nuclear-powered attack submarine, the "Provence," has just been renamed the "Rubis," on orders from the president of the republic. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Feb 81 p 4] 5058

NEW HELMET ADOPTED--A new helmet, one of the six models under study, has just been officially adopted for the equipment of infantry units and the crews of French armored vehicles. Its shape is more enveloping than the model currently in service; it is made of very strong and light alloys; it is furthermore made of one single piece, contrary to the two pieces ("light" [liner] and "heavy" helmet) of the current model. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Feb 81 p 4-5] 5058

SMALLER NAVY WORRISOME--The chief of naval operations feels that the cutback in the number of war ships planned, from 125 units in 1980 to 92 units in 1988, is worrisome and notes that ten vessels were taken out of active service in 1980 while only three (including one SSNB) were placed in active service during the same period of time. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Feb 81 p 5] 5058

IMPROVED ALPHA JET FLIES--The first flight of an Alpha Jet equipped with the transsonic wing cell, TST, designed and made by the German Dornier company and also called the "supercritical wing." Aircraft No A-1 is used for this purpose as a flying test bench. The new wing cell is thicker (by 18 percent) than a conventional wing; it is however lighter and offers a larger inside volume for fuel. Its new aerodynamic characteristics enable it to obtain both great cruising speed and a higher lift component coefficient. [Text] [Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Feb 81 p 7] 5058

CSO: 3100

CGIL-PCI RELATIONS SAID TO HAVE DETERIORATED

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 28 Jan 81 p 6

[Article by Sandro Antoniazzi, secretary of the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] in Milan: "Communists and the Union"]

[Text] Relations between the union and the Communist Party have deteriorated recently or, rather, an area of conflict has opened between them that is not going to be overcome in a short time, because it is not due to individual, however relevant, incidents but to new orientations that have grown up within the party.

The dispute began in July with a difference of opinion over government provisions, particularly the solidarity fund, and it continued in September with the Fiat dispute and Berlinguer's proposals; it broke out again with the consultation problems, which was one of the reasons that consultations were put off and fell apart.

Besides these symptomatic events, in the workplace, in communist workers' meetings, and in L'UNITA's union commentaries, the party has been separating itself from the union, using severely critical terms, and promoting its own direct initiative on labor issues. We are, then, witnessing a profound change in the Communist Party's attitude toward the union, especially the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor]. I think this new position could be termed a withdrawal of the proxy that the party had granted the CGIL for union issues and labor in general in recent years.

In the clamor of the recent past, the strict application of incompatibility has no doubt taken worker leaders out of the party and reduced its influence and contact with industry. Union unity itself, a great positive force in certain political phases and moments, may become overcommitted and too much of an intermediary when it is important for it to establish its own identity and show new, characteristic initiative.

While union policy used to match the PCI's political prospects (Chiaromonte acknowledged in a recent interview that the EUR [labor union headquarters] fit in with the policy of national unity), now, on the other hand, an outright contradiction has appeared between the party and union positions; they are no longer what is immediately useful in the new situation.

However, we would be burying our heads in the sand if we did not admit that the communists, who massively supported EUR policy in the past, have now decidedly separated themselves from it by saying that a policy valid in one situation may not necessarily be valid in another

The issue can be stated in other, more decisive terms.

It is a widely held opinion that the union has become a "political subject." There are essentially two possible solutions: either the union uses its political strength indirectly, that is, to support new political formulas and a new government, or it uses its increased power directly to make its own specific contribution to a new politico-social base without foolish ambitions or dependencies and in relation and confrontation with the other interested forces, especially the parties. It is not hard to recognize in that the two guiding spirits of Italian unionism, that of the CGIL and that of the CISL, with the UIL [Italian Union of Labor] in the middle.

From this standpoint, Berlinguer's remarks at the last meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party are an unmistakable step backwards.

His Aristotelian distinction between a "general" task proper to the party and a "particular" function proper to social organizations such as the union amounts to an even more reactionary position than the now old and worn out conveyor-belt theory.

The future of unionism cannot be found solely in making demands for labor; dropping the central question of the union's autonomous role in the country's social and political change is a problem that union forces must confront and resolve above all, especially in confrontation with the Communist Party.

The party is not above the union; in the area of strategic planning, all forces are supposed to contribute on an equal basis and strive to achieve a common program. There is a difference of role and task between the party and the union in achieving their objectives, and it hard to distinguish between them in terms of hierarchies or priorities. Rather, they both have important functions that must necessarily be coordinated and meshed together.

8782
CSO: 3104

'L'UNITA' REPORT ON PCI-LCY BELGRADE CONTACTS

LD251107 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 20 Feb 81 pp 1, 16

[Dispatch by Silvo Trevisani: "Napolitano Meets With Prominent League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) leaders in Belgrade"]

[Text] Belgrade--Yesterday saw the end of PCI directorate member Comrade Giorgio Napolitano's talks in Belgrade with LCY leaders. During his 2 days in Yugoslavia Napolitano, who was accompanied by PCI Central Committee members Angelo Oliva and Gino Galli, had conversations with president of the LCY presidency Lazar Mojsav and LCY presidency members Aleksandar Grlickov and Milos Minic. He also met with Stane Dolanc. The conversations were also attended by LCY Central Committee deputy secretary Borislav Milosevic and international relations section director Petar Boskovic.

The talks took place in the spirit of friendship and cooperation characteristic of both parties and centered primarily on the latest developments in the international situation. Particular attention was paid to the topics of detente and security in Europe, the role of the leftwing forces and the prospects for dialogue and understanding among the various components of the European left. The LCY leaders also discussed at length the initiatives of the nonaligned movement and the conclusions of the recent New Delhi conference.

At the same time an examination was also made during the conversations of problems connected with relations among the workers and communist parties and in this connection full agreement was confirmed on the principles of the autonomy and responsibility of every party and of the right of every people and nation to choose their own path, free from any interference. In the conversation with Comrade Mojsov an exposition was given of both parties' policies in connection with the specific economic, social and political situations in Yugoslavia and Italy. Finally, both sides expressed full satisfaction with the state of relations between the PCI and LCY and confirmed their desire to develop and expand contacts and cooperation between the parties, partly in the interests of cooperation between the two peoples.

Yesterday afternoon Comrade Napolitano also celebrated the PCI's 60th anniversary at the headquarters of the Belgrade LCY City Committee. Before a large assembly of party members the PCI leader briefly recalled the most important stages in our party's history--from the antifascist struggle and the resistance to the difficult battles of the cold war years and the June 1976 elections.

Those events were connected with the ups and downs of the international workers movement. Napolitano referred, among other things, to the 20th CPSU Congress: the problem posed at that time, he said, was how to accomplish a transition "from the uncritical exaltation of the USSR to a rational historical and critical analysis of that and other experiences. We have never adhered to purely negative assessments and summary dismissals but have striven to make autonomous assessments of the various situations and specific facts. Unfortunately over the years we have also had to speak out on phenomena of regression and crisis in certain socialist countries and in relations among the socialist countries. "Our attitude," he continued, "has always been constructive. However: we have never wanted ruptures. We have taken care to defend our independence of assessment and action and have sought convergences with all progressive and peace-loving forces throughout the world. There has thus come about a new view of internationalism which reveals substantial points of contact with the view invoked by the PCY. It is within this framework," Napolitano added, "that the Eurocommunist option is situated."

Next Giorgio Napolitano talked about the Italian communists' present policy which, proceeding from the line defined by Togliatti back in 1944, characterizes the PCI as "a party active in politics, which envisages positive solutions to the problems of the masses and the country."

Immediately after the talk and the debate--during which Comrade Napolitano was asked several questions--the PCI leader gave an interview to Yugoslav television, which was screened yesterday evening. "The bonds between our parties are very deep," Napolitano said, answering a question from the interviewer. "First, we share a strong sense of the independence and autonomy of each party. On many points of principle and policy our viewpoints coincide."

CSO: 3104

CHART OF LEFTIST GROUPS FROM 1968 TO 1978

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 8 Dec 80 pp 145-148

[Article: "The Chart of '68"]

[Text] In the following centerfold of the magazine, which may be detached, we reproduce two charts on the year 1968. These were published by L'ESPRESSO on various dates. They complete documentation on "that incredible year" which was contained in the six records we give readers as a gift. The first chart (outer centerfold) describes the genealogical tree of the political groups to the left of the PCI which contributed to preparations for the events of 1968. It starts with the Marxist-Leninist and anarchist groups and continues to the publications sub-groups of the "new left."

The second chart (inner centerfold) in practice is the continuation of the first. It represents the evolution, with all its splits and mergers, of the extreme left extraparliamentary political ranks which emerged from the magma of the student movement. To the left are the five "historical" currents that preceded 1968. Then there was the rise of the student revolt from which also emerged the first organizational "ultra red" nuclei within the factories. Moving to the right there is a succession of itineraries of various groups up to the "1977 Movement." In the colored boxes (the key to which is contained in the caption within the chart) are the names of the various groups with their publications and, in parentheses, their most noted leaders.

The two charts were drafted by Paolo Mieli and Mario Scialoja.



[Key on following page]

Key [to outer centerfold chart]:

1. Years [1960 etc]
2. Anarchists-FAI [Italian Anarchist Federation]

2a. Laborists
--QUADERNI ROSSI [Red Notebooks], 1961-1964--(Panzieri, Alquati, Tronti, Negri).
--CLASSE OPERAIA [Working Class], 1966-1967 (Asor Rosa, Piperno).
--Potere operaio veneto-emiliano [Veneto-Emilia Workers Power], 1967, Negri, Svesce, Brogio).
--Il potere operaio di Pisa [Pisa Workers Power], 1967, Sofri, Cazzaniga, Della Mea).
--QUADERNI PIACENTINI [Piacenta Notebooks] (Fortini, Fofi, Bellocchio, Cherchi).

3. Marxist-Leninists
--Communist Party of Italy ML (Pcd'I-ML) NUOVA UNITA [New Unity] (Dinucci, Pesce).
--Federation-ML RIVOLUZIONE PROLETARIA [Proletarian Revolution] (Semeraro).
--Marxist-Leninist League--IL COMUNISTA [The Communist] (Duse).
--Maoist Proletarian Vanguard (Spazzali).
--LAVORO POLITICO [Political Labor] (Curcio, Berio).

4. The 1968 Student Movement and the early rank and file committees.

5. Bordiga Internationalists.
--Internationalist Communist Party--IL PROGRAMMA COMUNISTA (Bordiga, Maffi).
--Communist Battle (Damen).
--Communist Revolution.
--Communist Left Leninist Groups (Cervetto, Parodi).

6. Trotskyites
--Fourth International BANDIERA ROSSA [Red Flag], Maitan, Pellegrini.
--LA SINISTRA [The Left] (Colletti, Flores, Savelli).
--Hammer and Sickle (Brandirali).

7. FAI--UMANITA NUOVA [New Humanity]

8. Clubs: Ghisolfa, Bakunin, Durruti.

9. Anarchist action groups--L'INTERREGIONALE [The Inter-Regional], (Farinelli, Turroni).

10. Federated anarchist groups.

11. Neosituationists (Siggiani, Cesarano, Sanguineti).

12. Advisors--D'Este, Gimosa, Faina).

13. The Class

14. Worker Students--Fiat mechanics
Ms Rome, Florence, Bologna
Cub Fatme and Montedison of
Porto Marghera.

15. Worker Students--Fiat body shop
Cub Saint Gobain (Pisa).
M.S. Turin, Trento, Pavia.

16. Continuing Struggle (Sofri, Viale, Rostagno, Bobbio, Boato).

17. Italian Communists Union ML--SERVIRE IL POPOLO [Serve the People], (Brandirali, Stame, Meldolesi).

[Key continued on following page]

18. Cub Pirelli
    Negative University of Trento
    Cub Siemens
19. Metropolitan Political Group (Curcio, Berio De Mori).
20. Milan Student Movement (Capanna, Cafiero, Toscano, Saracino).
21. Communist Vanguard
22. Student Mess and Housing Jobs (Genoa, Milan, Turin).
23. Cub Pirelli
    Milan Science Students Movement
24. Workers Vanguard (Gorla, Vinoi, Corvisieri, Campi).
25. Manifesto (Rossanda, Magri, Pintor, Natoli).
26. AGITAZIONE DEL SUD [Southern Agitation], VOLONTA [Will], A ANARCHIA [A Anarchy].
27. Area of Workers Independence
    --Communist Revolutionary Committee, POTERE OPERAIO PER IL COMUNISMO [Workers Power for Communism].
    --Communist Committees for Workers Power--SENZA TREGUA [No Truce].
    --Workers Political Groups--ROSSO [Red]
    --Veneto Political Groups
    --Marxist-Leninist Communist Party--LA VOCE OPERIA [Workers Voice].
    --ML Communist Committee for Unity and Struggle ADDAVENI [He Will Come--Tr. note: addaveni is a corruption of the Roman dialectical "ha da venire," or "deve venire." It was heard frequently in Rome during the Stalin period as a humorous threat as "just wait 'til Stalin gets you," or in Roman dialect "ha da veni' er baffone." Baffone, of course, is a reference to Stalin's moustaches.
    --Independent Workers Committees (Via del Volsci Group), RIVOLTA DI CLASSE [Class Revolt]
    --Independent Committee for Communism--COMUNISMO [Communism].
    --Liguria Independents Coordination
    --Roman Proletarian Organization (Scalzone, Negri, Spazzali, Leonetti, Baglioni, Pifano, Milucci, Caponetto).
28. Luddites
29. Commonists
30. Front Line Clandestine Armed Groups--Armed Struggle for Communism, etc., (more than 100 initials).
31. Workers Power--(Negri, Piperno, Scalzone, Bologna).
32. Lenin Clubs, K. Marx Centers (Cazzaniga, Di Marco, Del Giudice).
33. The Earth's Damned
34. Armed Proletarian Nuclei
35. Italian ML Communist Party
36. Gramsci Group--ROSSO [Red]
37. Rimini Congress 1976 LOTTA CONTINUA [Continuing Struggle] (Deaglio, Brogio).
38. Red Star (Calo)
39. Proletarian Left
40. Red Brigades
41. Workers for Socialism Movement FRONTE POPOLARE [Popular Front]
42. Historical Political Atlas: from 1968 to 1978
    This chart, drawn by Franco Originario, shows the evolution of those involved in the conflict from 1968 to date. On the left of the page are the "historical forces" that flow into the 1968 explosion. From the crucible of that

[Key continued on following page]

year emerge the groups and currents whose development we trace up to the 1977 "movement" (in yellow at right). The anarchist-situationist current is in black; red indicates the laborists, the independents and the Continuing Struggle area; light blue is the Marxist-Leninist component; light green indicates Bordiga internationalists; orange indicates Trotskyites; dark green is the PDUP [Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity], Manifesto and Workers Vanguard; purple indicates the armed fighting groups; blue, at bottom, represents the parties of the institutional left.

43. Communist Struggle (Cervetto, Parodi, Motosi).
44. Fourth International--BANDIERA ROSSA [Red Flag] (Maitan).
45. PDUP-AO [Workers Vanguard], Constituent League of Communists of Proletarian Democracy--QUOTIDIANO DEI LAVORATORI [Workers Daily].
46. Constituent Vanguard Workers and PDUP
47. IL MANIFESTO [The Manifesto] (Magri, Rossando, Castellina).
48. PDUP (Magri, Miniati, Rossanda, Foa).
49. Ex-PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity]-MPL

CGIL: Italian General Confederation of Labor
CISL: Italian Confederation of Workers Unions
UIL: Italian Union of Labor
ACLI: Christian Associations of Italian Workers



[Key on following page]

Key [to inner centerfold chart]:

1. How 1968 was born. This is the geneaological tree of the extreme left forces that constitute the historical background of 1968. Starting with the political forebears to the left of the chart, and moving to the right there is a sequence of the development of minority forces to the left of the PCI through splits, creation of new groups and new trends up to the great blast furnace of the student movement. There are five main currents: The anarchists, in black on the chart; the Bordiga followers, in light brown with hash marks; the trotskyites in black with hash marks; the laborite group in solid light brown; the Marxist-Leninists in hash-marked grey. The black-lined boxes with vertical lines give the names of the main publications of the "new left." The other boxes in upper case bold type give the names of the political groups; lower case bold give the names of their main leaders; entries in light type refer to publications.
2. Volonta [Will]--A. Borghi--UMANITA NOVA [New Humanity]
3. 1953--Anarchist Groups of Proletarian Action--L'IMPULSO [Impulse]
4. 1948 Bandiera Rossa [Red Flag]--Maitan, Di Giuliomaria, IV INTERNAZIONALE [Fourth International]
5. 1946--Internationalist Communist Party--B. Maffi
6. Revolutionary Communist Party (Trotskyite)--Posadas
7. Communist Revolution--Prometeo Spartaco
8. 1948 Internationalist Communist Party--BATTAGLIA COMUNISTA [Communist Struggle]
9. Lotta Operaia [Workers Struggle]--Piero Leone
10. Communist Action--Raimondi, Fortichiari, Seniga, Masini, Corvetto, Parodi
11. Anarchism--Bakunin, Malatesta, Costa
12. Bordiga Followers
13. IV International--Trotsky
14. Anarco-Trade Unionism--Sorel, Labriola, De Ambris
15. Leninist Groups of the Communist Left
16. Eastern Edition--QUADERNI [Notebooks] (China) Regis
17. Hail Leninism (Padua)--V. Calo
18. Third Internationale--Lenin, Trotsky, Bordiga, Gramsci
19. Workers World--Panzieri
20. First Internationale--Marx
21. Second Internationale--Kautsky, Luxemburg, Lenin
22. Francovich Research Center (Florence)--Berti, Greppi
23. Workers Unity Group--Di Toro--1968
24. The Trend (for PCI Membership) Hammer and Sickle--Brandirali
25. Class and Party 1967
26. "Workers Use of PCI and of PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Popular Unity]"
27. Trotskyite Left, PCI Left and PSIUP Left--L. Colletti
28. Red Notebooks--Panzieri, Tronti, Rieser, Alquati, Asor Rosa--1961--
29. Working Class--Tronti, Di Leo, Negri, Alquati, A. Rosa, Greppi, Gasparotto--1964
30. 1968--Counterplan--Tronti, Negri, Cacciari, Asor Rosa
31. Workers Power--Veneto Emilia--(P. Marghera, Venice, Padua, Bologna)
32. Workers Chronicles--GATTO SELVAGGIO [Savage Cat] 1963

[Key continued on following page]

33. Workers Power--Turin
34. Workers Power--Pomezia, WP Milan, WP Florence
35. Workers Power--Pizza--Sofri, Cazzaniga, Della, Mea
36. New Commitment
37. Youth Criticism
38. Red Star--Valle Giulia--V. Calo
39. 1968--Union of Italian Marxist-Leninist--SERVIRE IL POPOLO [Serve the People]
40. League of Marxist-Leninist Communists--IL COMUNISTA [The Communist]
41. Class and State--F. Stame, G. Scalia
42. Political Labor--Curcio, Berio, Perruzzi, Cheneri--1967
43. Communist Party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist) NUOVA UNITA [New Unity]
44. Italian Revolutionary Communist Party (M-L)
45. The Communist--(for the Victory of Marxism-Leninism)--U. Dune
46. 1965--Marxist-Leninist Movement--1966 NUOVA UNITA [New Unity]
47. Movement of New Unity
48. 1964 New Unity
49. Communist Federation M L of Italy RIVOLUZIONE PROLETARIA [PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION]
50. Maoist Vanguard--Spazzali, Semeraro, Gobinelli
51. QUADERNI PIACENTINI [Piacenta Notebooks]
52. 1967--Red Tribunal
53. Student Movement

6034
CSO: 3104

POLL SHOWS INDUSTRIALISTS WANT GOVERNMENT OF TECHNICIANS

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 25 Jan 81 pp 114-117

[Article by Paola Pilati, Giuseppe Nicotri, and Leo Sisti: "The Manufacturers Like the Technicians"]

> [Text] The majority is in favor of the Visentini proposal. Entrepreneurs want a government of technicians because they are tired of the political party game. They do not want the PCI [Italian Communist Party] and certainly not Craxi, either. What about Forlani? What about the economy? Here is what they say.

Rome. The manufacturers are for Visentini. As a matter of fact, 58 percent of the Italian entrepreneurs agree with his proposal for an administration run by technicians.

This is the most important finding emerging from a survey conducted by L'ESPRESSO among a sampling of entrepreneurs representative of the nationwide industrial establishment (see the list below).

With the political debate caught in a vacuum, dropped with some fastidiousness by almost all parties, the idea presented by PRI [Italian Republican Party] chairman and Olivetti company president Bruno Visentini, calling for an administration of technicians "which would no longer be the slave of the political parties," which in summary would be an administration of men capable of running the state, rather than the various currents and tangents, has been meeting with success among the entrepreneurs. And the consensus among the manufacturers also is a clear signal as to the atmosphere which has been created in a part of the country regarding the administration and the parties.

The Palace [executive branch] comes out looking rather battered in the responses from the entrepreneurs and, along with it, the entire policy--such as it has been conducted by the party secretariats--receives a definite vote of no confidence.

Is there any hope that things would change by trying other government formulas? What, for example, do the industrialists think about having the PCI join the administration? The majority says "no" and that means 83 percent. What about a socialist administration supported by the laic parties? With 46 percent negative responses and 41 percent positive responses, this solution perhaps might have somewhat more probability of success.

And what about the current administration? Will it be able to stay in office or not? The answer from the survey is rather reassuring for Premier Arnaldo Forlani: The "yes" votes come to 54 percent, with 7 percent "don't know." But this is a rather short-lived certainty: The fact is that even those "yes" votes constitute a sign of lack of confidence, motivated only by the fear of new elections and a crisis in the dark.

The Forlani cabinet however gets a definite thumbs-down on economic policy. Its ministers (even though the technical ministers have been spared) overall get no more than 42 percent of the positive votes. A majority of the 44 percent "no" votes and a big slice of undecided votes (14 percent) obfuscate the economic policy efforts made by Forlani. The views of industrial circles range from economic topics to more personal or job category problems, from the cost of money to the cost of labor. And the fact that these problems have not yet been resolved carries a negative weight in their judgment.

But let us see how the industrialists motivate their own responses.

Yes--To the Visentini Proposal

"These politicians are the worst you can find on the market," says Giordano Zucchi, president and deputy administrator of the Zucchi textile industry establishment. His opinion is shared by many. The administration of technicians therefore should work--in the opinion of the industrialists questioned in the survey--in bringing about a solution to the ineptitude of the political class. "We are at a complete dead stop," adds Enzo Giustino, a building contractor and president of the Naples Chamber of Commerce. "You cannot go on governing like that. The economy is much too much tied in with the actions of the government and the administration. We are now living in a permanent state of expectation: The expectation for the 'top leadership' to make a decision and for the presidents to make proposals. But in the meantime we lose lots of time."

The enthusiasm for the proposal however in many cases is tempered by doubts as to its practical feasibility: "Once at the helm, will the technicians know how to steer the ship of state in safety from the conditioning factors of politics?" Cesare Marini, manager of a public works company by the same name, keeps asking. "Or will they likewise in this case wind up being used by the blockhead classes?"

No--To the Visentini Proposal

Disappointed by the "prepotence of the palace," the industrial circles that voted "no" are above all moved by constitutional worries. "You cannot govern a democracy with technicians," says Ginolo Ginori Conti, member of the board, Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry]. And he continues: "The gap between the administration and parliament would grow and this would be an even worse cure for the disease." "This solution is like a dictatorial type solution," maintains Paolo Buffetti, president of Federlazio, "but the politician's job is a different one: It is up to him to work out the synthesis among the various tendencies that express themselves in the country." "The institutions are valid," asserts Aldo Belleli, deputy manager of Belleli machine-building industries, "and the technocratic approach wipes out the country's democratic operation." The primacy of politics--and with that, the professionalism of the party representatives--are still

being judged as a guarantee by a minority of manufacturers. Or they have not yet resigned themselves to the facts of life; it would seem to that, here and there, we still find that tribe of political technicians whom one could really trust. Some people mentioned Reviglio or Andreatta while somebody else with nostalgia recalls Marcora and Scotti.

Quite apart from the Visentini proposal, the atmosphere seems therefore rather favorable to some kind of change. How did the industrialists react to the possible alternatives in terms of administration which can be considered here?

Undecided As to Craxi

"Craxi is a centrist Doroteo man: He would do the same things that the DC [Christian Democratic Party] does. The real change is between the administration and the opposition." Piero Pozzoli, former leader of the young industrialists in Confindustria, expresses a suspicion shared by many: That the socialists would not constitute a real alternative and that one therefore could not entrust oneself to them. Hence, the solution of Craxian centrality remains firm in the middle of the road: Between those who are afraid that they would be dealing with an excessively emotional and therefore unstable majority and those, simply for the sake of change, would take that risk. "Let Craxi take over, just so long as the DC apple falls from the tree," said Gabriele Albertini, sole administrator of Albertini Foundries. Aldo Ravaioli shares a similar opinion: "I am not in agreement with any of the decisions made by Craxi, for example, the decision on terrorism, but if the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] can help break the ice and bring this famous alternation in government to life, then I would say yes."

PCI, Stop!

The revival of the idea of having the PCI included in the administration has been definitely slowed down by the responses from the industrialists questioned in this survey. "The one requirement which the PCI does not meet," says Carlo Alberto Corneliani, a clothing manufacturer, "is adherence to the free-enterprise system." Demonstrating that the times of ideological preclusions are long gone, the industrialists in summary want to make sure that the PCI way will not be a dead-end street. There are of course also some "no" votes. "The PCI wants to subvert the established order," says Umberto Severi, deputy manager of a textile firm in Carpi. "Its opening moves are nothing but a tactic to win power." And there are also the "yes" votes connected with direct experience: "I am afraid of Marxism," asserts Giordano Zucchi, "but I must admit that, when the PCI approached the establishment as such, the enterprises were better managed." In general, the time is not yet ripe although the businessmen in the north stand out by virtue of the fact that they have a somewhat more open attitude on this issue than those of the south.

The Best of Possible Administrations?

Forlani can still play his cards: The manufacturers, for the most part (54 percent) do have confidence in him. First of all regarding a question of principle: "So far beset by a thousand unforeseen problems, the administration," says Enzo Giustino, "must at last have the possibility of governing." "Weak as it is," adds

Carlo Violati, president of Sangemini, "this is still the best administration we can have now and we have to hold on to it." "This bunch is more or less equal to all the others we have had. For the time being, it seems to be able to hang in there," says Luciano Benetton, president of the hosiery company by the same name.

Some wanted to attack the trouble at its roots: "It is the constitution itself which calls for proportional systems and which therefore prevents us from having better administrations," commented Giovanni Zillo, sole administrator and general manager of Cementi Zillo. What might the solution be? "A presidential republic," is the opinion of Violati, "with a president serving for a term of at least 5 years."

No--To the Forlani Cabinet

Among those who scratch their heads and those who can decide without having to scratch their heads, we have the following responses. "This administration is a disaster, it has no technique, it has no political blueprint, and it does not even have any moral rigor. A real mess!" Enrico Gregotti explodes; he is the general manager of the Scotti Company (textiles). For the group of those who replied: "No," the administration has already used up whatever benefit of the doubt it may have had: Forlani and his ministers have already had every possible opportunity in recent months to show what they can do, even though "they are the government we deserve." And they failed. "We entrepreneurs need a stable point of reference," says Vincenzo Speziali, president of the Catanzaro manufacturers association. "And instead of the administration program, we are losing ground."

Incoherence, a bunch of people who are entirely too flexible, an excessively impenitent sensitivity to the issues of the parties--that is the image that emerges. What about the way the economy is being run?

The Technical Ministers

Their personal imagination has not been stirred up by participation in this administration. But the overall judgment on administration economic policy is not flattering at that (the majority of the economic ministers, we must remember, is made up of politicians, not technicians). "Andreatta has been doing a good job," says Zucchi, "in resolving the problem of bank appointments and CONSOB [National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange]. Reviglio is going to come up with big and complicated projects but he will seriously try to make everybody pay their taxes. La Malfa has drafted a synthetic plan, without tying the hands of the companies."

"But," observes Giuseppe Di Carlantonio, president of the Teramo Manufacturer's Union, "their hands are tied by the parties and that forces them to fly at low altitudes, to be good in technical terms, and nothing else." "We southern manufacturers," complains Michele Giannattasio, president of the Campani manufacturers and of the Avellino Industrial Consortium, "must be able to operate at minimum risk. But instead, even the programs that can be good last only 6 months and then they are changed." "In 1981," predicts Piero Pozzoli, "all our chickens will come home to roost; output will go down because demand will decline. Those who are exporting are already beginning to feel the wind of crisis blowing hot on their necks and

they are forced to finance the difference between the cost of their products and those of their foreign competitors, in other words, they have to borrow money. To keep the balance of payments even, we reduce the output and that is bad."

Demands

The average business operator has one big problem: The high cost of money. Among the suggestions given to the economic ministers, this is first in line, with the largest number of responses. Next comes the demand for the funding of social expenditures which, together with the more general demand for a reduction in the cost of labor, shows us that the manufacturers are getting to feel the restraints of excessively tight financial commitments. "We cannot go on with wages that keep rising 20-25 percent per year, with productivity frozen for the past 5 years, and with investments not moving," says Luigi Rossi, president of the Brenta shoe manufacturers. "We have to finance development without affecting the balance of payments, in other words, we have to use domestic resources," suggests Paolo Buffetti.

Opposition to Administration

In opposition to the government and as an instrument for punishing it for its ineptitude, the businessmen interviewed mention the Bank of Italy. "If we do not revive the economy through exports," says Vittorio Paravia, national vice president of young manufacturers, "the Bank of Italy will be forced to increase the discount rate and to reduce the economy's ceiling." This is also what Ginori Conti thinks: "Only the Bank of Italy can do anything with blocked notes; for the rest, we tend to live from day to day."

The entrepreneurs finally are definitely against any devaluation of the lira. Although this comes fourth in line, this step was received with a definite "no" by the majority of those interviewed. "As we say in Bologna, this would be like the blessing of death," says Eugenio Menarini, vice president of Federmeccanica [Federation of Machine-Building Workers]. "In addition to causing an increase in raw material prices, this would only be a short breathing spell that would last only a few months."

The Interviewees

The survey was conducted on a sampling of medium-sized manufacturers in all of the Italian industrial regions. We excluded not only the small businessmen, who are not representative, but also the biggest industrialists who are the major opinion leaders. Here is the list.

Gabriele Albertini (Albertini Foundries); Aldo Belleli (Belleli Machine-Building Industries, Incorporated); Luciano Benetton (Benetton); Pasquale Bertinetti (Bertinetti); Paolo Buffetti (Buffetti, president, Federlazio); Alberto Carmi (Carmi Extraction Industry, president, Italian Marble Industry Association; Confindustria Board); Mario Carraro (Carraro Agricultural Machinery); Cesare Contegiacomo (Contegiacomo Spa; National Committee Central Council, Small Industry; Confindustria Board); Carlo Alberto Corneliani (Corneliani Confezioni); Giuseppe Corsini

(Profilati Nave; president, Brescia Steel and Metallurgical Industries); Giuseppe Di Carlantonio (Di Carlantonio Laterizi; president, Teramo Manufacturers Union; Confindustria Board); Giovanni Faglia (Anonima Bresciana Pelli); Ferruccio Ferrero (Ferrero Machine-Building); Michele Giannattasio (President, Campania Manufacturers Association; president, Avellino Industrial Area Consortium; Confindustria Board); Ginolo Ginori Conti (Confindustria Board); Enzo Ciustino (Vice President, Confindustria, president, Naples Chamber of Commerce); Carlo Emilio Gnutti (Coimbre, vice president, Brescia Manufacturers Association); Enrico Gregotti (Scotti); Ferdinando Guadagno (President, Matera Manufacturers Union; Confindustria Board); Adolfo Guzzini (Guzzina Spa; Confindustria Board); Fabio Inghirami (Ingram; president, Clothing Manufacturers Association; Confindustria Board); Girolamo Manisco (Simi); Cesare Marini (Marini and Parachini; Confindustria Board); Eugenio Menarini (Menarini; vice president, Federmeccanica; Confindustria Board); Alessandro Merlo ("CCC" and Brunello); Andrea Milano (Modalba); Vittorio Paravia (Paravia Elevators; vice president, Confindustria Young Industrialists); Piero Peradotto (Fimit); Alberto Perna (Giustina, vice president, Amma); Alberto Portesi (Cpa Portesi; president, Brescia Small Industry Association; Confindustria Labor Union Relations Commission); Piero Pozzoli (Ceramica Vaccari; Confindustria Board); Aldo Ravaioli (Stampal; president, Small Industry, Turino Manufacturers Union); Giorgio Regazzoni (Casaralta, Chairmanship Committee, Bologna Manufacturers Association); Luigino Rossi (Rossi Shoe Factories; president, Brenta Shoe Manufacturers Consortium); Mario Scaroni (Scaroni Canned Foods; Confindustria Board); Umberto Severi (Tesan); Vincenzo Speziali (Speziali laterizi; president, Catanzaro Manufacturers Association; Confindustria Board); Mauro Stefana (Stefana Steel Industry); Clarimbaldo Tognana (Porcellana d'Italia and Sebring; president, Treviso Manufacturers Association); Armando Vincoli (Santoni); Carlo Violati (President, Sangemini; president, Federterme; Confindustria Board); Angelo Zegna (Ermenegildo Zegna); Giovanni Zillo Monte Xillo (Cementizillo); Giordano Zucchi (Zucchi).



Forlani, Craxi, and Berlinguer

On the Visentini proposal and on letting the PCI into the administration, the division among those in favor and those against is definitely indicated by the percentages in the responses. On the other hand, concerning the question of having Craxi become prime minister, those interviewed demonstrated greater indecision. The judgment on the administration therefore--especially concerning economic policy --therefore contains a percentage of "don't know" responses. To make up the list of priorities relating to "urgent steps," instead of a division between those in favor and those against, we calculated the frequency with which each step is mentioned by the entrepreneurs interviewed.

(1) Are you in favor of the proposal by Bruno Visentini for a government of technicians? Yes: 58 [percent]; no: 42.

(2) Are you in favor of the proposal for a laic administration with a socialist prime minister? Yes: 41; no: 46; don't know: 13.

(3) Are you in favor of letting the PCI into the cabinet? Yes: 13; no: 82; don't know: 5.

(4) What is your judgment on the Forlani cabinet: Can it run the country? Yes: 54; no: 39; don't know 7.

(5) Is the administration capable of coping with the economic crisis? Yes: 42; no: 44; don't know: 14.

(6) What are the most urgent economic steps? Reduction in cost of money: 79; funding of social expenditures: 65; reduction in labor costs: 42; devaluation of lira: 21; increase in productivity: 16; review of sliding wage scale: 12; cuts in public spending: 12; launching the energy plan: 9; investments in the South: 9; funds for housing construction: 2; revival of exports: 2.

5058
CSO: 3104

TEXT OF 17 JANUARY PCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 22 Jan 81 pp 3-5

[Text] On 17 January, a plenary meeting of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] CC [Central Committee] took place.

The CC examined the new situation created by the defeat of AD [Democratic Alliance] on 7 December, the resultant checking of the reactionary offensive and the failure of the AD's subversive plan to liquidate the democratic regime.

There has been a major change in the political situation, which has created favorable conditions for the struggle of the Portuguese people to defend their vital interests, the liberties and other conquests made by the revolution, the democratic regime and national independence.

The CC described the situation that exists in the organs of sovereignty, and set forth the major guidelines relating to the action taken by the PCP in them or with them. The CC also set forth the PCP's general orientation with respect to the Armed Forces and the revision of the Constitution.

The CC stressed the diversity of the types of struggle, underscored the essential role of the mass struggles and discussed some crucial problems in the labor movement and the Workers Commissions at the present time. The CC also highlighted a direct contribution to the solution of the economic, social and cultural problems as a type of struggle and intervention.

The CC considered the unity of the workers, the unity of democrats and the battle against division to be an essential factor for the success of the popular, democratic struggle.

Finally, the CC examined certain tasks relating to the reinforcement of the party, and to the celebrations marking the PCP's 60th anniversary.

1. The Elections of 7 December-Consolidation of Democracy

The victory of the great combination of political and social forces which elected Gen Ramalho Eanes by a substantial majority on 7 December brought about a major change in the Portuguese political situation.

The reactionary offensive, which was fully under way, suffered a sharp setback. The subversive plan of Sa Carneiro-Freitas do Amaral to liquidate the democratic regime, an essential and culminating part of which was the election of Gen Soares Carneiro as president of the republic, suffered a resounding defeat.

The defeat of AD in the presidential elections and the election of General Eanes meant that the democratic regime was saved from the total conquest of power by the reactionaries, and that a wave of violence, illegality and persecution in preparation for the establishment of a new dictatorship was immediately avoided. They meant that democracy was consolidated and new prospects were afforded favoring the struggle of the Portuguese people in the near future.

The overwhelming vote against the AD's candidate, Soares Carneiro, whom AD identified completely with its government and with its majority in the Assembly of the Republic, was a vote against AD, against the AD government, and against the AD majority in the Assembly of the Republic.

In the election of 7 December, AD lost the social and electoral backing that it had obtained, albeit by antidemocratic methods, in the election of 5 October. As a result, the government lost the legitimacy to pursue the same policy. From this standpoint, it may be rightfully claimed that the results of the 7 December elections "rectified" the results of the 5 October elections.

Even though the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic and early elections did not take place immediately, the results of the 7 December elections created conditions to prevent the early resumption of subversive plans by the reactionaries, and to make considerable changes compulsory in the policy of the AD government and in the AD's legislative proposals in the Assembly of the Republic. They created conditions for preventing the continuation of the AD's unconstitutional, illegal and subversive offensive against the conquests made by the Portuguese people (namely, agrarian reform, the nationalizations, workers' rights and democratic liberties), and against the regime itself.

The PCP's CC emphasized that, despite these favorable conditions after the presidential elections, and at a critical time when the reactionaries, and AD in particular, were disoriented, discouraged, depressed and paralyzed by the great defeat that they had not expected, the forces which emerged from the elections as winners, including the reelected president himself, instead of intensively exploiting and rapidly consolidating the democratic positions, adopting the appropriate measures, resorted to a defensive position, giving the reactionaries time to partially recover from the immediate effects of the electoral disaster, to seal gaps, to reorganize ranks, to adjust to the new situation, to adapt tactics, and to renew plans and programs.

The PCP's CC is of the opinion that the defeat of AD and the victory of democracy on 7 December, although it represented a considerable reinforcement of the democratic regime, has not materialized thus far in proposals, decisions and changes which the election results fully justified.

The results of the 7 December elections reflected, signified and promoted a change in the correlation of forces favoring democracy. There are new, more favorable conditions for putting up opposition to the reactionaries, for defending the

democratic conquests and interests of the workers, and of the laboring classes and strata, for the unity of the democratic forces, and for insuring the democratic, free and independent future of Portugal.

2. The Serious Situation That Exists

The country's serious economic and social situation, brought on essentially by the policy of capitalist, landholder and imperialist recovery directed by the government run by the PS alone, and aggravated by the fascist-oriented governments of Mota Pinto and Sa Carneiro-Freitas do Amaral, shows signs of deep crisis, and augurs new, serious difficulties and problems.

The economic situation in no way relates to the promises made by consecutive governments to justify the intensification of their policy against the conquests made by the revolution and against the welfare of the working masses.

The productive activity of the manufacturing industry failed during the second half of the year that has just ended. Despite good weather conditions, the production of major agricultural products declined, or fell below predictions, owing to the agricultural policy of the AD government and the offensive against agrarian reform. (It is predicted that nearly 40 million contos worth of grain will be imported in 1981.) The rate of expansion in the GDP (gross domestic product) became stagnant in 1980, and it is not expected to exceed 3 percent in 1981 as well. The balance of trade on current account was considerably worsened, rising from $33 million in 1979 to over $800 million in 1980, despite the remittances from the emigrants and from tourism. The trade balance continues to register extremely large deficits, reflecting the stagnation of the national economy and the policy of dependence on the great imperialist powers. The foreign debt increased by over 50 million contos in 1980, amounting to nearly 380 million contos. The deficit of over 28.5 million contos in "capital efficiency" reflects the exporting of profits and the burdens of foreign loans.

The offensive against the nationalizations and against agrarian reform has caused intense damage to the national economy.

The offensive against the nationalizations brought about the disguised opening of basic sectors of the economy to big capital, the transfer of major public holdings to the private sector, the worsening of the external and internal debt of the public enterprises and of their financial status, and curtailment of productive investment and of economic development in general.

The offensive against agrarian reform brought about the destruction of 200 highly productive agricultural enterprises (UCPs/Cooperatives), leaving thousands of hectares of land from the reservations turned over to the agrarians abandoned, and caused the destruction of grainfields, the calamitous slaughter of thousands of head of cattle and the unemployment of thousands of workers.

The policy of capitalist and landholder recovery proved to be totally against the interests and welfare of the working masses and the national economy.

The status of the working class and of workers in general suffered seriously from the antipopular, antiworker policy of the reactionary governments, especially the Sa Carneiro-Freitas de Amaral government.

The exploitation of the workers has intensified, belying the verbal demagogy and demagogic acts of the reactionary governments.

Real wages have decreased. Term contracts are widespread. Unemployment has increased, with a proliferation of collective layoffs and selective layoffs. Prices have skyrocketed. The purchasing power of the masses has been reduced. The status of women and youth has become worse. There is a proliferation of persecution of labor leaders and representatives, and the use of private militias (thugs) by the reactionary bosses. The oppression in business firms has become a tool used increasingly to force the intensification of the exploitation.

Small and medium-sized farmers are experiencing further serious problems, with the abolishment of emergency farm credit, the increases in production factors and the freezing of prices of various products charged by the producer. Thousands of small and medium-sized merchants and manufacturers are approaching bankruptcy.

The offensive in the economic and social area has been accompanied by a widespread attack on the state apparatus, and by an increasingly bold offensive against the liberties and rights of the citizens.

The CC considered, with particular attention, the extremely serious situation that exists in the nationalized news media, attacked by AD and subject to its party control and use, specifically, in the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System] and RDP [Portuguese Radio Broadcasting System], in overt violation of democratic legality. The most basic rules of pluralism, impartiality and independence have been trampled upon. There is a proliferation of the various types of censorship. Parties, union organizations and social and political sectors are discriminated against and excluded. Deserving, competent workers in the news media are persecuted, fired and bypassed, assigning in their place individuals who are lacking in qualifications and professional dignity. The news is manipulated and has become a propaganda tool for the reactionaries and their government, and for poisoning public opinion. There has been an overt announcement of the intention to liquidate the public information sector.

The serious situation and the prospects for the AD government's immediate continuation demand a constant, strong and combative opposition and resistance on the part of all democrats and patriots, the working class and the popular masses, and all the social classes and strata that are hurt by the policy of capitalist and landholder recovery and by the plan to restore the power of the monopolies (allied with the imperialists) and of the large estate holders.

The results of the 7 December elections, checking the reactionary offensive and defeating the subversive plan of AD, and consolidating institutions and liberties, created more favorable conditions for the development of the popular, democratic struggle for a policy which, at present, relates to some fundamental lines already indicated by the PCP:

The restoration of democratic legality to all sectors of national life in which the Sa Carneiro-Freitas do Amaral government established de facto antidemocratic situations;

The defense of the democratic conquests stipulated in the Constitution (specifically, agrarian reform, nationalizations, workers' rights and control of management);

The guarantee of citizens' liberties and rights;

The establishment of pluralism in the news media;

The improvement of the people's living conditions;

A foreign policy of national independence, and of peace, friendship and cooperation with all peoples, without any subjugation to foreign interests.

3. Diversified Types of Struggle and Intervention

Examining the conditions under which the struggle of the workers and the Portuguese people as a whole is progressing, the CC stressed that the conclusions of the party's Ninth Congress concerning the diversified, complementary types of popular, democratic struggle and intervention, under the conditions of the Portugal of April, have been completely confirmed and continue to be completely valid.

After the electoral struggle, it is essential:

To continue steadfastly the joint action of the organs of power (president of the republic, Council of the Revolution and government) and in the organs of central and local power (Assembly of the Republic and local governments), as well as with the regional governments in the autonomous regions;

To intensify the masses' struggles which retain their critical, decisive nature;

And to stress the direct contribution to the solution of problems as a type of intervention and struggle that the workers and democrats will have to continue courageously.

Despite the favorable changes that have occurred in the political situation as a result of the 7 December elections, the prospects for national policy are gloomy. It is only through the struggle and intervention of the various types that have been cited that it will be possible to put up opposition to the government's policy and to insure the defense of the vital interests of the working people, the defense of liberties and other great conquests made by the revolution, the final defeat of the reactionaries and a democratic alternative,with the guarantee of a democratic regime and of national independence.

4. The President of the Republic and Democratic Stability

Pursuant to the positions announced previously, the PCP's CC emphasizes that the 7 December elections confirmed the positive role of the organ of sovereignty of the president of the republic, and of Gen Ramalho Eanes as president of the republic, in stabilizing and consolidating the democratic regime.

The CC, still considering the 7 December elections, concluded that the results clearly confirmed the party's orientation: the designation with the main, priority goal of defeating the AD candidate, the presentation, the campaign and abstention from running a Communist candidate and the final appeal to vote for Gen Ramalho Eanes. The CC is of the opinion that, with this orientation and the pertinent action, the PCP made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the reactionaries in the presidential elections and to the resultant consolidation of the democratic regime.

In view of the present AD domination of the Assembly of the Republic and the government, its intention to pursue the antidemocratic, antipopular offensive in the service of big capital, the landholders and foreign imperialism, and the plan, which still continues, for an unconstitutional revision of the Constitution, it will continue to be incumbent on the organ of sovereignty of the president of the republic, on the level of the institutions, owing to its political and military authority, to play a major role in the defense and consolidation of the democratic regime.

The PCP's CC considers the reaffirmation in President Eanes' inaugural speech of 14 January pledging to defend the democratic regime, to comply with and enforce compliance with the Constitution and to contribute to the correction of the situation of the news media to be constructive.

The PCP will continue to maintain relations with the president and with the presidency of the republic, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution.

5. The Council of the Revolution and the Defense of Democracy

Essentially, the PCP's CC made a positive assessment of the role of the Council of the Revolution in defending the stabilization of the Portuguese democratic regime.

Considering that the democratic regime is still running serious risks (as is clearly shown by the AD's subversive plan, defeated in the 7 December presidential elections), the CC confirms the fact that the PCP, for its part, has no objection to the continuation of the Council of the Revolution as an organ of sovereignty for 4 more years.

Apart from its consideration of the constitutional revision in this regard, the PCP's CC gives notice that, until the changes in the Constitution (approved by a two thirds majority of the Assembly of the Republic) go into effect, the organs of sovereignty, including the Council of the Revolution, will continue to have their complete current constitutional functions.

Until that time, the Council of the Revolution will continue to have complete authority, as a political organ and as a legislative organ in the military area, to guarantee the regular operation of the democratic institutions and faithfulness to the spirit of the Portuguese revolution of 25 April.

6. Strong Opposition to the AD/Balsemao Government

The Pinto Balsemao government is the perpetuator of the Sa Carneiro government under the new conditions imposed on AD by its resounding defeat in the 7 December presidential elections.

Prevented by the presidential election results from carrying out the subversive plan of Sa Carneiro-Freitas do Amaral, AD, weakened by the defeat that it had suffered, was forced to immediately reconsider its type of action. It was forced into a minimal understanding with the reelected president that it fiercely fought. It was forced to moderate the language which, before the presidential elections, was assuming more clearly fascist-oriented tones. It was forced to replace some of its "hawks" in government posts. It was forced to drop from the government roster the president of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] himself, Freitas do Amaral. It was forced to move from a position of obvious intolerance to an apparent openness and dialog.

However, the political objectives of AD and its government remain essentially unalterable.

The destruction of agrarian reform and of the nationalizations, the restoration of the monopolies and the large estates, the unrestrained exploitation of the workers and the laboring classes, the restriction of citizens' liberties and rights and the final destruction of the democratic regime still typify the policy of the reactionary Alliance.

The CC stressed the fact that it is a dangerous illusion to think that the Balsemao government represents a shift in the AD policy, or a rectification of the previous reactionary policy.

The new prime minister's speech at the inauguration ceremony and the government program submitted to the Assembly of the Republic confirm the fact that the new government does not intend to be a government abandoning and rectifying the anti-democratic, antipopular, unconstitutional, illegal and subversive policy of AD, but rather a government to perpetuate it, with outward adjustments necessitated by the defeat of 7 December.

From the AD/Balsemao government one can anticipate disregard for democratic legality, the continuation of the unconstitutional offensive against the great April conquests (agrarian reform, nationalizations, etc.), a deterioration in the economic situation, and that of health, education and culture, and a general worsening of the living conditions of the workers and the entire Portuguese people.

From the AD/Balsemao government one can anticipate the continuation of the anti-worker and antipopular policy of the previous governments, which involved the conversion of the Ministry of Labor into an agency to protect the reactionary bosses, and into a tool for labor union division.

From the AD/Balsemao government one can anticipate new concessions to big capital, the payment of indemnification and the turnover of state land and enterprises.

Like the previous governments, the AD/Balsemao government will not solve all the major national problems, but will, rather, exacerbate them.

In its foreign policy, the Balsemao government will pursue a policy of subjugation and submission to North American imperialism, to the most warmongering circles in NATO and to the interests of the Common Market multinationals.

The PCP's CC alerts the Portuguese people to the arrangements made by the AD government to grant facilities on Portuguese territory for the installation or traffic of nuclear weapons; something that would represent extremely serious danger to the security, territorial integrity and independence of Portugal.

The actual sabotaging of the development of friendly, cooperative relations with the new Portuguese-speaking African nations and with the socialist countries may be anticipated.

Such a policy is deeply detrimental to the interests of our people and of the national economy, and seriously jeopardizes national independence.

The program of the Balsemao government, submitted to the Assembly of the Republic, retains the main objective of restoring the economic and political power of big capital and of the large estate holders.

It retains, and even more clearly explicates the offensive against the nationalized business firms, the opening of the nationalized sector, including the banks, to capitalist firms, and the payment of indemnification with the financial participation of the state. It retains the offensive against agrarian reform. It retains the disastrous adherence to the EEC as "a top priority in the government's action." It retains the deterioration in the living conditions of the workers and the population as a whole, seeking to increase the exploitation, to set the wage ceiling at 16 percent and to liberalize layoffs. It retains the intention of seriously curtailing liberties with the new law on parties, the new law restricting the right to strike, new labor legislation, and the new electoral law. It retains the intention of not lessening the AD's antidemocratic control of the news media, especially television and radio, aimed at poisoning public opinion. It retains the plan for institutional confrontation and a break in the Constitution.

The CC decided that the PCP's parliamentary group would submit a motion within the next few days to reject the program of the Balsemao government, and will consider motions for rejection submitted by other parties as a means of insuring that the largest number of deputies vote against the AD government.

The CC calls attention to the fact that AD, which was resoundingly defeated in the 7 December elections and forced into a defensive position, is already taking great advantage of the fact that the democratic victory has not been exploited intensively.

Sensing the lack of initiative and the defensive position of the forces and sectors that won the 7 December elections, AD and its government are gradually resuming their arrogance and intolerance, where it would not be difficult to force them into major setbacks.

The PCP's CC firmly upholds the view that, in the event that the Balsemao government, like the Sa Carneiro government, should embark on the path of unconstitutionality, illegality and subversion, it should be immediately dismissed.

The PCP's CC calls attention to the unconstitutional nature and legal irrelevance, as well as the totalitarian political significance of the new prime minister's assertion that the government has a right to govern for 4 years, because it is a "government of legislature."

In the context of the Portuguese democratic regime, the government may be replaced on any occasion, on the basis of the various institutional mechanisms stipulated by the Constitution (dismissal of the prime minister by the president of the republic, motions for censure, refusal of the vote of confidence, dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic, etc.).

The attitude of Mario Soares and other PS leaders, claiming that the AD government should govern for the next 4 years is a conformist, defeatist attitude. The 7 December elections, which AD itself described as elections for or against AD and its government, proved that the vast majority of the Portuguese people are against AD and its government.

The PCP will maintain an attitude of strong opposition to the Balsemao government.

On the basis of the Constitution and democratic legality, the PCP is struggling and will continue to struggle for the dismissal and replacement of the present government as rapidly as possible, a government which is not in keeping with either the desires or the interests of the Portuguese people. It is struggling and will continue to struggle for the formation of a democratic government, within the context of the possible constitutional solutions.

The PCP's CC is of the opinion that the new political conditions created by the defeat of AD in the presidential elections have made it entirely possible to attain such a goal.

7. The PCP Parliamentary Group in the Assembly of the Republic

The AD majority in the Assembly of the Republic is a result of the violation of democratic legality and of the electoral manipulation on the part of the Sa Carneiro-Freitas do Amaral government, which made the results of 5 October possible.

The AD majority in the Assembly of the Republic, which never met the majority political desires of the Portuguese people, was directly challenged by the presidential elections. The policy of the AD majority, aimed at imposing unconstitutional legislation in an antidemocratic manner, suffered severe condemnation and rejection in the presidential elections. The AD majority in the Assembly of the Republic has no electoral or social base for continuing to devise and pass reactionary legislation to destroy the Portugal of April.

The contradictions, differences, conflicts and rivalries within AD and its majority in the Assembly of the Republic are tending to worsen.

It cannot be precluded that a majority parliamentary base for a reactionary government will cease to exist in the Assembly of the Republic with its present composition.

In the Assembly of the Republic, the Communist deputies will act with the following main objectives:

a. To check all attempts for an unconstitutional revision of the Constitution and for passing laws contrary to the Constitution, the liberties, the April conquests and the interests of the Portuguese people and of Portugal;

b. To have democratic laws submitted either by PCP deputies or by other deputies passed;

c. To oversee the government's action, and to expose and combat its antidemocratic policy and actions;

d. To be a spokesman in the Assembly of the Republic for the aspirations and demands of the working class and of all workers, intellectuals, technical cadres, small and medium-sized farmers, merchants and manufacturers, women, youth, all laboring classes, retirees, disabled, the population in general and the emigrants;

e. To use the Assembly of the Republic as a platform for informing and enlightening the public.

For these purposes, the PCP's parliamentary group will attempt to intensify the friendly cooperative relations that exist with the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement), and to establish, on a permanent basis if possible, or in concrete instances, understandings and agreements with parliamentary groups and deputies from other parties; and, in particular, owing to its importance, with the PS parliamentary group and with the Socialist deputies.

8. The Courts and Democratic Legality

During the present phase of Portuguese political life, wherein the reactionary forces installed in power are violating the most basic democratic principles and standards, the PCP's CC has considered the increasing importance that the courts could assume for defending the rights and interests of the citizens, the constitutionality of the laws and legality.

The PCP strongly upholds the independence of the courts, and is opposed to the pressure that other organs of sovereignty attempt to exert on them, and to the attempts to subject them to the government or to party politics.

The CC stresses the strict obligation to comply with the courts' decisions that is incumbent not only on the citizens, but on all the authorities, beginning with the government itself.

The PCP's CC underscores the role of the judicial magistrates and the Public Ministry in the democratization of national life, and the dignification of the administration of justice through partiality and integrity.

9. The Armed Forces and the Democratic Institutions

An objective study of the present Portuguese reality leaves no room for doubt that the Armed Forces are continuing to have a real participation in Portuguese political activity. This situation may be regarded as positive or negative. But it is a de facto situation, resulting from numerous factors, including the April revolution, one which cannot be changed by voluntarist decisions.

The assertions by the reactionary forces and certain opportunistic sectors regarding the "Armed Forces' submission to the civilian authority" are demagogic. What those

forces are seeking, under the guise of that slogan, is the dissociation of the military from April, and the creation of a new reactionary hierarchy that could serve as a tool for the subversive plans to liquidate the democratic regime.

The PCP maintains that the Armed Forces' intervention in political activity (a reality of the national situation) must be institutionalized, and not left to the mercy of the mere movement in the correlation of forces.

The Constitution approved in 1976 institutionalized that intervention, specifically through the Council of the Revolution and the authority of a military nature vested in the president of the republic.

If the Council of the Revolution should be abolished, and the president of the republic should cease to be CEMGFA [Armed Forces Chief of Staff], it is essential that the Constitution stipulate new forms for that institutionalization.

The PCP's CC takes a strong stand against any attempts to make the Armed Forces partisan, or to subject the Armed Forces to the policy of parties which temporarily constitute the government or hold a majority in the Assembly of the Republic.

The PCP's CC considers as extremely dangerous to democracy the intentions expressed by the new prime minister to assign to the government, in the constitutional revision, the direction and administration of the Armed Forces, as well as certain counterproposals made by AD leaders for a constitutional revision aimed at reserving for the Assembly of the Republic, or the government and the defense minister, the authority to legislate in military affairs, and to make appointments to high-ranking military posts.

In the present situation, if such orientation were approved, it would be tantamount to making the Armed Forces a tool in the service of whatever parties were in power. It would mean, not the Armed Forces' submission to the civilian authority, but rather the creation of a new reactionary military hierarchy likely to make the Armed Forces intervene in support of subversive coups of the reactionary parties.

The PCP's CC is of the opinion that, in the present state of evolution of the democratic regime, the principle that "in the Armed Forces, and in military affairs, it is the military who decide," should be in effect.

The PCP's CC is of the opinion that the legislative authority of the Assembly of the Republic in military affairs should be limited to the determination of the general national defense policy lines, with the exclusion of structuring, organization and administration. Extensive internal executive and regulatory authority should continue to be given to the Armed Forces, on the assumption that they observe the constitutional principles, democratic legality and fidelity to the defense of the regime and of national independence.

10. Democratic Local Government in the Service of the Population

The democratic local government discharges essential functions for the improvement of the material and cultural living conditions of the population, and for the democratization of national life.

In the current political situation, the reinforcement of the democratic local government, with emphasis on administrative decentralization and financial autonomy, is called upon to make an increasing contribution to the solution of the most variegated economic, social and cultural problems, to the nation's economic development and to the consolidation of the democratic regime.

The PCP's CC warns against the attempts that the AD government will certainly continue to make to interfere, through the MAI [Independent Movement for Local Government], in the running of the local government services, to refuse to implement completely the law on local finances, to delay the passage of the law demarcating responsibilities in the investment area and to reintroduce the policy of discrimination and protectionism through subsidies. The facts prove that the antidemocratic policy of the reactionary forces is manifested in the demand for great decentralization of the local government when they do not have control of the central government, and in strict centralization when they take over the government.

The CC calls attention to the reactionary plan to undermine the democratic nature of the local governments through the constitutional revision. Included in this category are Freitas de Amaral's proposals that the Municipal Chambers cease to be elected by direct suffrage and with proportionate representation, and start to be elected by the Municipal Assemblies (which would give rise to a despicable policy of unnatural collusion and alliances in the local governments), and the non-simultaneous regionalization plan that would make it possible to insure strong, dictatorial local governments in which the reactionaries would prevail, and to continue to make regions wherein the democratic forces have a predominant influence entirely dependent on the government.

The PCP will oppose these plans, which are in direct contradiction to administrative decentralization and democracy in the local governments.

The PCP will continue to uphold the democratization of the local government organs, and pluralist participation in all these organs, in accordance with the wishes of the respective voters.

The PCP will continue to uphold direct, proportionate election of the local government organs, more extensive popular participation in these organs, and unity in the local governments among all those who seriously desire to work toward the solution of the problems of the population and for the democratization of local government.

11. Constitutional Revision of the Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic, a supreme juridical reflection of the legal, institutional establishment of the democratic regime and of the revolutionary changes achieved by 25 April, in its essential features and in the present phase of history, is in keeping with the conditions and requirements for the development of the Portuguese people and of the "real country" that Portugal is at present.

Compliance with the Constitution, and the fulfillment thereof, have been a factor of prime importance to the stability of the democratic regime, to the defense of the interests of the Portuguese people and to national independence. The battle in defense of the Constitution is a front of the popular movement and a major battle, the results of which will determine, to a large extent, the future of Portuguese democracy.

The purpose of the revision of the Constitution is to preserve and perfect the Constitution, and not to subvert it and replace it. The PCP firmly rejects any idea of a total revision, and maintains that the revision must be limited to what is strictly necessary.

The PCP's CC warns against the proposals made by AD for unconstitutional changes aimed at weakening the regime and its institutions, and at preparing for its subsequent liquidation.

The CC insists that, if the revision of the Constitution is to be legal and legitimate, it must abide strictly by the material and formal limits established by the Constitution itself, in Articles 286 and 290; specifically, the requirement for a two thirds vote of the deputies, and the impossibility of revising certain principles and provisions, such as the rights and guarantees of citizens, the rights of workers, the principle of collective appropriation of the means of production and of land, the elimination of the monopolies and large estates, economic planning, the system of proportionate representation, the separation and independence of the organs of sovereignty, the independence of the courts, the autonomy of the local governments, etc.

Any change in the Constitution which did not abide by these limits would be illegal and illegitimate, and would assume a subversive nature.

The Assembly of the Republic elected on 5 October has the authority for constitutional revision, but it does not have powers to subvert the Constitution, or to alter the limits on revision established in the Constitution itself.

The PCP will submit proposals and counterproposals for changes, aimed specifically at: a. reinforcement of the guarantee of fundamental rights and liberties; b. preservation of the system of balance and interdependence among the various organs of sovereignty; c. maintenance of the powers of the president of the republic; d. maintenance of the Council of the Revolution, or the transfer of its authority so as to safeguard the defense of the democratic regime and the nonpartisan nature of the Armed Forces.

The constitutional revision, taking place at a particularly crucial juncture in the political struggle, has been injected into the political battle of the present time, and has been used by various political forces to respond to current problems, and to facilitate the attainment of their short and medium term goals.

As an example, Freitas do Amaral's proposal that the president of the republic not be allowed to dismiss a government that enjoys majority backing in the Assembly of the Republic is obviously intended, on the one hand, to create legal instruments for resuming the offensive against the reelected president, and denying him opportunities to effectively intervene against new subversive plans of the reactionary forces; and, on the other hand, to perpetuate the AD government, whatever its activity and regardless of the opposition to its policy.

The battle in the defense of the Constitution should not be confined to the Assembly of the Republic, the parliamentary groups and the party leaderships. All democrats and patriots, and the entire Portuguese people, have an important role to play, by

expressing their opinions and striving steadfastly to guarantee that the revision of the Constitution will not be converted into another destabilizing and subversive action of the reactionary forces.

12. Working Class Struggle

The struggle of the masses continues to play a decisive role in political and social life.

The CC stresses that its pursuit and progress are essential to protect the interests of the people, the liberties and agrarian reform, the nationalizations and other conquests made by the revolution, to defeat the antipopular policy of AD and to force the necessary democratic shift in national political activity.

The working class, with its aggressiveness, determination and powerful organization, was in the center of the vast popular movement of 1979-80 against the reactionary offensive, which was intensified upon the AD victory on 2 December 1979.

The CC emphasizes once again that the major conquests of a social nature made by the workers were a result of their intensive struggle. It was because of the struggle that the AD government was forced to unfreeze hiring; it was because of the struggle that the period for actual enforcement of the wage scales was reduced and the attempts to impose a wage ceiling were defeated. It was the workers' struggle that forced the shelving of the labor package and the decree on work schedules with which the government was attempting to subvert the major conquests in the area of labor legislation.

The workers did not struggle merely for an improvement in their living conditions. Their resorting to varied, multiple types of struggle, with emphasis on strikes and street demonstrations, was also aimed at defending the liberties, the conquests made by the revolution and the demand for a democratic policy capable of solving the serious national problems.

The confirmation of the reactionary Alliance's victory on 5 October 1980 has caused new threats and dangers to hover over the workers and the popular masses; and the arbitrary acts of management have become more intense.

The defeat of the reactionary forces and their candidate in the 7 December presidential elections and the brutal measures ordered by the government against the people's living conditions have created further prospects for a new rise in the struggle of the masses, which is already taking place.

The workers are putting up opposition to a widespread offensive by management which, with the collusion and backing of the government, especially the Ministry of Labor, enjoys complete impunity in its action against the rights of the workers and their union organizations.

The oppression by management has become very extensive: the use of "thugs" in the business firms, increased resorting to disciplinary procedures as a method of intimidation and arbitrary action, layoffs, and selective promotions and admissions have converted the work sites into centers of oppression.

In the business firms, the union activists are persecuted and discriminated against; and rights and liberties are violated with restrictions and bans on the activity of the workers' labor union organizations.

The forms of exploitation of the workers have become intensified and diversified, increasingly resorting to overtime work, special shifts, widespread use of bonuses, piece work and contract work.

The term contracts have reached gross percentages, amounting to as much as 100 percent. The term contracts are a source of all kinds of arbitrary action and discrimination, and have become a dreadful factor for instability in employment.

Unemployment, the seriousness of which the government attempts to minimize, is tending to worsen. Collective layoffs, specifically in the multinational firms, have intensified.

The workers' determination to struggle is increasing. The government is again threatening to reestablish the wage ceiling, this time at 16 percent. The intensification of the exploitation is a main objective in the government's policy. Concurrently with the struggle against this dangerous threat, there must be an intensification of the struggles in defense of the prerogatives that have been acquired, against management's oppression, in defense of labor union liberties, against unemployment and layoffs, against term contracts, and against the increased cost of living.

Collective bargaining continues to be a deciding factor in the improvement of the living and working conditions of the vast majority of workers. The CC is of the opinion that, owing to the number of workers that it mobilizes and because the bargaining has established many of the major conquests that management wants to eliminate, the labor movement must pay particular attention to this important front for struggle.

The vast, diversified struggle of the labor movement has one powerful tool, namely, its sound organized base. In addition to the united labor movement, the Workers Commissions are particularly prominent.

In the hundreds of Workers Commissions, contrary to the expectations of the divisionists, there has been a reinforcement of the unified positions, a key to the agglutination and mobilization of varied forces.

The more active the intervention of the Workers Commissions in solving the concrete problems of the workers and the business firms, the more actively they become associated with the workers and the more their democratic operation is reinforced, the more prestige they will acquire, making management's offensive against this essential form of organization more difficult.

This year, elections will be held to reelect hundreds of Workers Commissions. The party's cells must prepare for this important battle in time, attempting to uphold and reinforce the unified nature of the Workers Commissions.

The Central Committee stresses that, like the labor movement and the workers movement as a whole, the unified movements of small and medium-sized farmers and tenant

farmers, the small and medium-sized merchants and manufacturers, the intellectuals and technical cadres, the youth, women, retirees, the disabled and all antimonopolist classes and strata are of extraordinary importance.

13. Labor Movement

The unified labor movement is the most dynamic and decisive organized force of the workers' unified movement. This is why the provocative action of the divisionists against it has developed and proliferated.

The unified labor movement, firmly entrenched, has gained great prestige and influence. The CC calls attention to the fact that the progress and success of the struggle of the masses will depend greatly, not only on the defense of the unified labor movement, but also on its reinforcement on all levels and the elimination of defects and problems.

The CC calls upon all members of the party to act in the labor movement, with an active, committed participation in the reinforcement and restructuring of the unified labor movement, and in the defense of its democratic practice.

The enemies of the workers (government, management, reactionary parties), in a close alliance with reformist elements, are concentrating their efforts on the division of the workers movement and its union organizations.

The divisionists are, in an increasingly obvious manner, assuming the role of betrayers of the workers' interests; they do not approve of strikes; they attempt to separate the service workers from the factory worker sector and to bring them into confrontation; and they are in collusion with management, facilitating its offensive against the workers' rights and liberties.

In the area of organization, they behave like genuine "gangsters", their essential goal being to disorganize the labor movement. The antidemocratic nature of the activity of the divisionist organizations, their submission to the party apparatuses and the corruption of their leaders are features which have been becoming more marked.

The divisionists are finding increased backing from the government and from imperialist diversionary centers. The UGT [General Union of Workers] Congress will represent a new escalation in divisionist action.

The widely publicized "social contract" offered by the divisionists is part of the strategy to subject the workers to the yoke of capitalist exploitation.

Despite the powerful backing that they have, the area of the divisionists' intervention and influence is limited.

The CC emphasizes that divisionism can and must be defeated, by exposing it in the political and ideological realm, combating sectarianism and laborism, providing a fitting response to the organizational problems created by the parallel entities, increasingly reinforcing the unified labor movement and its association with the masses, and consistently protecting the interests and aspirations of the workers.

It is only by struggling against managerial authority and against the government's reactionary, antipopular policy that the union organizations can win prestige, gain influence and become reinforced. Only the unified labor movement can achieve this.

14. Direct Intervention in the Solution of Problems

The CC emphasizes that the existence of the revolutionary conquests that the counter-revolutionary activity has not managed to destroy, and the forms of economic organization created by the liquidation of monopolistic capitalism and by agrarian reform, have made the direct intervention of the workers and the population as a whole in the solution of crucial economic problems imperative.

The CC backs the proposals of the workers from many nationalized business firms, from business firms with management control and, in some instances, from private business firms, to insure the satisfactory operation of the firms, the high quality of the products, the solution to technical and work problems, and sales on markets.

The CC reaffirms the importance of reinforcing the workers' control as a means of having the workers intervene in the activity of the business firms, and expresses its complete support for the struggle to have the managers elected by the workers take over the public enterprises.

The CC backs and hails the decisions of the plenary meeting of militants in the agrarian reform area held on 10 January, whereby it is required (concurrently with the battle against unemployment, for the reestablishment of legality, for the stoppage of surrendering more reservations, machinery and livestock and for the withdrawal of the GNR [Republican National Guard] from the process) to continue along the path of production, producing more and better, and attempting to increase production and its value with less land.

The CC stresses that, while simultaneously battling against the worsening of the exploitation and of living conditions, the workers, the Portuguese people, the democratic regime and Portugal as an independent country are vitally interested in solving the economic and social problems, in emerging from the crisis and in national economic development.

15. Popular Unity and Democratic Unity

In the current conditions, and considering the prospects for change in the economic, social and political situation in the near future, the unity of the working class, popular unity and democratic unity may be deciding factors.

Accompanied by a high degree of organization, the unity of the working class, the workers, the peasants, and the different social classes and strata concerned with combating the reactionary policy of the AD government is a powerful weapon in the struggle to protect the popular and national interests and the democratic regime, which continues to be threatened by the reactionary forces entrenched in the government.

The CC cites as a constant task of prime importance the struggle against divisionism in the labor movement and in all movements and organizations of a unified nature.

Even when concealed by pseudorevolutionary and pseudodemocratic language, divisionism is the arm of internal reaction, of big capital, of reactionary management and of foreign imperialism within the popular movement. It must be combated relentlessly.

In the realm of the relations among the parties, the CC insists on the policy of dialog, rapprochement, understanding and joint action with the other democratic parties, and cited the particular importance of an understanding between the PCP and PS to the defense and consolidation of Portuguese democracy.

The CC was of the opinion that, in view of the anticommunist attitude of PS leaders, conditions have not been created for a formal agreement between the two parties. But conditions which experience has confirmed and to which the 7 December elections bore eloquent witness have been created for normal, friendly coexistence, understanding and joint action, that is coordinated or convergent in many instances, between Communists and Socialists.

The CC examined the significance and consequences of the disintegration and sharp decline in the influence of the leftist groups, confirmed in the presidential elections. Continuing the ideological battle, the CC underscored the importance of attracting to the struggle sectors which until recently have been influenced by leftist groups.

The CC once again turned its attention to the experience and lessons from the 7 December presidential elections, and confirmed the theory that those elections revealed the existence of an extremely vast, majority social and political area of potential backing for a democratic shift and a democratic policy.

In this connection, the influence and the role that has already been revealed on the part of the independents in national political life is noteworthy, as is the importance of the advent of new unified structures and movements which reflect the new situation which has been created by the presidential elections.

The unity of the democratic forces has assumed critical importance in preventing the unconstitutional revision of the Constitution and in guaranteeing the essential features of the democratic regime, to combat the reactionary policy and to prepare for the replacement of the AD government by a truly democratic government, and to insure national independence and a foreign policy marked by peace and friendship with all peoples.

The progress in the cooperation among the democratic forces means the isolation of the positions of those, such as Mario Soares, who preaching the legitimacy of AD to govern without any reservations, are attempting to make us forget the blatant defeat of the reactionaries on 7 December and its necessary repercussions on national political life.

The CC calls upon all the organizations and militants everywhere, from the business firms to the Assembly of the Republic, to engage with determination and confidence in a constant action on behalf of unity, combating sectarianism, stressing mutual interests and mutual goals, and finding areas for mutual understanding and action.

16. The Alternative Is Possible

The situation is still complex and difficult. Further difficulties and ordeals are in store for the Portuguese people as a result of the policy of AD entrenched (albeit temporarily) in the government, the Assembly of the Republic, the state apparatus, the command posts of economic and financial activity and the news media. Further attempts at destabilization and coups are to be anticipated. Serious threats continue to hover over Portuguese democracy.

However, after the resounding defeat of AD on 7 December and the failure of its subversive plan, the forces of liberty, democracy and social progress are in a more favorable position to put up opposition to the reactionaries, to continue with the struggle and to finally bring about a democratic shift in national policy.

The PCP's CC proclaims that the fall of the AD/Balsemao government and the formation of a government that will correct the most serious aspects of its policy are within the reach of the Portuguese people, in the context of the Constitution and the institutions.

The reactionary forces are interested in violating, destroying, subverting and replacing the Constitution, because it establishes the democratic conquests made by the antifascist revolution, and confers rights and liberties which give the Portuguese people sufficient instruments to effectively defend their interests, to fulfill their aspirations and to insure the continuity and progress of democracy.

It is the reactionary forces that are acting outside of that context. The Portuguese people are vitally interested in defending it, as an essential area of national democratic life.

17. Reinforcement of the Party

The CC deems it timely to emphasize once again the reality that the facts are confirming day by day, namely, that the PCP is a necessary, indispensable and irreplaceable force for the defense of the workers' interests, of the conquests made by the revolution, of the democratic regime and of national independence.

The reinforcement of the PCP is in the interests, not only of Communists, but of the workers, of the entire Portuguese people and of the democratic regime.

Pursuant to the conclusions of the CC plenary session of 13-14 October, the CC made some preliminary decisions for essential measures, to be decided at the next plenary meeting on 13-14 February, aimed at reinforcing the work of leadership, organization, information and propaganda, and ideological work.

The CC considered, as general guidelines:

For the reinforcement of the leadership work, the summoning of new comrades to work in the CC's executive bodies, or in conjunction with the latter, and an in-depth examination of the work of the DORs [Southern Region Organization Directorate], including its composition;

For the reinforcement of the organization work, a general effort for the structuring, and the regular operation of the company cells, the participation in regular activity by thousands of militants who are not engaged therein, the provision of cards in due time and the regular payment of dues, and intensification of the recruitment associated with the marking of the party's 60th anniversary;

For the reinforcement of the information and propaganda work, a change and improvement in the content and graphic appearance of AVANTE, to be carried out in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the PCP's central organ this coming February; an improvement in the intervention in the news media; and a rapid, direct and incisive response to daily events;

For the reinforcement of ideological work, a more intensive analysis of the problems, an improvement in the overly routine work style of responsible entities, and the reinforcement of reading and study habits among the militants.

18. 60th Anniversary of the PCP

The CC decided that the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the party on 6 March 1921 are to be held with the slogan of the party's organizational, political and ideological reinforcement.

An extensive publication of the history of 60 years of struggle will be carried out, citing the PCP's role in the resistance to fascism, the liberation from the dictatorship, the Portuguese revolution, the democratic transformations and the defense of the democratic regime established in the Constitution.

The PCP's role in the present political situation and in the democratic and socialist future of Portugal will be highlighted.

The CC decided that, at the next plenary meeting to be held on 13-14 February, a resolution on the 60th anniversary, which will indicate the fundamental political and ideological lines of the celebrations,will be approved for publication.

For the present, the CC has decided:

To hold a major session marking the 60th anniversary in Lisbon, on 7 March;

To hold a major exhibition on the party's 60 years of existence and struggle;

To publish a special edition of AVANTE on 5 March, devoted to the 60th anniversary, and to publish in AVANTE during the next few months major aspects of the party's history;

To issue a medal, an emblem and a poster marking the 60th anniversary;

To have the r gional, district and local organizations carry out their own initiatives.

17-1-1981

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

2909
CSO: 3101

NATO, THIRD WORLD, NORTH-SOUTH FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS

Lisbon POVO LIVRE in Portuguese 7, 14, 21 Jan 81

[Excerpts from book by Antonio Maria Pereira: "Portuguese Foreign Policy" (to appear)]

[7 Jan 81, p 9]

[Excerpt] Today, we begin publishing a portion of the book entitled "Portuguese Foreign Policy" by Antonio Maria Pereira.

The excerpt that we are printing today deals with the definition of the concept of Third World promotion, a term which is very common in Portugal's recent political vocabulary, but the meaning of which has not been probed deeply.

The acknowledgment of the fact that there is profound inequality betwen the North and South which demands the continuation and intensification of the dialog aimed at the construction of a new world order is now accepted with equanimity by all conscious individuals who cannot, on that account, be described as Third World promoters, with the meaning that the term currently holds in the political vocabulary.

Certain trends of thought of Marxist origin, based upon confirmation of the differences that exist between North and South, and applying the Marxist method of analysis to this, have reached the conclusion that, in the present-day world, the class struggle (which, as everyone knows, is, from a Marxist standpoint, the dynamizing factor for social progress) has been replaced by the hostility between the developed North and the South, where the new proletariat comprised of Third World peoples lives. As Melo Antunes wrote: "An intensification of the analysis leads to the conclusion that the principal contradiction in the contemporary world is the contradiction that has developed on the basis of a North-South axis, bringing the 'developed' and the 'underdeveloped' into conflict, and no longer the classic East-West contradiction between different political and social systems." *

The Marxist interpretation of the North-South problem in itself does not entail any major obstacles to Portuguese interests. However, the matter starts to become serious on the national level when the political officials who are responsible for foreign policy, possessed by a messianic spirit, begin considering the lofty goal of the construction of the new international order a priority direction for foreign policy to which the other national interests must be sacrificed, if necessary.

*In O JORNAL, 16-2-79.

Among these national interests sacrificed to the ideal of the new international order is, primarily, that of the defense against Soviet expansionism. This is because, to those modern Marxists (who, in reality, are acting as "fellow travelers" of the Communists), one of the indisputable premises is that Soviet expansionism does not exist, inasmuch as the only major world problem is that of the construction of the new international order, and the only "imperialism" is the North American; and anyone who does not think so is nothing but a crude anticommunist.

Through a semantic evolution, the term Third World promotion is currently applied to this trend of thought, which has stubbornly persisted in Portugal since the revolution; and its leading ideologist is the presidential adviser, Lt Col Melo Antunes, from whom a great deal has been learned and continues to be learned by Gen Ramalho Eanes and all the other members of the politicomilitary faction of the so-called "Group of Nine" that has been institutionalized in the Council of the Revolution. Its political influence on Portuguese society is still being felt, in highly negative terms for the complete democracy to which the country aspires.

3. The Third World Tenets

Jean-Francois Revel, who has analyzed the phenomenon of Third World promotion with penetrating clarity, is of the opinion that the doctrine is based on three tenets, which he described as follows:

"The first of these tenets is that there is no possibility of improving the 'system'- a vague term which is apparently applied both to Swedish and Brazilian capitalism, the former of the first quarter of the 19th century, and the latter of the last quarter of the 20th century. The differences between the periods of history and regions of the world are obliterated, in the intrinsic, uniform depravity of the 'system.' When the 'system' is harsh toward the workers, it exploits them; when it gives them relative prosperity, it 'recovers them.' Hence, it is inferred that all reformism is ridiculous. There never has been, nor can there ever be a real improvement, at least an improvement that does not conceal another trap. It is necessary to 'destroy the system,' and in the absence of this all else is futile.

"The second tenet is that the destruction of the 'system' is a priority, and the system is clearly understood to be capitalism, and it alone. The mission of abolishing it has priority over liberties, democracy, legalism, elections and human rights.

"The third tenet is that the only imperialism in existence stems from capitalism. Hence the imperialism par excellence is American imperialism, possibly backed by some pseudodemocratic, neocapitalist puppets. In all areas of the globe, imperialism is simply synonymous with the United States."

The credo summarized in these three tenets constitutes a kind of pidgin*-Marxism. This basic credo, which at times cannot even be challenged, is an intellectual and political carte blanche. It wields a constant influence in the direction of a Stalinization of the economic and political power. It has helped to justify all the

*Pidgin is a mixture of various languages (English, Chinese, Malaysian and African tongues) used as a primitive means of communication, similar to the Sabir (a mixture of Mediterranean languages with Arabic).

authoritorian forms of power, in which its organizers resort to a vaguely socialist program, although, as they continue, they prove to be incapable of putting it into practice or, more often, prove incapable of governing. But even after the failure, which generally hurls into the same abyss the rudimentary economic prosperity that may have already existed, and the citizens' liberties, the archaic political boss system clothed in Marxist rhetoric claims not to be at fault, because there is always an "imperialism" to excuse all its failures. *

Nonalinement

In the area of foreign policy, the Third World promoters advocate nonalinement, and preclude adherence to either of the major military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), as well as demanding the end of the military bases of "imperialist" (interpreted as United States) powers in foreign countries.

In addition, the nonalined countries declare themselves to be "anti-imperialist," "anticolonialist" and "antineocolonialist"; they strive for the dispelling of international tension, and preach cooperation among the Third World countries.

At their beginnings, during the time of their inspirers, who were Tito, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno, and whose efforts were responsible for the holding of the Bandung Conference in April 1955, the nonalined countries actually had neutralism toward the great politicomilitary blocs as their ideal.

But in the meantime, particularly after the last nonalined summit meeting in Cuba, during 1978, at which Fidel Castro officiated, the movement has become mainly influenced by the more radical countries associated with the Soviet sphere. Recalling that the liberation movements have been aided primarily by the Soviets, in their struggles for independence, Fidel Castro repeatedly proclaimed the movement's new "slogan": the Soviet Union is a natural ally of the Third World countries.

Thus, it is understood that Third World promotion has become increasingly reflected in preferential treatment or, at least sympathy for the Communist Parties. In the case of Portugal, this explains why the relations between the former colonies that have become independent and Portugal have taken place essentially through a privileged spokesman: the Portuguese Communist Party.

[14 Jan 81, pp 5, 14, 15]

[Text] Today, we continue the publication of the chapter devoted to Third World promotion from Antonio Maria Pereira's book, "Portuguese Foreign Policy" which will soon be in print.

In the first part, which we published last week, entitled "What Third World Promotion Is," the author, after defining the term, explained how Third World promotion, a byproduct of decolonization, has become entrenched in the ideology of the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], primarily through Lt Col Melo Antunes.

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* In "Totalitarian Temptation" (p 112).

a. Period of Provisional Governments

As we shall observe subsequently, the history of Portuguese foreign policy since the revolution has wavered between the European and Western tendency, on the one hand, and Third World promotion, on the other, with one or the other orientation prevailing in accordance with the balance of political forces and the personality of the ministers of foreign affairs at each interval.

During the first, second and third provisional governments, until May 1975, Mario Soares was minister of foreign affairs. A convinced European, the Socialist leader carried out the Portuguese foreign policy with two main objectives: Portugal's openness to the countries and international organizations, in general, with which we had no relations or had very troubled relations; and decolonization.

The Third World Promoters and Decolonization

I do not intend to debate the heated issue of decolonization at this time. Hence, I shall confine myself to remarking that Mario Soares began the process, following a consistent line, imposed by the need to insure international credibility for the new democratic regime, which demanded genuine decolonization. Soon, however, the Third World promoters in the MFA, especially Melo Antunes and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, interfered in the scheduled process, establishing confidential contacts with the leaders of the liberation movements, and sabotaging the action of the then foreign affairs minister. At a certain juncture, Mario Soares was completely outstripped by the MFA leaders, whose Third World promotion prompted them to surrender the overseas area, pure and simple, without in the least protecting the interests, or even the lives of the Portuguese residing there.

In Angola, the Marxist Third World promotion of Melo Antunes and Rosa Coutinho led, during the civil war, to a declared option for the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], in violation of what had been stipulated in the Alvor Accords.

In the fourth provisional government, the foreign affairs minister was the great ideologist of Third World promotion, the then Maj Melo Antunes.

Through acts and declarations by Melo Antunes, he then had an opportunity to give free rein to his Marxist Third World promotion.

Angola was embroiled in a bloody civil war among the three parties which had signed the Alvor Accords with Portugal: UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], FNLA [Angolan National Liberation Front] and MPLA.

Prompted by his ideology, Melo Antunes immediately opted for the Marxist party, MPLA, as he himself expressly declared: "At the conclusion of the fourth provisional government, in mid-July 1975, when I visited Angola at the height of the battle among the movements, and Luanda was dominated by the MPLA and militarily defended by Portuguese forces against an offensive movement of the FNLA, backed by regular Zairian forces (following my express orders in this regard) (sic), I upheld the proposition (Melo Antunes continues) both in Angola and later in Lisbon, that the Alvor Accords had been completely negated by the reality, and that Portugal should denounce them, give up the notion of 'active neutrality' and courageously and clearly take it upon itself to support the MPLA." He later added, with respect to the

FLNA, that, "This movement appeared, with increasing clarity, to be attempting to convert Angola into a satellite of Zaire, subjecting it to imperialism." *

As has been noted, Melo Antunes, faithful to his Third World promotion ideology, considers "imperialism" to be only that of the West, dominated by the United States, and by no means that of the Soviets, exercised by way of Cuba, through the Marxist party, MPLA.

Hence, thanks to the decisive action of the MFA's Third World promoters, especially Rosa Coutinho and Melo Antunes, Angola, upon becoming independent, immediately entered the Soviet orbit, thereby bringing about a substantial change in the world geopolitical balance, in favor of the Soviet Union.

Melo Antunes applies his Marxist Third World promotion not only to Angola, but to Portugal as well, convinced, as he is, that our place lies primarily among the group of Third World countries. On another occasion, the then foreign affairs minister stated: "In fact, I think that the course of our history is one wherein we have been a country far more destined toward the Third World than a country inclined toward the developed world." **

The Third World Promoters and EEC

Melo Antunes' Third World promotion has prompted him to assume a position against Portugal's membership in the EEC. He declared: "We are ambiguously participating in this developed, industrialized center, which Europe is; and I say ambiguously because the feeble development of our productive system, the persistence of outworn social relations in large portions of our country, and our dependence and subordination with respect to the great economic forces in the world make us a poor partner for this Europe, to which we are still fully entitled to belong. Hence, setting aside the possibility of our joining the European Economic Community, because of that backwardness and weakness in our economy, which would readily make it vulnerable to competition, we must seek specific types of relations which will fittingly reflect our special ties with the Europe of the Nine." ***

The Third World Promoters and NATO

Faithful to his Third World promotion ideology, Melo Antunes came out in favor of the dismantling of the military blocs, and even agreed to Portugal's leaving NATO, which would be counterbalanced by a policy of rapprochement with the nations of the East. Let us hear what he says in this regard: "We are struggling for the dismantling of the military blocs, which does not mean that Portugal should remain in the organization until NATO is dismantled. Our country is continuing to develop an independent policy of rapprochement with the East European countries, especially Romania and Yugoslavia, and even Poland." ****

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* In EXPRESSO, 17-2-79.
** In EXPRESSO, 21-9-74
***In DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 3-6-75.
****In A CAPITAL, 3-8-79.

In executing his Third World promotion policy while minister of foreign affairs, Melo Antunes increased the number of trips to Eastern and Third World countries, especially the Arab nations, in the hope of great economic advantages that could constitute an alternative to Europe and the Common Market. All those efforts were completely futile, once again attesting to the fallacy of his Third World promotion theories.

Melo Antunes' Third World promotion antagonism toward American "imperialism" prompted him to notify the United States, unofficially, in April 1975, that Portugal would not allow the use of the American base in the Azores in the event of a conflict in the Middle East, contrary to the position that the pro-Western Democratic Alliance government was to adopt later.

The fifth provisional government, which lasted only 30 days, had Mario Ruivo as its foreign affairs minister. We were experiencing the hot summer of 1975, and the Communist Party, allied with the most radical sector of the MFA, was accelerating its Leninist cavalcade. Nonalined Third World promotion continued to be the guideline for the foreign policy, which was evolving increasingly toward an aloofness from the West and rapprochement with the Eastern countries. Our departure from NATO ceased to be a timid tendency, as in the time of Melo Antunes, and became a stated objective.

As we read in a brochure entitled "Foreign Policy of the Fifth Provisional Government," published by the heads of the department, "Among the goals toward which the foreign policy of the fifth provisional government has been directed, emphasis should be placed on national independence and the efforts to reinforce Portugal's ties with the anti-imperialist Third World countries, to intensify the relations with the Eastern countries and to bring about progressive emancipation from subjugation to Western capitalism and 'Atlantism' as an indispensable requisite for a proper reequating of the unquestionable Portuguese presence in Europe.

"...Now, the effort of the fifth government was precisely that of gaining autonomy, and hence a margin for maneuvering and negotiation with respect to the capitalist West, without necessarily seeking alinement with the East, but merely stressing the development of multiple bilateral and multilateral relations with the Third World countries, thus laying the groundwork, firmly and clearly, for Portugal's nonalinement with any politicomilitary bloc."

NATO could not fail to react against the increasingly strong influence of the Communist Party in Portugal, reflected, in foreign policy, in Third World nonalinement and rapprochement with the Eastern countries. For this reason, Portugal was denied access to the NATO meetings on nuclear armament, and the then secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, declared that " NATO might have to expel Portugal from the Alliance if that country continues to be dominated by a Communist minority."

The Third World Promotion of the Group of Nine

But in the meantime, confronted with the offensive of the Communists allied with the most radical sector of the MFA and the extreme left, the so-called "Group of Nine", whose ideologist was, as always, Melo Antunes, and of which Ramalho Eanes was a member, was preparing the conditions for the victory of 25 November.

The political program of the Nine was summarized in the so-called "Document of the Nine" or "Melo Antunes Document" published on 6 August 1975; and therefore at the height of the hot summer. Insofar as foreign policy was concerned, the document established (as it could not fail to do, since it was drafted by Melo Antunes) a clearly Third World promotion orientation, based on the following guidelines: "Independence from the great powers; maintenance of our ties with Europe; clearcut openness with respect to the Third World (with special emphasis on our former colonies and the Arab nations); and intensification of the relations with the East European socialist countries."

As is evident, faithful to the Third World promotion concept of its author, the document did not contain a single word about the Atlantic Alliance or NATO, rather stressing a determined effort for a closer relationship with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and with the Third World.

In the sixth provisional government, Melo Antunes again held the post of foreign affairs minister. The guideline for the foreign policy continued to be nonalined Third World promotion, although not so radical as in the fifth government. The minister still traveled untiringly to the Arab and East European countries, attempting to win markets that would make it possible to establish alternative export lines to those of Europe, but the results were completely nil.

Melo Antunes Saves the PC [Communist Party]

Meanwhile, 25 November occurred, and on that occasion we witnessed once again a typical demonstration of Melo Antunes' Marxist Third World promotion when, in view of the Communist Party's deep involvement in the totalitarian armed coup, the normal course of the victorious counteroffensive would surely have led to holding it responsible, and perhaps even to outlawing it. Melo Antunes went on television and, on 26 November, stated that "the participation of the Communist Party in the construction of socialism is indispensable; it seems to me impossible to construct socialism without the PCP."

In publicly claiming, with his authority as minister of foreign affairs and ideologist of the Group of Nine, that the Communist Party was indispensable to Portuguese democracy, Melo Antunes rendered it an invaluable historical service, allowing it to emerge unscathed from the armed confrontation in which it was involved and in which it was defeated.

The Third World promoters' solidarity with the Communist Parties had been demonstrated once again.

b. Period of Constitutional Governments

(Temporary) End of Third World Promotion

This concept of Third World promotion in our foreign policy which, as we have observed, lasted throughout the provisional governments, was finally removed, starting with the first constitutional government of Mario Soares, with Medeiros Ferreira (and after his resignation, Mario Soares himself) as minister of foreign affairs.

Finally, the European option was clearly adopted, and Portugal requested admission to the European Council and the Common Market. Simultaneously, the doubts which had persisted regarding our enduring membership in NATO were dispelled, through unequivocal statements by two ministers of foreign affairs. Starting with the first constitutional government, Portugal became definitively European and Western.

Hence, it appeared that, after all, the Third World promotion was nothing more than one of the many illusions of the captains of April that Portugal's unequivocal European option had finally been relegated to the refuse heap of history (as will be explained more in detail later, this obviously has nothing to do with the desirable development of cooperative relations with the Portuguese-speaking African countries marked by mutual respect for the sovereignty and political options of each party).

The Revival of Third World Promotion

However, it did not happen in this way. Just like the phoenix rising from its own ashes, Melo Antunes and his Third World promotion reappeared in the national foreign policy some time after the first constitutional government took office.

On this occasion, Third World promotion emerged through an unwarranted interference by President Ramalho Eanes in foreign policy. Creating his own channels, and dispatching his own emissaries (especially the chronic Maj Melo Antunes) to the capitals of the Portuguese-speaking African countries, the president developed his own Third World promotional foreign policy, creating major embarrassment and making consistent external action on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs impossible.

In acting in this manner, President Ramalho Eanes, who constantly proclaimed himself a faithful adherent to the Constitution, did not hesitate to violate it; inasmuch as, according to the terms of paragraph a, No 1, of Article 203, and paragraph a, No 2, of Article 204 of that fundamental charter, the administration of foreign policy is incumbent on the government exclusively, and is executed by the minister of foreign affairs. According to the provisions of Article 138 thereof, the president of the republic is only assigned the limited authority to appoint ambassadors, to promulgate international treaties and to declare war.

President Ramalho Eanes' constant interference in foreign policy continued during the second constitutional government of Mario Soares, with Sa Machado as minister of foreign affairs.

The Third World Promoters' Boycott of the Portuguese Language in UNESCO

The case of the blocking of the Portuguese language in UNESCO is a typical example: Making use of the occasion of the first meeting of UNESCO in Portugal, in April 1978, at which I presided, I succeeded in having all the working documents issued during the meeting, as well as all the final recommendations disseminated not only in UNESCO's working languages (English, French, Arabic, Spanish and Russian), but in Portuguese as well.

During the course of this initiative to adopt Portuguese as a working lanaguage for UNESCO, the foreign affairs minister gave express instructions to the then Portuguese ambassador to the organization, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, to officially request such adoption.

Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo (whose Third World promotion is public knowledge, and is accounted for by her ideological agreement with Melo Antunes, and also by her stay in UNESCO, the proclivity of which is naturally toward Third World promotion), instead of taking the necessary initiative (contacts with Brazil and the other five Portuguese-speaking nations to form a common front for the promotion of Portuguese), chose to address the president of the republic directly; and the latter, acting in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, placed a freeze on Sa Machado's diplomatic initiative.

Third World promotion lies at the root of what occurred: Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo was convinced, and managed to convince the president of the republic, that a Portuguese initiative to foster the Portuguese language might be considered a "manifestation of cultural neocolonialism"! *

President Ramalho Eanes' first major international initiative occurred during this second constitutional government. Accompanied by Sa Machado, the president attended the historic Bissau summit, with Agostinho Neto, president of the People's Republic of Angola, in May 1978, from which resulted the Bissau Accord, representing a decisive (and unquestionably positive) point in the Third World promotion line of our foreign policy. (As has been noted, rapprochement with the former colonies, apart from ideological differences, is praiseworthy, provided it does not become a priority direction in our foreign policy, sacrificing other more important national external interests).

A Presidential Foreign Policy

When the second constitutional government fell, it was followed by Nobre da Costa's third government, which virtually had no time to act; after which President Ramalho Eanes named Mota Pinto prime minister of the fourth constitutional government, in which Freitas Cruz held the post of foreign affairs minister.

At the outset, its presidential origin placed this government in a situation of obvious subordination to the president of the republic, which was reflected in foreign policy particularly.

Enthusiastic over the repercussions of the Bissau summit, President Ramalho Eanes virtually started administering Portuguese foreign policy, not only through the usual parallel diplomacy, but also through the ministry's own machinery. The minister and the secretary general himself started regular dealings with the president on matters which eventually became a mere expedient.

The contacts with the governments of the former colonies took place through emissaries of the president, and often in default of the government. Since the latter, in turn, was dealing with the same matters through official channels, there was such confusion that Aquino de Braganca, Samora Machel's foreign policy adviser, told ANOP [Portuguese News Agency] at the time that, "The negotiations between Portugal and Mozambique have been hampered by Portuguese political instability and by the multiplicity of Portuguese negotiators, who have almost always been ignorant of the recent history of Mozambique and the very problems under discussion." **

*This topic is discussed in depth in my book, "The Portuguese Language in Danger," Oliveira Martins Foundation edition, 1978.
**In A CAPITAL, 3-8-79.

As the intervention in the administration of foreign policy by the president of the republic increased, the influence of Melo Antunes and his Third World promotion became increasingly evident. The rapprochement with the Eastern countries was intensified; at the height of the crisis of the Mota Pinto government, the president, without consulting the Assembly of the Republic in advance, decided to tour three Warsaw Pact countries, and while in them hailed the bonds of friendship uniting them with Portugal, advocating an increase in the multiple economic and cultural relations and stressing the "similar positions in the area of international policy." (!)

While in Bulgaria, which in foreign policy is a mere obedient representative of the Kremlin, the president discussed the Southern Africa problem in terms that obviously ended up representing a reinforcement of the Soviet position in Angola and Mozambique. And while there he signed an agreement abolishing visas which allowed Soviet citizens who obviously would not go there for tourism to enter Portugal without any control.

At the same time, in an obvious timed coincidence with the president's visit to those countries, the presidential envoy Melo Antunes visited Maputo, where he conferred with Samora Machel, a few days before the summary execution of the Portuguese citizen Rui Manuel Nunes da Silva.

Upon the collapse of the Mota Pinto government, the presidential Third World promotion became official, with the appointment of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo as prime minister. Her Third World promotion association was no secret to anyone, and her foreign policy program was reflected in a genuine establishment of Third World promotional nonalinement. In it, no mention was made of NATO, and Portugal's associations with the Third World countries were put in the same category as those linking us with the Western countries. (!)

The Nonalined Conference in Havana

In July 1979, the Conference of Nonalined Nations took place in Havana, with Fidel Castro officiating. No Western country participated in it except Spain, in view of its specific interests in Spanish-speaking America.

Portugal, however, forced by its president to consider itself a part of the Third World, was in attendance there, with a high-level delegation comprised of the state secretary for foreign affairs, Paulo Eanes, a general director, our ambassador in Havana and other individuals as well. For a country with a Third World destiny and a tendency toward nonalinement, this imposing presence was a matter of "noblesse oblige"...

Shortly thereafter, departing on a visit to Guinea-Bissau, President Ramalho Eanes, explaining the reason for that strong presence of Portugal at the summit in Cuba, made it clear that, "having good relations with the Cubans means, to some extent, creating conditions enabling our foreign policy to be carried out in a more consistent and effective manner" (we would add, provided that foreign policy is one of Third World promotion and is aimed at nonalinement).

In accordance with his Third World promotion tendencies, President Ramalho Eanes, in an interview with the WASHINGTON POST, with his first and only praise ever given

to a Portuguese political party, claimed that the Communist Party "has left a good impression, and is no longer attempting to impose its ideology;" in short, it is behaving impeccably. How can one fail to connect this surprising assertion with the speech by the president's foreign affairs adviser, Lt Col Melo Antunes, on 26 November 1975, in defense of the Portuguese Communist Party?

The Invasion of Afghanistan

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at Christmas of 1979 was, without doubt, the most serious threat to peace since the Nazi attack on Poland in 1939, and made a fundamental change in the international political atmosphere. The attack was unequivocally condemned by all the Western countries, the majority of the Arab countries, and even the Spanish and Italian Eurocommunist parties. Nevertheless, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia, South Yemen and the other nonalined countries in the Soviet sphere (as well as the French and Portuguese Communist Parties) approved it.

Perhaps because Angola and Mozambique had refused to condemn the USSR, the fact is that Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, then prime minister, also refused to condemn the Soviet attack, going so far as to claim that it did not jeopardize the commitments assumed in the final Act of Helsinki !!! *

Along the same train of thought, President Ramalho Eanes, in equivocal and scandalously mild terms, confined himself to accusing the Soviet Union of "military audacity," nevertheless taking the opportunity to criticize NATO, which he blamed for what had happened, a blame resulting from the fact that "it delayed in assuming the deciding factors of a new world situation." This is tantamount to saying that it was not oriented toward Third World promotion for the creation of the new international order.

But, one might ask, do these shocking statements by President Ramalho Eanes mean that there are any reservations on his part regarding Portugal's continuance in NATO? Has not the president stated several times that Portugal would remain faithful to its international commitments, including those assumed in the area of the Atlantic Alliance?

As for the claims of faithfulness to NATO, it may be recalled that the pro-Communist and Third World promoter, Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves, put them in exactly the same terms, going so far as to visit Brussels, the organization's headquarters, in person, where he vehemently protested Portugal's faithfulness to the commitments assumed in the area of the Atlantic Alliance. And the Communist Party itself, during the revolution, never questioned our remaining in NATO over the medium term. When Alvaro Cunhal was interviewed on this topic by Oriana Fallaci in June 1975, he made the following verbatim response: "It is our position that, for the time being, we do not wish to discuss the problem, which will have to be considered in a more extensive context: world peace, the Warsaw Pact, cooperation among countries with different political systems. Some day, we shall discuss the matter; we are in no hurry. For the present, NATO does not represent a problem." **

*In DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 3-1-80.
** In L'EUROPEO, Milan, 13-6-75.

Political officials have to be judged not only by their statements, but primarily by their actions, and also by the advisers that they select. From this standpoint, the action of President Ramalho Eanes in foreign policy, throughout his term in office, advised as he always has been and continues to be by the Third World promoter, Melo Antunes, is indisputably aimed at a moderate, ambiguous Third World promotion, compatible over the medium term with the Portuguese presence in NATO, but far more concerned with the North-South dialog and the new international order than with the very serious problem posed to the survival of Europe by Soviet aggressiveness.

Finally, in 1980, with the Democratic Alliance in power, Portuguese foreign policy has clearly and without ambiguity established, by words and deeds, Portugal's pro-European and pro-Western option.

[21 Jan 81, pp 4, 6]

[Text] Today we conclude the publication of the chapter on Third World promotion from Antonio Maria Pereira's book, "Portuguese Foreign Policy," soon to be published.

In the first and second parts, published in the last two issues and entitled "What Third World Promotion Is" and "Third World Promotion in Portuguese Foreign Policy," respectively, the author demonstrated how nonalined Third World promotion has, with brief interruptions, influenced Portuguese foreign policy, particularly through the action of Lt Col Melo Antunes and President Ramalho Eanes.

The first mistake of the Third World promoters who have influenced our foreign policy is that of maintaining that Portugal is a Third World country, or at least closer to the Third World than to the industrialized countries. As we have observed, this is the notion of the great ideologist of Third World promotion, presidential adviser Lt Col Melo Antunes.

Now this is untrue. Portugal, a country of intermediate development, is among the European countries the one, after Turkey, which has the lowest economic and cultural indexes, but yet it ranks far above the Third World countries. For example, whereas the average gross domestic product of the developing countries is $250 per inhabitant, and the illiteracy rate for 1970 was 74 percent in Asia and 74 percent in Africa (reaching over 80 percent in the former Portuguese colonies), in Portugal the GNP is $2,150 per inhabitant and the illiteracy rate is about 30 percent. These figures, which are unquestionably deplorable from a European standpoint, constitute, in spite of everything, an unattainable ideal for the developing countries (with the exception of the oil producing countries, insofar as the GNP per inhabitant is concerned).

Furthermore, it is important to consider that the fact that we are a European country with a European culture and with trade systems established primarily with Europe (at the rate of 60 percent, as opposed to 8 percent for the former colonies as a whole) has also contributed decisively to negating any incorporation into the group of Third World countries.

We might add (and this factor is as decisive as the preceding, or more so) that our values are Western European values, based upon democracy and human rights; unlike

the situation in most of the Third World countries, wherein autocratic regimes (of both the right and left) and systematic violations of human rights are the rule.

For all these reasons, the Third World promotion proposition of Portugal's actual incorporation, or tendency toward incorporation into the Third World countries does not correspond to the Portuguese economic, cultural and political reality; and therefore it should be condemned without reservation.

The Priorities in Foreign Policy

As we have observed, the Third World promoters ascribe to Portugal a fundamental role in the North-South dialog for the purpose of constructing the new international order. They claim that therein lies one of the highest, if not the highest priority in our foreign policy. In this respect also, the Third World promoters behave like hopeless utopians, overlooking, on the one hand, a fundamental fact associated with the present international problem: the eminent and imminent dangers threatening Europe and Western civilization from Soviet expansionism, which the armed invasion of Afghanistan has only made more obvious.

As has been stated previously, Portugal is primarily a European country, staunchly determined to live in a Western type pluralistic democracy. But Western type democracy can only survive in liberty, which is now, more than ever before, threatened by the Soviet aggressiveness, against which the Atlantic Alliance, and its armed branch, NATO, are the only defense.

On the basis of these premises, which appear indisputable to anyone not suffering from Third World promotional myopia, the question of ascertaining what the priorities in our foreign policy should be (whether Europe, the West and the defense of Western values through NATO, or the construction of the new international order) can only be answered with the first alternative.

The Unequivocal Western Option

But it is obvious, as we noted at the beginning, that Portugal cannot and should not become dissociated from the North-South dialog, and it should also make its contribution to the construction of a new, more just international order.

How, and under what conditions?

The first condition would consist of its affirming itself unequivocally as a European, Western country.

The practice pursued, especially after the third constitutional government, when Ramalho Eanes started running foreign policy, of affirming ourselves (or acting like) countries with a Third World destiny, toward the Third World nations, and as Western toward the governments of the industrialized countries, only led to a natural mistrust on the part of both as to what our real intentions were, in fact.

In order to play a leading role in Africa, Great Britain and France never had to claim to be Third World members. The example of the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, achieving a negotiated, democratic solution for Zimbabwe, which

the Labour Party members (ideologically much closer to the Third World promoters) were never capable of accomplishing, is indicative in this regard.

Once our European, Western option has been established, without Third World ambiguity, Portugal's contribution to the new international order should proceed along two paths: our action in the great international organizations, the UN and its agencies, to which we contribute financially; and through cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking African countries.

Action in the International Organizations

In the past, the Third World promotion theories led to the assumption of improper positions in the international organizations, particularly the UN and UNESCO.

During the period of the Vasco Goncalves governments, our positions were nearly always alined with those of the Group of 77; * and instructions were even given to our representatives calling for Portugal's inclusion in that group.

After the first constitutional government, Portugal unequivocally joined the group of industrialized countries. However, beginning with the presidentialist governments, the revived Third World promotion again led to ambiguous situations, with the assumption of positions that were often closer to those of the Third World countries than to those of the Western nations. During this period, specifically in relation to the problems in Southern Africa, Portugal systematically assumed positions marked by adherence to some of the most radical positions assumed there by the so-called "front line" countries.

This situation changed starting with the sixth constitutional government of the Democratic Alliance. Our country started assuming positions arrived at with the Common Market countries which, not leaving any doubt as to our inclusion in Europe, had the virtue of not causing incompatibility with the Third World countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique, on the occasions when we voted contrary to the latter.

For example, Portugal, like the other European and Third World countries (to be sure, including the former Portuguese colonies) voted to condemn South Africa for its armed intervention in Angola, but it did not join with its vote the positions assumed by Angola and Mozambique, and the other "front line" nations, when the latter refused to condemn the Soviet Union for the armed invasion of Afghanistan.

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*There are three groups of countries in the international organizations: the B group, comprised of the industrialized countries, essentially, the United States, Japan, Canada, the Common Market and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries, Spain and also Portugal; the group of 77 (which numbers 117 now), including the developing countries; and the D group, consisting of the so-called socialist countries.

As a European and Western country, Portugal, in view of its special relationship with the Portuguese-speaking African nations, is in a privileged position to establish bridges between the latter countries and the industrialized nations; and can thereby make a positive contribution to easing the tensions in Southern Africa, and to the construction of the great edifice of the new international order. This unique position of ours also represents a trump card in our foreign policy, as our friends abroad admit. In early 1980, when the top-ranking officials of the Common Market, Roy Jenkins and Lorenzo Natali, visited us, this was one of the points that they emphasized most.

However, we cannot exaggerate, as the Third World promoters attempt to do, our attitudes of solidarity with the Third World countries, especially the former Portuguese colonies. We cannot forget that Angola and Mozambique are countries integrated into the Soviet sphere, whose votes are systematically adherent to the USSR against the Western nations, even on issues (such as the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan) wherein the majority of Third World countries condemned the Soviet Union, despite their tendency to sympathize with their "natural ally."

The Third World promoters, who want to aline our position with those of the former colonies, should meditate on these statements made by Samora Machel in a recent interview: The president of Mozambique declared: "We have established, as a principle, first the socialist countries, those which backed us, and marched with us; in second place, the Nordic countries, which marched with us and aided us greatly; and, in third place, the West, Portugal." And, emphasizing his unequivocal Soviet option, Samora Machel added: "Our congress established scientific socialism; therefore, the socialist countries today are not natual allies to the People's Republic of Mozambique, they are brothers." *

If to Mozambique (and the same holds true for Angola) the first priority in foreign policy is the relations with the socialist countries, and Portugal is only the third priority, why do the Portuguese Third World promoters insist that the relations with the former colonies and the construction of the new international order should occupy a priority status in our foreign policy? At least on this point, they should learn from Samora Machel.

Cooperation With the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries

The other way in which Portugal can contribute to the new international order is through cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking African countries. We have, as no other nation does, a profound understanding of those peoples and of Southern Africa in general, and the common language represents an extraordinary means of rapprochment. In the area of intermediate technology and services, our contribution could be and already is very useful to those countries.

On the other hand, however, our economic potential is limited, which prevents us from launching grandiose projects involving large financial outlays. Anyone with basic needs at home is not in a position to divert capital that is so greatly needed for use abroad.

*In EXPRESSO, 24012-80.

However, within our limited financial means, we have succeeded, through cooperation, in making a significant contribution toward enabling the Portugese-speaking African countries to provide for some of their basic needs. Nearly 700 Portuguese cooperants, partly financed by Portugal, are collaborating in the cultural and technical take-off of those countries; hundreds of study grants have been made available; we are cooperating in the opening of a law school in Guinea-Bissau, etc. In 1979, we spent a total of 272,000 contos on cooperation, and in 1980, with the Democratic Alliance in the government, we spent 400,000 contos.

This is the proper way for Portugal to contribute, as it ought, to rapprochement with the Portuguese-speaking African countries, and, at the same time, to the construction of the new international order. Anything else is nothing but Third World promotional utopias of those who, still traumatized by the loss of the overseas areas, are unconsciously attempting to compensate for their disappointment. Obstinately turning toward Africa, they have lost the notion of the current realities, in an attempt to achieve, indirectly, the legendary Fifth Empire.

During the difficult times that are in view, it is essential that Portugal's European and Western options be maintained unequivocally. For this reason, as Freitas do Amaral recently emphasized, the Democratic Alliance's seventh government must maintain a position of constant vigilance over President Eanes, so as not to allow non-alined Third World promotion to be revived again in Portuguese foreign policy, as has occurred in the past.

The detached Nikita Khrushchev aptly commented that there are no neutrals in the present-day world. Anyone who is not for the West and for the strengthening of NATO, even though he might not be aware of it, is collaborating with the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union, whose final goal is the destruction of European civilization, based on democracy and human rights.

2909
CSO: 3101

BUILT-IN ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS OF CURRENT CONSTITUTION

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Dec 80 p 21

[Article by Francisco Sarsfield Cabra: "Our Current Constitution"]

[Text] Why does the current constitution represent an obstacle to economic progress? In a nutshell, because it imposes an unequivocal model of progressive collectivization of the economy which is incompatible with the options of most of the people, with the anticipated membership in the Common Market in Europe and with the normal activity of private initiative.

A few excerpts from the text of the constitution will serve to illustrate this concept:

"The Portuguese Republic is a democratic state (...) whose objective is to assure the transition to socialism" (Art 2).

"Basic tasks of the state are: ...c) To socialize the means of production and wealth (...)" (Art 9).

"On the economic level, the development of the revolutionary process imposes the collective appropriation of the principal means of production" (Art 10, No 2).

"The workers have the right to establish worker committees (...) aimed at strengthening the unity of the working classes and their mobilization for the revolutionary process (...)" (Art 55, No 1).

"The economic and social organization of the Portuguese Republic is based on the development of socialist production relations through the collective appropriation of the principal means of production and lands as well as the natural resources and on the exercise of democratic power by the working classes" (Art 80).

"All nationalizations carried out after 25 April 1974 are irreversible conquests by the working classes" (Art 83 No 1).

"In the transitional phase to socialism, there will be three sectors of ownership of the production means, lands and natural resources (...)"--the public, cooperative and private sectors--(Art 89, No 1).

"For the construction of a socialist economy through the ransformation of capitalist production relations and accumulation, the country's economic and social organization must be oriented, coordinated and disciplined by the plan" (Art 91, No 1).

"Agrarian reform is one of the basic instruments in the construction of a socialist society (...)" (Art 96).

"The financial system will be structured by law (...) with a view to the gradual and effective socialization of the economy" (Art 105, No 1).

"(...) it is incumbent on the state: a) To promote the control of foreign trade operations (...)" (Art 110).

"Laws of constitutional revision will have to respect... f) The principle of collective appropriation of the principal production means and lands as well as the natural resources (...) g) Democratic planning of the economy" (Art 290).

The result of Sunday's elections drastically reduced the possibility of a true constitutional revision.

I am not to blame: I did not vote for Banes.

8568
CSO: 3101

BRIEFS

SERIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION--The second series on "The Constitutional Revision" has just appeared in the magazine, DEMOCRACIA E LIBERDADE. The following individuals collaborated in this series: Barbosa de Melo, Carlos da Silva Campos, Lucas Pires, Jose Miguel Judice, Ribeiro e Castro, Barrilaro Ruas, Luis Barbosa and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. This issue completes the series of articles begun in the previous issue with the collaboration of other well-known jurists, such as Jorge Miranda and Rui Machete. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO REVISTA in Portuguese 5 Dec 80 p 48] 8568

CSO: 3101

ONLY ONE-FIFTH OF GALICIAN VOTERS APPROVE AUTONOMY STATUTE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 23 Dec 80 pp 1, 17

[Excerpts] The Galician Autonomy Statute was approved on Sunday by a meager number of voters, approximately one-fifth of Galicians entitled to vote. Only 616,526 persons went to the polls, i.e. 28.36 percent of the voters, and 19.73 percent of them did so to vote no. Despite approval of the statute, this outcome brought about mutual accusations among the main parties on Sunday night, which was spent sadly and tensely at the headquarters of the Council of Galicia.

Affirmative votes accounted for 73.35 percent of those cast. Numerous blank and void ballots turned up, apparently many of them attributable to ultrarightist voters, who wrote expressions such as "Long live Spain" on the ballot boxes. The negative votes can be attributed above all to radical nationalists, who support this option.

The UCD [Democratic Center Union] and PSOE [Spanish Socialist Worker Party] each stated separately that the affirmative vote corresponds to their respective electorates. The centrists reject the socialists' accusations that their party acted with restraint during the electoral campaign. The socialists maintain that the vote was larger in areas with leftist mayors. Moderate nationalists also share this view.

Political leaders in general, however, appeared concerned that this vote may mean a lack of popular support for negotiating the degree of autonomy with Madrid and expressed the need to consider the lack of rapport with popular initiatives, which the vote seems to indicate.

At the headquarters of the Council of Galicia, where the rumor, later denied, had even spread that the chairman would resign, no high official of the government party came forward as spokesman. Minister Pio Cabanillas returned to Madrid on the same Sunday evening after lunching in Santiago with Galician UCD leaders and after stating, just before boarding his plane, that "with less tension, more abstention." The council's chairman, Jose Quiroga, made two brief appearances to furnish information and to state [illegible] it cannot be implied from the results that the government would obstruct the process of autonomy.

Immediately after the results were known, the conflict among the various Galician parties sprang up again. The UCD and PSOE stated separately that the yes votes are theirs, while the no votes seem to correspond more to leftwing nationalists than to radical rightists forces, although there are areas in which the righwing vote may be responsible, as in the cities of El Ferrol and La Coruna and some towns with Popular Alliance mayors, such as A Pontenova (Lugo), for whose electoral district the highest abstention in all Galicia was recorded, 95.28 percent, with a negative vote of 46.78 percent, as opposed to an affirmative vote of only 23.39 percent.

Miguel Sanmartin acted as UCD spokesman, stating that there is no basis for the accusations that his party exercised restraint during the referendum campaign. The general secretary of the Galician centrists added: "Our effort was 10 times greater than those of the other parties. We mobilized a structure of 10,800 persons." This leader believes that the referendum's outcome obliges the parties to think deeply about the elections for the autonomous parliament, which are scheduled for June of next year, "because either we have stirred the politicians with our initiatives or we have not been able to motivate the people adequately."

The same self-critical tone was used by the general secretary of the Galician socialists, Francisco Vazquez, who said at 0130 early yesterday morning in the council's headquarters that "the abstention has darkened Galicia's path to autonomy" and expressed his confidence that the results of the referendum would not be used by the government to obstruct Galician autonomy and that of other peoples of Spain. "The abstention," he added, "was not only technical; it was also a reflection of the apprehension which many people feel about the current political situation." The socialists accuse the UCD of not applying itself thoroughly during the referendum campaign in view of the fact that in coastal areas, where there are many leftist and nationalist mayors, voter participation was greater than that recorded in the provinces of Lugo and Orense, districts in which the centrists exert strong control.

Ceferino Diaz, deputy general secretary of the Galician PSOE, in turn remarked that the UCD did everything possible so that the statute would not receive strong popular support: "It even went so far as to make Galician autonomy the first of second-class autonomies." In this spokesman's opinion, Galician autonomy has emerged with some margin of hope and as a challenge to autonomist forces, "which must stimulate the enthusiasm of a disillusioned people."

Galicians also attribute the high degree of abstention to the policy followed by the UCD in Galicia. "We have information," Galician Party general secretary Luis Sobrado stated, "that in Orense a certain UCD leader advocated abstention."

The low voter turnout was also discussed by officials of other parties involved in the referendum. Anxel Lexama of the Galician Communist Party believes that it will constitute a serious obstacle when the time comes to negotiate with the government. In the opinion of a Galician Popular Alliance leader, Sunday's vote does not mean that the people do not believe in autonomy, but that they distrust the politicians who are to implement it.

The nationalist parties which advocated a negative vote, basically the Galician People's National Bloc (BNPG) and the Galician Socialist Party (PSG), have expressed their satisfaction with the high percentage of votes which their initiatives received. In particular the mayor of La Coruna, Domingo Merino, a PSG member, believes that the parties which supported an affirmative vote are now in the minority.

Although political leaders have hedged in their answers, it is a certainty that the referendum's outcome is reason for deep concern among regional officials of the majority parties. There was talk on Sunday night that the council's chairman, Jose Quiroga, was resigning his post and that the UCD's Lugo chairman, Antonio Roson, was leaving politics because of the poor results obtained in his province. Both resignations were later denied.

In view of the results and the constant attacks on the UCD during the campaign, some members of this party were wondering last night whether it had been worth the trouble to amend the statute and to have waited to make a pact with other political forces. They base this argument on the poll taken by Icsa Gallup in early September for the council and which forecast a participation of 39 percent before the "hostel pact" was formalized.

Some centrist and socialist parliament members are also of the opinion that negotiations with Madrid may prove difficult with so little popular support. Such negotiations are not limited to autonomy, but also involve relations with their respective parties' leaders in the government.

	% Abstention	% Participation	% Yes	% No	% Blank/Void
La Coruna	67,88	32,12	72,63	20,72	6,65
Lugo	80,13	19,87	71,47	20,52	8,00
Orense	78,74	21,25	77,47	15,98	7,70
Pontevedra	68,23	31,77	73,40	19,56	7,04
Total	71,60	28,36	73,35	19,73	6,91
Total of Voters			20,80	5,59	1,96

This table lists the official vote figures issued by the civil governments of the four provinces. The total percentages of the last two lines are our own estimates based on the absolute number of voters, abstentions, affirmative votes, etc., after totaling those for the four provinces. It should be pointed out that these percentages do not agree with other furnished yesterday by Ministry of Interior sources to Europa Press Agency. There are also differences with respect to those of the Council of Galicia.

11915
CSO: 3101

TURKEY DISCUSSED IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 27 Jan 81 p 10

[Text] Strasbourg, Special -- The Council of Europe Political Committee met yesterday to discuss the draft resolution to be presented to the Council's General Assembly meeting scheduled for Wednesday, but failed to complete its deliberations. The committee will resume its efforts today. Meanwhile, Assembly President de Coster said at the opening session of the Council of Europe: "Evren is not a person who would hold power longer than necessary."

Developments in Turkey and the draft resolution to come from the Political Committee will be taken up at the General Assembly meeting to be held on Wednesday.

Resuming its efforts today, the Political Committee will find two draft resolutions before it. The first is the draft by Austrian parliamentarian Steiner, who prepared the report. In this draft resolution, it is first pointed out that developments in Turkey must be monitored closely and that the restoration of democracy and respect for human rights are essential preconditions for Council membership, attention is then drawn to the "need for the administration in Turkey to give a firm and detailed timetable for the return to democracy" and it is proposed that "developments in Turkey be postponed to the May session."

The second draft before the Political Committee belongs to the Belgian socialist parliamentarian Dejardin. Dejardin proposes in this draft that "Turkey's Council membership be suspended."

The general atmosphere in the Political Committee is that Dejardin's draft should not be accepted at this early stage and that Turkey's new administration should be given time. According to members attending the meetings, "Dejardin's draft doesn't have a chance." Alongside this, however, Steiner's draft is considered "soft" and new proposals are being prepared to stiffen it. Steiner's report is taken as the basis in the committee.

Developments in Turkey were also taken up in the socialist group meeting, where some criticisms were registered. A French national deputy attending this meeting said, "I do not think the Dejardin draft will pass the socialist group. The view that Turkey should be allowed a specific time predominates." The socialists are saying that [unless] they get their views accepted in the Political Committee and get the Steiner draft stiffened a little more, they will present a separate draft to the General Assembly themselves.

In particular, the socialist group heard Greek National Deputy Venizelos and Boodts, just returned from Turkey. Venizelos noted that anything he said could lead to misunderstanding because he is Greek, but said, "We know the Turks better than any of you. Developments in Turkey affect us more than any of you," and insisted that the administration in Turkey should be allowed time.

In the opening session of the first meeting of the General Assembly, which the Council of Europe holds every 3 years, Assembly President de Coster spoke of international developments and, in reference to Turkey, said, "Certain allegations are being heard. I do not have firm or precise information on these matters. I will be going to Turkey in May to make first hand observations." He pointed out that perhaps a specific pressure mechanism would be useful on the return to democracy in Turkey but said that the greatest danger was that "a good policy should be undertaken at a bad time." De Coster said that he was personally acquainted with Head of State Kenan Evren and added, "Evren is not a person who would hold on to power any longer than necessary."

Putting debate of Turkey on the Council of Europe agenda has brought representatives of many groupings within the various regions of Europe to Strasbourg. These organizations are trying to get their views across to the parliamentarians by means of bulletins, press conferences and small-scale demonstrations.

Steiner, who prepared the report on Turkey for the Council of Europe, appeared night before last on the third program of a German TV series to discuss Turkey and said:

"Expelling Turkey from the Council of Europe would remove the Council's opportunity to monitor events in Turkey. It would prevent our remaining in constant contact with the Turkish government and being able to admonish them on respect for human rights and such claims as torture, for instance. For this reason, it would be better to give them another chance and wait for signs that Turkey is accelerating the transition to democracy."

8349
CSO: 4907

ROLE OF SUPREME ARBITRATION COUNCIL EXPLORED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 18 Feb 81 p 5

[Editorial by Sukran Ketenci]

[Text] For at least a month the eyes of millions of people along with hundreds of thousands of workers and employers and their families have been focused on the Supreme Arbitration Council. A report appears almost daily in the press. One enthusiastically reads hoping perhaps to get a clue. Commentaries are made. Still it is impossible to arrive at a clear judgment as to what the Supreme Arbitration Council will introduce into employee-employer relations and how it will attain results regarding union rights. Nonetheless, giving these matters priority and discussing the pros and cons before time runs out are vital perceptions.

The Supreme Arbitration Council's paramount and important function is to determine the wages of workers whose ranks will reach at least 500,000 in the initial stage and gauge the development of workers' wages. The process designed to revalidate agreements--whether called a "collective agreement" as law makers maintain, a "disposition" as scholars designate it, or even an "edict with the force of law" that combines the Council of Ministers' prerogative to alter and generalize agreements--will determine new wages for workers. And because wage determination will be done by a single body and will encompass all workers who have concluded contracts, it carries very great significance and meaning and will spark wage disputes willy nilly.

Successful propaganda foisted on the public for years by employers has taken the attack that workers' rights--particularly in certain businesses--are progressing in a way that will harm the economy. When employers defend their thesis in which they portray workers' wages as the primary obstacle to the development of investment in Turkey, they have a tendency to use as exemplars individuals from businesses that have the most prosperous wage earners who appear to have employee status but are actually management.

Regarding real wage increases for workers, employers' unions in recent years have been quite ill-disposed to make an effort that would encompass all places of business. A tiny portion printed in the papers of the report which is still unavailable to the public prepared by Turk-Is for submission to the Council amply discloses the real situation. At present the gross wage of 45 percent of contract-holding Turk-Is members who have benefited from union

rights for years is below 15,000 lira a month. The real wages of workers who belong to Turk-Is has continually declined since 1970. In other words, excluding the army of unemployed who outnumber those with jobs and those working without contracts and for minimum wage, even the standard of living for those workers who have taken advantage of labor contracts has regressed and these individuals have progressively become impoverished.

When calculated to include the Council's 70 percent wage hike, a skilled laborer in the mining industry averages a monthly net income of 15,000 lira while that of a textile worker is around 10,000 lira. Certainly wage levels in some Turkish businesses outstrip others. But even in businesses that pay the highest wages, the attainable level here for a maximum of 200,000 or 300,000 workers is 20,000 to 25,000 lira a month computed with all social rights and overtime. But how can we make our comparison by assessing the wages of a group of workers that can only be regarded as a fortunate minority among all workers? How do wages compare with rent and the prices of food and clothing? When we attempt to do this we must first congratulate workers' families--generally having several children but receiving no other socioeconomic support--for their ability to get along on these wages.

Workers' wages cannot be compared with civil service pay or white-collar salaries. That the pay of Turkish civil servants--who do not have the right to unionization or collective bargaining--has remained very low is a separate social issue. Using this as a point of departure could never yield a result that afforded "high" wages for workers. Moreover, there are wage discrepancies throughout the world owing to difficulties in certain lines of work.

When assessing workers' wages, one must first of all remember that wages are an expression of generated value. The value that workers generate appears to us as employer profit on the management end. Since profit is the share given to the employer out of what the worker generates, a proper comparison can only be made between this share and workers' wages: a comparison which, we believe, no employer in Turkey would dare make.

Therefore, let us turn to a scientific forum using a realistic and sound approach that dealt with the work of the Supreme Arbitration Council. Let us simply relate the view agreed upon by the minister of labor, employer representatives, and labor lawyers at this forum held at Istanbul University.... "If the Supreme Arbitration Council, while setting workers' wages, is going to improve those wages with a view to the economic benefit, then the same improvement--along parallel lines--must be afforded prices. Attempting to improve wages without the ability to check price hikes can result in very dangerous consequences and social upheaval."

CSO: 4907

STATUS OF TURKISH WORKERS IN GERMANY EXAMINED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 27 Jan 81 p 8

[Text] Ankara (HURRIYET) -- German social consultants will come to Turkey in order to see and observe first hand Turkish mores, customs and traditions so that they may have a better understanding of the more than 1.8 million Turkish workers and their families in Germany and may be of more help to the families of Turkish workers.

Agreement was reached in this regard between German authorities and authorities of our Labor Ministry. Both men and women will be among the social consultants which the German government will send. They will observe first hand the differences between the lives, mores, customs and traditions in Turkish and German families and society. Thus they will better understand the Turkish workers and their families living in Germany and will try to improve their mutual relationships.

Meanwhile, the necessary facilities are being shown Turkish workers now employed in Germany as to the visa implementation. By a decision of the EC Partnership Commission which entered into effect on 1 December 1980, the waiting period for the wives of workers in Germany was reduced from 4 years to 3 years and in this way upwards of 25,000 Turkish women have found jobs in Germany. With the harsh winter conditions and growing unemployment in Germany, it is considered an accomplishment that more than 25,000 Turkish women have jobs.

New Gains for Our Workers

Meanwhile, as the result of joint talks and contacts between Turkish and German officials, our workers have been assured gains of 1 billion marks per year in the West German labor courts with the acceptance of free translation and interpreting for Turks. Our workers have at least 5,000 cases per year in the labor courts and have been paying at least 1 billion marks for these cases. As a result of the new agreement, the cost of translation and interpretation for Turkish workers will be paid by the German government.

Moreover, agreement was reached between authorities of the two governments on the development of the social services required for our workers. According to this agreement, the German government will provide new social workers for Turks and agreed on the need of at least 234 case workers, instead of the present 1, per 6,500 Turkish workers.

45,927 of Our Workers Jobless

Reports coming to the Labor Ministry from Germany reveal that the unexpectedly hard winter this year in Germany has created a great deal of unemployment and loss of work. According to the reports, steady snowfall and below-zero temperatures have caused much unemployment and delay in outdoor jobs, and the number of foreign jobless among Germany's present 967,300 unemployed is shown as 123,000 with 45,927 of them Turks.

Meanwhile, the number of Turkish workers is growing as the children of our workers living in Germany enter the labor force. Between 5,000 and 6,000 children of Turkish workers join the German labor market each month.

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CSO: 4907

ALL ANKARA TERRORIST LEADERS UNDER ARREST

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 3 Feb 81 pp 1,9

ANKARA BUREAU -- The Ankara Martial Law Command published a communique yesterday announcing that "all of the leadership cadres of the illegal organizations in the Ankara area have been arrested." The notice also touched on the status of the unions and said, "Union lords who misappropriate the fruits of the Turkish worker's labors will not escape an accounting before justice."

Communique No 5 published by the IV Corps and Ankara, Cankiri and Kastamonu Provinces Martial Law Command said the following:

"All of the leadership cadres of the terrorists belonging to illegal organizations whose goal was to deliver the great Turkish nation into the hands of suspicion, doubt and hopelessness and whose headquarters were in the Ankara area have been arrested by security forces.

"Immediately after these arrests, when only a few persons among security authorities knew about them in fact, strong protest messages from individuals and organizations which are extensions of the illegal organizations and whose imported ideological leanings and propensity for Turkish separatism have long been known began arriving at the command, complaining of various types of force being used against the prisoners. These letters will take their place in history as documents betraying the foreign ties of the illegal organizations. The provocation and encouragement of foreign intervention in Turkish justice of those who would deceive the public with their slogan "Full Independence for Turkey" will stand as a palpable warning to others when they are sent before justice to account for their crimes.

"The great Turkish nation will see henceforth these soldiers of fortune, who imagine the state to be illegitimate and themselves to be legitimate, who get the appearance of strength from the ignorance of hiding in dark corridors, in the bright light of day and will behold how wretched and impotent these persons are, these creatures of darkness whose ambition was to direct the nation against its will by terror.

"After seeing with their own eyes and evaluating this cadre divested of its charisma, if there are those who intentionally or unintentionally have given them material or moral support and aid, it will be on their own consciences.

"In this connection, however, union lords who have appropriated the hard-won fruits of the Turkish worker's labor, without his knowledge and against his will, to the purposes of this cadre will not escape an accounting of their actions before justice.

"Lists will be posted from time to time of the names which emerge from statements made by the arrested leaders of illegal organizations and for which no addresses are known at present and they will be summoned to defend these allegations before justice.

"The devoted efforts of the security forces which, working so as not to disrupt social tranquillity and public order, sought out and arrested one by one the terrorists who were working in secret cells within society -- and, in this context, whose destruction was attempted through deliberate false accusations by the organizations which felt them closing in -- will find their true place and appreciation in the hearts of a grateful nation.

"To the inhabitants of the region, all of whom took their places wholeheartedly beside the security forces with common sense and patience in this ploy which was perpetrated on the fate of the Republic of Turkey and to the teachers who enlightened their students, protecting them from victimization by the anarchists, I present my thanks and respect on behalf of the security forces."

"Recep Ergun, Lieutenant General"

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CSO: 4907

REVISIONS MADE IN PENAL, PROCEDURAL LAWS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 8, 9 Jan 81

[8 Jan 81, p 6]

[Text] Ankara--Law bills that amend the CMUK [Criminal Courts Procedural Law] and the TCK [Turkish Penal Code] were discussed and passed at yesterday's National Security Council meeting.

The principles related to changes in the TCK will be announced tomorrow.

However, according to information that has been obtained, an article that has been approved raises the penalties that will be imposed on criminals 18 years of age and under. It was decided that those from the age of 15 through 18 will receive, in lieu of the death penalty, sentences of imprisonment at hard labor for 25 years or more rather than for 20 years as in the past. Imprisonment at hard labor for 15 years, which replaces life imprisonment for minors, will be increased to 20-25 years. Other penalties are raised by two-thirds by the same article.

Penalties that are cited in other articles of the law are also increased. In cases of recidivism, a statute has been included to allow prior crimes to be scrutinized and to be able to raise penalties imposed by up to four times. In addition, the penalty can be raised even further for those who commit crimes against the state.

CMUK Amendments

Under changes made in the CMUK, in urgent cases, hearings of suspects and witnesses of incidents will be able to be held by police forces at the request of the attorney general. Reorganization that is being carried out for the purpose of completing judicial affairs expeditiously applies new principles to suspects' rejection of a judge in the courts.

In cases in which rejection of the judge occurs during the hearing, that session of the hearing will be continued even if there must be a delay or postponement in order to be able to reach a decision on the rejection. The

claims and statements of the parties that seek to reject the judge will be heard, and a future session will not be begun by the judge who is being rejected or in his presence before a decision is made.

If the request to reject the judge is not made in time, if no reason or credible evidence is provided, or if it is obvious that the purpose of the request is to prolong the hearing, a request to reject the judge submitted at the final stage of the investigation will not be approved. In these cases, the rejection request will be sent back by the judge himself if it is a one-judge court or by the rejected judge in cooperation with the other judges in courts where there are panels of judges.

Another article of the bill that has been adopted gives, in urgent cases, the courts and the examining magistrate the authority to issue summons to appear in court to prisoners and to suspects without having received such a request. However, the reasons for issuing the summons in this manner must be cited.

In cases of communal crimes committed by a minimum of three persons and when there is an abundance of witnesses, a suspect will be brought before a magistrate within a maximum of 15 days following completion of the initial hearing. However, the police will not be able to hold a suspect longer than 48 hours without a written order from the attorney general, a magistrate, or examining magistrate if there appears to be an objection to a delay. A new statute in the bill makes all police officials and employees responsible for carrying out the attorney general's orders in areas concerning justice. These orders may be verbal or written. Police forces will see to it that prisoners and, in urgent cases, suspects and witnesses are present during preliminary hearings on the date and at the time stated on the written orders received from the attorney general.

If a suspect flees after a decision is reached to have him arrested for a crime different from the one for which he is then being tried, the trial will continue and be completed in his absence provided that he had been questioned during the hearing and that the court does not deem his presence necessary. If it is believed that a person who has caused incidents in court will create an incident at a forthcoming hearing, the court may decide to continue the hearing in his absence.

Furthermore, for crimes that come under the jurisdiction of the minor courts for petty offenses, the magistrate may issue a decision through a certificate of penalty without holding a hearing. These certificates of penalty can only issue light or heavy monetary fines or imprisonment without hard labor for a maximum of 3 months or call for suspension of professional or occupational activity for a period of time or confiscation of goods.

[9 Jan 81, p 6]

[Text] Ankara--Under statutes of the law amending Article 17 of the TCK that was approved by the National Security Council the day before yesterday and that becomes effective upon publication in the RESMI GAZETE, officials responsible for convicts or prisoners who help prisoners or convicts to escape will be sentenced to imprisonment of up to 15 years. An amendment to another article of the law, which declares that rioting against the administration in a prison will result in sentences of up to 7 years, imposes a sentence of a year in solitary confinement on escapees who are serving life sentences.

The major statutes of the new law that makes changes in the TCK are:

[1.] An offense that results only in a monetary fine or a misdemeanor whose penalty does not exceed a maximum of a month of imprisonment without hard labor will not be brought to trial provided that the minimum fine or the monetary equivalent of the lowest limit shown in the executive law for each day of the minimum sentence for the offense is paid together with investigation costs within 10 days of notification.

[2.] If three or more civil servants abandon their jobs, fail to report to work, or, having gone to work, refuse to work or do engage in a slowdown, each will be sentenced to imprisonment of 4 months to a year and fined 2,000-10,000 liras. They will also be deprived of the right to serve as civil servants in the future.

[3.] Civil servants who commit this crime by carrying out decisions reached by others or communiques that are published will be subject to the same penalties.

If these crimes are committed as a result of decisions reached by officials of a society or occupational organization, those who made the decisions or published the communiques will be sentenced to 1-3 years' imprisonment and fined 3,000-10,000 liras. If these persons are civil servants, they may never serve as civil servants again.

[4.] Penalties for prison escapes have been raised. Escaped convicts and suspects will, upon recapture, be sentenced to cell confinement for 1-2 years and will have their remaining sentences increased by from one-sixth to one-half.

[5.] Officials who play a role in a prison escape will be sentenced to 1-15 years' imprisonment.

[6.] Persons who publicly incite commission of a crime will be sentenced to imprisonment of between 3 months and 5 years depending on the crime that has been encouraged.

[7.] Persons who praise actions that the law considers to be crimes will be sentenced to imprisonment of between 6 months and 2 years.

[8.] Persons who incite the people by pointing out class, religious, racial, doctrinal, or regional differences will be sentenced to 1-3 years' imprisonment and fined 3,000-12,000 liras.

[9.] Persons who murder a family member by means of poison will be sentenced to life imprisonment.

[10.] Murder of a Turkish Grand National Assembly member who has completed his term and the murder of a state employee following completion of service because of what these persons did while in office are subject to the death penalty.

[11.] Persons who obliterate or deface signs, both printed and unprinted, that exist on walls will be sentenced to 3-6 months' imprisonment and a fine of not less than 1,000 liras.

[12.] Those who post or put up on walls posters, communiques, or placards, both printed and unprinted, without receiving permission will be sentenced to 1-2 years' imprisonment and a fine of not less than 5,000 liras. If these crimes are committed on behalf of a society or organization, the penalties will be doubled.

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9 March 1981